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A bstract
This dissertation explores Nietzsche's political theory through an 
analysis of his major work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is demonstrated that 
the narrative structure of Zarathustra follows from a politically-grounded 
critique of collective human existence. Nietzsche critiques the state and 
mass society as inherently repressive. He critiques the concept of the 
community and friendship as producing ressentiment and bad conscience. 
One of the central metaphors in Zarathustra proves to be that of nausea, 
arising from contempt for the mediocre masses of humanity and the 
realization of the chaotic and contingent nature of existence. Through 
nausea, the individual necessarily becomes separated from the masses and 
is able to begin the process of constructing an individually-actuated 
selfhood. Nietzsche then discusses the possibility of self-creation, spurred 
by the confrontation with individual finitude. This project of self­
overcoming proceeds thorough an aesthetic ethics of resistance to repression 
and acts of protean creation. Nietzsche's theory of transmuted selfhood is 
one that embraces multiplicity and contradiction within the consciousness.
It is ultimately shown that the model of selfhood presented in Zarathustra 
depends upon resistance and solitude, thus precluding the possibility of 
constructive political theory in the traditional statist sense. Rather, 
Nietzsche's relevance for politics is the imperative to seek new permutations 
of personal existence.
iv
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Chapter I 
N ietzsche a n d  Political Th ough t 
Nietzsche has received a great deal of attention in recent years and 
has had a profound influence over contemporary scholarship. However, 
there has been less attention paid to Nietzsche in political theory than in 
other areas of the humanities. Despite the dearth of literature addressed to 
Nietzsche's political thought, there is surprisingly little consensus as to its 
content Interpretations range from the assertion that Nietzsche was a 
deeply political thinker concerned with the institutional arrangements of the 
state to the rival interpretation that Nietzsche had little political interest 
outside of the internal struggle within die individual soul. Certainly textual 
support can be found for both of these assertions, with a broad intermediate 
ground lying in between. The lack of unanimity concerning Nietzsche's 
political thought is troubling as Nietzsche had a profound impact upon 
most contemporary political thinkers and has helped to shape postmodern 
thought
This project is designed to remedy a serious omission in the political 
literature on Nietzsche. The ambiguity regarding Nietzsche's political 
thought is largely an artifact of the strategies and presuppositions of the 
interpreters of his texts rattier than an accurate representation of Nietzsche's 
political reflections. This project will demonstrate that Nietzsche's political 
thought is not as fragmented and contradictory as the literature suggests.
1
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2Rather, Nietzsche's political and social thought is relatively coherent and 
follows from his epistemological and ontological project The 
misunderstanding of Nietzsche's political thought is largely due to the 
stubborn neglect by political theorists of Nietzsche's major work, Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra.
This project will demonstrate that Zarathustra is Nietzsche's most 
important contribution to political thought and provides the key for 
interpretation of Nietzsche's thought as a whole. It is only in Zarathustra 
that Nietzsche, freed from the constraint of conventional philosophical 
discourse, is able to discuss his own very unconventional theories of 
philosophical anthropology and the creation of the individual self. It will be 
shown that Zarathustra bridges Nietzsche's early praise of Homeric 
societies and the mediating force of tragedy with his later discussions of the 
transmuted self and the ethic of resistance to societal norms and institutions. 
Without referring to Zarathustra, it is ultimately impossible to understand 
Nietzsche in any but a fragmented and superficial fashion.
Furthermore, by concentrating on Zarathustra, it is possible to 
examine Nietzsche at his own self-proclaimed best As the culmination of 
his mature philosophy, Zarathustra represents the opportunity to study 
Nietzsche's political theory most accurately. As such, studying Nietzsche 
through an interpretation of his narrative most closely resembles die
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
interpretive exercise Nietzsche called for in his philosophy. Therefore, this 
dissertation represents an attempt to meet Nietzsche on his own terms.
It will be shown that Nietzsche constructed Zarathustra as a 
deliberate critique of traditional political institutions and practices. Indeed, 
it will be demonstrated that Nietzsche chose the narrative format in order to 
avoid the linguistic and stylistic constraints of conventional philosophical 
discourse. As such, Zarathustra represents a unique challenge: it is 
Nietzsche at his finest both philosophically and rhetorically. However, it is 
also Nietzsche at his most problematic and evasive.
L
Not surprisingly, the question of Nietzsche's political theory has 
engendered a formidable scholarly debate. It is necessary to penetrate the 
debate and determine the main currents of thought underlying the most 
influential interpretations of Nietzsche's political theory. This review will 
demonstrate that the literature on Nietzsche's political thought does indeed 
suffer from inattention to Zarathustra; and will detail the interpretations 
that will be criticized and elaborated upon by the substantive discussion of 
Zarathustra.
There has been a great amount of work on Nietzsche, but most have 
been only marginally successful or wrongheaded. This is primarily because 
they have not sought to understand Nietzsche in his own terms, but try to 
make Nietzsche conform to traditional models and terminology of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4traditional political theory. In attempting to pigeonhole Nietzsche's political 
reflections into the categories familiar to conventional state-centered 
political theory, the radical elements of his political message are 
simultaneously distorted and emphasized. This phenomenon is illuminated 
by the tendency of political interpreters of Nietzsche to cluster around two 
fundamental themes.
Paradoxically, these fall into two antithetical categories, statist and 
apolitical. Statist interpretations, including Strong and Ansell-Pearson, try 
to find a positive political theory of the state in Nietzsche's philosophy.1 
Generally, these interpretations identify new institutions, new social norms, 
and tend to stress Nietzsche's affinity with the ancient Greek heroic state. In 
these interpretations Nietzsche is acknowledged as a critic of the modem 
nation-state, but they emphasize that Nietzsche envisions a new model of 
society to replace the flawed political system of modernity. Interestingly, 
these interpretations tend to stress the early works of Nietzsche and neglect 
the aphoristic works.
Apolitical interpretations, including Thiele, Heidegger, and 
Klossowski, argue that Nietzsche does not present a comprehensive political
1 Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f Transfiguration (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1974), Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political 
Thinker The Perfect N ihilist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5theory.2 Rather, Nietzsche presents a critique of politics and political theory 
that is so scathing and complete that it is impossible to rejuvenate politics. 
Generally, these interpreters argue that Nietzsche envisions all human 
interaction as essentially repressive and given to creating self-replicating 
mechanisms of oppression. These interpretations stress the destructive 
aspects of force, the specter of Nihilism, and imply that Nietzsche's 
philosophy is either completely inimical to politics or a form of aristocratic 
individualism. These interpretations rely upon the aphoristic and later 
works to support their conclusions.
In order to set the stage for the analysis of Zarathustra, it is necessary 
to explore these interpretations to discern the important controversies that 
may be answered by this analysis of Zarathustra. In keeping with the 
central theme of this dissertation, Nietzsche's theories on the constitution 
and origin of the concrete self, this literature review will primarily 
concentrate on this theme as it has been explored in the political literature 
on Nietzsche. This often takes form of discussion of the enigmatic concept 
of the Vbermensch?
2 Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul. A Study o f Heroic 
Individualism  (Princeton University Press, 1990), Martin Heidegger "Who is Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra?" in ed. David Allison The New Nietzsche (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 
Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 4 vob. trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 
1979), Pierre fdossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
3 Nietzsche's prose is elegant and readily translates. However, it is simply impossible to 
translate the vicissitudes of the German language, especially the loaded terms common to 
philosophical discourse. Indeed, mistranslation of Nietzsche's key terms has led to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Tracy Strong elaborated one of the first interpretations specifically 
devoted to Nietzsche's political theory. Strong attributes to Nietzsche a 
"politics of transfiguration/' which has as its goal "the development of 
beings who do not simply live as human-all-too-human." 4 This striking 
transfiguration requires "a change in the very stuff of humanity."5 Strong's 
argument is based upon an interpretation of Nietzsche's project for 
humanity that argues for the production of a successor species for man.
Man is not only overcome, he is replaced.
Strong contends Nietzsche envisioned that this transfiguration would 
occur within a political system. He acknowledges Nietzsche's attacks on the 
state, but contends that "to assert. . .  that Nietzsche attacks politics is to 
miss the key point This is not a specifically anti-political doctrine "6 Strong 
contends that Nietzsche is reacting specifically to the modem nation-state,
common misconceptions of his philosophy. Accordingly, I have endeavored to leave 
untranslated those terms which can not be clearly rendered into English. These include 
such words as Obermensch or words whose English equivalents have a different 
connotation, such as Dekadenz Words with multiple English equivalents, such as Geist, 
have been dealt with as accurately as possible, considering the complexity of the text 
Except where I quote directly from sources, I render W ille zur Macht hyphenated as "will- 
to-power," following the practice of Bemd Magnus, in order to emphasize the essential 
unity of phrase which does not come across otherwise. However carefully it is attempted, 
translation is always an interpretive exercise and fraught with danger. No amount of 
linguistic knowledge or skill can replace or accurately simulate the raw force of Also Sprach 
Zarathustra in German.
4 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Polities o f Transfiguration. 13.
5 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Polities o f Transfiguration, 260.
6 Tracy Strong, "Nietzsche and Politics" in Nietzsche: A  Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. 
Robert Solomon (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 283.
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7which is a "concretization of only slave morality."7 Rather, Nietzsche
envisions a state similar to the ancient Greek poliso t Homeric heroic
societies, which lauded the triumph of the exceptional individual. Although
these two models are drastically different from one another, they both have
a common element
For Nietzsche, the development of society which is not its own 
rationale and therefore does not permit of a nihilistic self- 
consciousness must come from or at least be co-equal with the 
appearance of men who do not share the ontological problems of the 
present men and their society.8
For Strong, Nietzsche's politics starts with the individual, but must 
necessarily end with the social. Indeed, these individuals might not arise at 
all without the presence of the state. This interpretation relies heavily upon 
Nietzsche's early essay "The Greek State," in which Nietzsche praises heroic 
society. Such themes can also be detected in The Birth of Tragedy.
However, Nietzsche's later works, including Zarathustra, do not seem as 
optimistic regarding the general theme of the state, much less the creation of 
an "ideal society."
The most disturbing element of Strong's interpretation, however, is 
the insistence on the actual transfiguration of humankind. The thesis of this 
argument might be called into doubt through the reading of some of 
Nietzsche's later works, specifically The Antichrist
7 Strong, "Nietzsche and Politics," 283.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed mankind in the 
sequence of living beings (man as an end), but what type of man shall 
be bred, shall be willed, for being higher in value, worthier of life, 
more certain of a future. Even in the past this higher type has 
appeared often—but as a fortunate accident, as an exception, never as 
something willed?
Through analysis of Zarathustra, a work largely ignored by Strong, it 
will become clear that Nietzsche is arguing that the concept of the 
Obermensch is to be used as a guide for willing the exceptional human, not 
for replacing the species in a concrete, eugenic sense. The exceptional 
human must arise from self-mastery and self-overcoming. It remains a 
dubious assertion, or at least unclear, that Nietzsche had a biological or 
evolutionary model in mind for the production of this individual. Most 
prominent Nietzsche scholars differ with Strong's interpretation.
Danto's examination of the concept of the Obermensch is at odds 
with Strong's. "The Obermensch. . .  is not the blond giant dominating his 
lesser fellows. He is merely a joyous, guiltless, free human being, in 
possession of instinctual drives which do not overpower him.10 Beyond 
these traits, Nietzsche gives little specific information. Danto concludes that 
Nietzsche left the idea of the Obermensch "as a variable and not a constant,
8 Strong, "Nietzsche and Politics," 290.
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist trans. Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable N ietzsche 
(New York Viking, 1962), »3.
10 Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, (New York Columbia University Press, 1965), 199.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to be given a value by those of us who are to achieve it"11 However, Danto 
acknowledges that this ambiguity has left the concept open to be interpreted 
as one advocating "brute exercise of strength," especially considering some 
of the illustrations that Nietzsche employs, such as Cesare Borgia.
Dannhauser describes the Obermensch as Nietzsche's project for the 
future development of humanity. The Obermensch is both the fulfillment 
and the transcendence of previously conceived ideals of man. However, he 
asserts that the concept of the Obermensch is "necessarily vague and 
ambiguous . . .  the superman cannot be fully described because he will be 
above all a true self. Every superman will be unique.12 Dannhauser 
concludes that Nietzsche does not give a political solution to achieve the 
realization of the Obermensch. Nietzsche instead offers an apolitical road to 
achieving the Obermensch, which Dannhauser refers to as "radical 
individualism." This is evident in Nietzsche calling for the potential 
Obermensch to become "true selves. . .  to seek solitude, to flee from public 
life, to reject established modes of conduct and thought"13
Keith Ansell-Pearson contends that Nietzsche advocates the "great 
politics" of aristocratic radicalism in the face of the "petty7' politics of
11 Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, 200.
12 Werner J. Dannhauser, "Friedrich Nietzsche," in H istory o f Political Philosophy, ed. Leo 
Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 847.
13 Dannhauser, "Friedrich Nietzsche," 847.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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European nationalism. Ansell-Pearson stresses that the individualism 
advocated by Nietzsche is an aristocratic, not a liberal, notion. "As he 
himself tells us, his philosophy 'aims at an ordering of rank, not an 
individualistic morality/"14 Individuals can only attain value by "placing 
themselves in the service of the culture (which for him means the cultivation 
of great human beings), and by representing. . .  the ascending forces of 
'life'"15 Like Strong, Ansell-Pearson looks to "The Greek State" and The 
Birth o f Tragedy for an articulation of Nietzsche's political theory. "In it we 
find a clear expression of Nietzsche's political theory, with its emphasis on 
political life as a means to the production of great human beings and 
culture."16
Ansell-Pearson ultimately argues that Nietzsche's political theory is
designed to produce individuals capable of producing new philosophical
legislation to bring the masses into line, a postmodern Philosopher King:
Nietzsche's thinking on politics. . .  is best seen as an attempt to 
understand how the conditions can be cultivated for man to undergo 
further development and advancement in the epoch of the death of 
God and the advent of nihilism. His preoccupation with politics is 
thus neither accidental nor peripheral to his concerns, but can be seen 
to arise in a very fundamental sense from his teaching on redemption 
and from his reflections on the destiny of the soul. An important 
aspect of the attempt to think through the problem of nihilism is the 
need to develop an understanding of how new values can be created
14 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political Thinker, 11.
15 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political Thinker, 11.
16 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political Thinker, 63.
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and fashioned through the conjunction of philosophical legislation 
and political power.17
Importantly, Ansell-Pearson argues that this exceptional individual is 
not a eugenic notion, but an individual accomplishment, citing passages in 
Ecce Homo to this effect "The Obermensch is not in any way to be 
conceived along Darwinian lines or as representing a transcendental ideal..
. posited in terms of an infinite future beyond the reach of mere mortals."18 
However, Ansell-Pearson consistently argues that Nietzsche asserts the 
Obermensch can only arise within a societal context
Bruce Detwiler argues that Nietzsche's political significance rests in 
"aristocratic radicalism." The death of God offered an opportunity to the 
Dionysian artist-philosopher to emerge and take his rightful place at the 
forefront of the creation of a new culture.19 Detwiler argues that one of 
Nietzsche's fundamental points is that philosophy is an inherently artistic 
endeavor, a contention that has profound societal implications. Nietzsche 
argues that the worth of a philosopher is not found in discovering new 
truths, but in the creation of new values. This artist philosopher is impelled 
by the will-to-power to set for himself the artistic goal of a higher humanity.
17 Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 201.
18 Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political Thinker, 106. Danto 
makes a similar point, Nietzsche as Philosopher, 200.
19 Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics o f Aristocratic Radicalism  (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990), 99.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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This search involves a "philosophy of becoming and self-overcoming" and 
involves "periodically discarding one's intellectual commitments."20 
Detwiler concludes that the political implication of Nietzsche's thought 
involves an aristocratic political order governed by a ruling caste of artist- 
philosophers.
Mark Warren employs an interesting, albeit questionable, distinction 
in the analysis of Nietzsche and the political. Rather than discussing 
Nietzsche's political thought as a whole, he makes a sharp distinction 
between Nietzsche's political philosophy and his "philosophy of power."21 
Warren asserts that Nietzsche's political philosophy does not warrant 
serious consideration, as it is encompassed within Nietzsche's "philosophy 
of agency" and his larger critique of Western culture. Nevertheless, Warren 
ultimately characterizes Nietzsche's politics as "neoaristocratic 
conservatism."22 Warren undertakes a thorough discussion of various 
permutations of the will-to-power, and the political ramifications of each. 
Warren ultimately finds that Nietzsche's philosophy of power leads to a 
valid and useful "framework for a critically postmodern political
20 Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics o f Aristocratic Radicalism, 170.
21 Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 1-8,207- 
223.
22 Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought 211.
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philosophy."23 Warren's conclusion is somewhat paradoxical, given his 
bifurcated analysis of Nietzsche's political philosophy. As such, his analysis 
is rather confusing and overly concretized.
The apolitical interpretations of Nietzsche are exemplified by Leslie 
Paul Thiele, who offers one of the most perceptive studies of Nietzsche. 
Thiele focuses upon Nietzsche's "politics of the soul." Thiele contends that 
Nietzsche viewed the individual self as a multiplicity, composed of an 
unique composition of drives. This internal regime forms the stage for the 
politics of the soul. "The individual is a law unto himself, unpredictable 
and unmanageable."24 As such, a true individual can never be part of a 
society, which requires "members" conditioned to conform to societal 
norms.
"The purpose of the state, according to Nietzsche, ought to be the
cultivation of individuals, but this is never the case."25 The state and society
seek to make the individual conform, by their very nature they can not do
otherwise. Such would be inimical to their existence:
Ultimately, the strong individual is a product of the struggle with his 
own isolation. Political affairs are at best a distraction from this task, 
and at worst its greatest inhibitor. To be antipolitical, as Nietzsche 
considered himself, is the mark of individuality. For the worthiest
23 Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought, 207.
24 Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul, 38.
25 Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul 417.
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struggle is not waged within the public realm. True heroism, 
according to Nietzsche, stakes its agonal thirst within the soul.26
Haar questions whether the Obermensch should be seen as "some
sort of highest type of man, the perfect embodiment of the essence of man,
or as a species higher than man. . .  as some living being other than man."27
Haar concludes that the Obermensch is "an attempt at something which is
no longer man," yet he is not a myth; he is an "economical exigence of the
Will to Power." As such, the Obermensch is as different from man as man is
from the animals. The Obermensch does not fulfill humanity, he fulfills that
which "in humanity is more originary than humanity," the will-to-power.
Thus the Obermensch is the fulfillment of the essence of life, not merely the
essence of man.28
Heidegger argues that Nietzsche identifies the essence of
contemporary humanity as incapable of correctly relating to "Being," i.e. the
will-to-power. Indeed, humanity in its present form is radically estranged
from its own essence—a type of ontological inauthenticity similar to
Heidegger's analysis in Sein undZeit Heidegger asserts that the
Obermensch is more than a new expression of the heroic personality or even
an existential attitude, it is a new permutation of ontological relation:
26 Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul, 47.
27 Michel Haar, "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language," in The New Nietzsche, ed. David 
B. Allison, (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of technology Press, 1965), 25.
28 Haar, "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language," 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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With the name overman Nietzsche is by no means designating a 
merely superdimensional human being of the kind that has prevailed 
hitherto. Nor is he referring to a species of man that will cast off all 
that is humane, making naked willfulness its law and titanic rage its 
rule.29
Heidegger asserts that Nietzsche realizes humanity is no longer in 
proper relation to the "being of Beings," again understood as the will-to- 
power. This ontological estrangement is the cause of modem Dekadenz?0 
The Ubermensch is therefore the reawakening of the innate constitution of 
human ontology, which has become repressed (forgotten) through centuries 
of doctrinal and philosophical error
. . .  the overman—taking die word quite literally—is that human 
being that goes beyond prior humanity solely in order to conduct 
such humanity for the first time to its essence, an essence that is still 
unattained, and to place humanity firm ly within that essence?1
For Heidegger, Nietzsche understands this ontological problem as a
value judgement "The question asks: Is man, in his essence as man
heretofore, prepared to assume dominion over the earth?"32 Nietzsche of
course answers in the negative. The question, then, is how to rectify this
29 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215.
30 Nietzsche's use of the term Dekadenz does not correspond to the English "decadence." 
Rather, Dekadenz connotes decay, both individual and cultural, not hedonism. As such, I 
have left it untranslated. This concept is discussed fully in Chapter Three.
31 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215. Italics mine.
32 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215.
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ontological alienation. The answer, and the problem, is to be found in
transcendence. Heidegger asks of Nietzsche:
Must not prior man be conducted beyond himself, aver his prior self, 
in order to meet this challenge? If so, die 'over-man/ correctly 
thought, cannot be the product of an unbridled and degenerate 
fantasy that is plunging headlong into the world.33
Heidegger therefore argues that Nietzsche's political project must
remain ambiguous as he proceeds from an ontologically clouded
perspective. Nietzsche is unable to present a political theory because he is
unable to conceive of an authentic relation to Being. As such, an authentic,
non-repressive model for society eludes Nietzsche.
Daniel Conway's interpretation of Nietzsche's political thought can
be viewed as occupying the middle ground between the statist and
apolitical interpretations. Conway sees Nietzsche's political goal as the
perfection of the human being, not its replacement This perfection is best
served by the concentration of resources upon those few individuals who
show the possibility of becoming great "Throughout his productive career,
Nietzsche's political thinking centers around a simple, yet powerful, diesis:
human existence is justified only by the presence of those exemplary
individuals who re-define the horizons of human perfectibility."34
33 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215-216.
34 Daniel W. Conway, Nietzsche and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1997), 7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A community of these exemplary creatures does not look like a
modem state, with its leveling and normalizing mechanisms. However,
there is a community. This is not a community based upon some universal
ethical principle or rational systems of legislation, but rather upon a new
type of ethics. "[T]he founding labors of the Obermensch create a
community of friends in the particularly Nietzschean sense, of fellow
travelers who share a common aesthetic sensibility, who mutually elevate
one another through conflict and contest"35
Conway's assertion that the Obermensch can participate in a
community of friends is an intriguing notion, given the common
interpretation of the Obermensch as the quintessential anti-social
personality. Indeed, it must be asked whether the Obermensch, given the
characteristics described above, could exist in any state, whether composed
of equals or inferiors. Alasdair MacIntyre mirrors this concern in his
description of the Obermensch:
[T]he man who transcends, finds his good nowhere in the social 
world to date, but only in that in himself which dictates his new law 
and his own new table of the virtues. . .  (T]he great man cannot enter 
into relationships mediated by appeal to shared standards or virtues 
or goods; he is his own only authority and his relationships to others 
have to be exercises of that authority.36
35 Conway, Nietzsche and the Political, 24.
36 Alasdair MacIntyre, A fter Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1986), 257- 
258.
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This question of community raised by Conway retains its legitimacy 
even if Nietzsche is taken to offer an essentially individualistic, separatist 
politics. Humans will always have contact with the "other." Perhaps the 
answer to this question is to be found in Nietzsche's conception of 
friendship. This concept is scarcely mentioned in Nietzsche's works, and 
then it is mentioned most prominently in Zarathustra. Nietzsche's 
conception of friendship is coupled with the idea of contempt; one can only 
love another if one can have an equal amount of contempt Therefore, one 
can only be a friend with an equal.37 Because of these important concerns, 
the concept of friendship will be analyzed in detail in this dissertation.
This review of the literature is by no means complete. However, it 
has illuminated many of the main currents within the political 
interpretations of Nietzsche. An evaluation of these interpretations is 
difficult Each is well argued and scholarly. However, the arguments 
advanced by Strong and Ansell-Pearson seem to have serious problems. It 
is one thing to argue that Nietzsche envisioned a heroic Community, it is 
quite another to argue that Nietzsche advanced the idea that there should be 
positive state intervention to produce higher individuals. Thiele is correct in
37 This conception of friendship obviously parallels Aristotle's discussion of friendship as 
found in the Ethics. Conway's argument is persuasive, more so than the type of 
community that Strong discusses. Strong and Ansell-Pearson imply that Nietzsche 
envisioned an activist state with a positive goal of the creation of ubermenschen. This is 
drastically different from a community of like-minded individuals, and will be discussed in 
Chapter Four.
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asserting that this was an ideal Nietzsche did not believe would be 
implemented, or even possible. Instead, it will be demonstrated that 
Nietzsche's political theory is centered on the individual quest for self- 
mastery and ultimately self-creation.38
It is critical to note an enduring trend in Nietzsche literature, 
especially relevant for political interpretations. The content of these 
interpretations is largely tied to the texts that are relied upon. The 
interpretations that cast Nietzsche in a statist lights Strong and Ansell- 
Pearson, tend to rely upon early texts. Interpretations that emphasize 
nihilism and solipsism often rely on the NfachJass and the later aphoristic 
works. This is especially true of Schacht and Heidegger. More pragmatic 
interpretations like Nehamas and Thiele generally quote from most of 
Nietzsche's texts but may draw predominately from one period.
Perhaps most striking among all of the political, and indeed most of 
the philosophical interpretations, is the neglect of Zarathustra. The 
literature explored above has sought to understand the political implications 
of Nietzsche while ignoring his most important and profound treatise on the 
subject Zarathustra. Scholars have ignored Zarathustra for several reasons, 
none of which are explicit Traditionally, political theorists have preferred
38 This conclusion was foreshadowed as early as Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1964); and is most evident 
in Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and 
in Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul.
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to deal with straightforward philosophical texts rather than narratives. 
Further, it has been assumed that most of the important philosophical and 
political points advanced in Zarathustra are duplicated and more explicitly 
laid out in Beyond Good and Evil. This is a mistaken assumption. Indeed, 
the narrative structure of Zarathustra is in itself an important facet of 
Nietzsche's political thought which must be taken into account
The ambiguity that these interpreters have found in Nietzsche's 
political theory may well flow from their consistent refusal to confront 
Zarathustra. It is in Zarathustra that Nietzsche, at the height of his creative 
and critical powers, brings together many of the disparate strands of his 
social and political thought This project will seek to do what has not been 
done by these previous interpretations: to examine Nietzsche's magnum 
opus to resolve the contradictory impulses identified in Nietzsche's political 
thought and reveal his underlying political thought Before moving to a 
preliminary discussion of this project; a brief discussion of the literature 
specifically addressing Zarathustra is in order.
IL
Jung observed:"Zarathustra. . .  is a hell of confusion and 
extraordinarily difficult"39 This is indeed an understatement and it seems 
that the perceived difficulty of Zarathustra has contributed to die reluctance
39 CG. Jung, Nietzsche's Zarathustra: Notes o f the Seminar, VoL 1 ed. James L. Jarre tt, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 3.
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of Nietzsche scholars to interpret Nietzsche's masterpiece. Despite the large 
amount of interest in Nietzsche in recent years, across many disciplines and 
languages, Zarathustra has largely been relegated to the top shelf; a book to 
be admired but not studied.
Among the interpretations of Zarathustra, none has been more 
influential than the short essay by Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra?"40 This essay, written several years after Heideggers 
monumental study of Nietzsche, attempts to minimize the radical nature of 
Zarathustra by portraying it as an outgrowth of metaphysical thinking. 
According to Heidegger, the central theme of Zarathustra is the overcoming 
of the spirit of resentment against human finitude, which Nietzsche is not 
able to bring to fruition because of his flawed theory of time. Heidegger's 
analysis has influenced the interpretations of Zarathustra examined below, 
some to a considerable degree. Because of its importance, a thorough 
examination and critique of this article is included in this dissertation as an 
appendix.
There have been only a handful of full-length studies of Zarathustra 
in any language, and only four in English. All of these studies have been 
written from a philosophical standpoint with only passing attention to die 
political or social implications of Zarathustra. Indeed, in these studies only
40 Martin Heidegger "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?."
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a few pages are devoted to the political or social implications of Zarathustra.
To my knowledge, a political interpretation of Zarathustra has not been
completed in any language. In addition, there are very few journal articles
relating to Zarathustra, much less from the standpoint of political theory.
While this paucity of secondary literature presents some problems, it also
presents a rare opportunity for truly original research within the crowded
field of Nietzsche studies.
Lampert's study, Nietzsche's Teaching, is of exceptional quality.41
Lampert analyses each section of Zarathustra in order, giving a detailed
analysis of the arguments and symbolism in each section. Lampert is an
especially good source for examining the connection between Zarathustra
and German literature, especially Goethe. Lampert also draws connections
between Zarathustra and Nietzsche's other works. Especially valuable is
Lampert's discussion of the theme of education in Zarathustra. Other than
the chapter on education, Lampert does not explicitly deal with politics, and
this chapter is not written in terms of political analysis.
Specifically, Lampert's study is designed to illuminate Nietzsche's
break with the philosophical tradition:
As I will try to show, die main point of the action of Zarathustra is to 
demonstrate first the need for a new teacher, then the nature of his
41 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation o f Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
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teaching in the discoveries of the will to power and eternal return,
and finally the founding of that teaching by Zarathustra himself.42
Alderman's study, Nietzsche's Gift, is of a similar quality.43 
Alderman is primarily concerned with Nietzsche's "masks." Alderman's 
study is topical rather than a direct textual interpretation, focusing on the 
dramatic format of Zarathustra. Alderman examines the themes of 
transfiguration, will, comedy, and philosophy in terms of drama. This 
study is useful for understanding die text as a whole, but it offers little 
related to politics directly. In addition, Alderman explicitly states that his 
interpretation is primarily guided by Heidegger's interpretation of 
Nietzsche. As such, it has an agenda that differs from many contemporary 
interpretations and studies of Nietzsche.
Stanley Rosen's analysis of Zarathustra is among the most recent and 
perhaps influential interpretations.44 Rosen argues that Zarathustra is an 
inherently political document "The book is best understood as a 
philosophical mediation and as a political document. . .  it is an incitement to 
revolution, to the overthrowing of the old order and so to the preparation
42 Lampert, N ietzsche's Teaching 5.
43 Harold Alderman, Nietzsche's Gift (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977).
44 Stanley Rosen, The Mask o f Enlightenm ent N ietzsche's Zarathustra (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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for a new order."45 However, Rosen interprets Nietzsche's politics in a very
concrete sense, presenting a statist analysis of Zarathustra.
In the broadest sense of the term, Nietzsche is not an ontologist or 
metaphysician but indeed a political thinker. His most 
comprehensive intention is to transform the collective circumstances 
of human existence in order to breed a new race of mankind. It is in 
this radical and comprehensive sense that Nietzsche is a prophet or 
lawgiver.46
Rosen goes on to assert that Nietzsche's Zarathustra is an elaboration 
of a political scheme analogous to Plato's Republic. "Nietzsche's enterprise 
is Platonic in that he wishes to create by legislation a new race of human 
beings."47 This argument is troubling, as it virtually ignores the critiques of 
collective existence that are prominent in Zarathustra. Further, Rosen 
disregards Nietzsche's call to solitude and the overcoming of nausea, both 
of which are central metaphors in Zarathustra. Essentially, Rosen presents a 
political interpretation that is skewed by a shallow reading of Nietzsche and 
the stated desire to defend the Enlightenment project from Nietzsche's 
critiques.48
45 Rosen, The Mask o f Enlightenment. 21.
46 Rosen, The M ask o f Enlightenment 56.
47 Rosen, The M ask o f Enlightenment 247.
48 "The decisive problem for the next philosophical generation is to separate justice from 
pity and shame. This will be possible without a reconstitution of reason that enables us to 
perceive once more the common root of truth and goodness. That root was once known as 
philosophy. Nietzsche bears a heavy burden of guilt for the radical deterioration in the 
second half of the twentieth century of our understanding of the nature of philosophy." 
Rosen, The M ask o f Enlightenment 250.
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This literature review has pointed to the glaring absence of 
scholarship on one of the most important philosophical texts to emerge in 
the last few centuries. The few studies cited above, although of superior 
quality, have been either too broad in scope or very tightly focused. Because 
of the problematic nature of Zarathustra, this tendency may arise out of 
necessity. However, the fact remains that there has been no study focused 
upon the central theme of Zarathustra: the formation and overcoming of the 
individual self through the process of self-discovery and self-creation. The 
above interpretations hint at the project of self-creation or dismiss it, but 
they do not explore this problem in any depth.
m.
This review of the literature has highlighted several problems with 
previous political interpretations of Nietzsche that will be confronted in this 
dissertation. Political theorists have failed to understand Nietzsche largely 
because they do not appreciate the extent of the radical departure that 
Nietzsche makes from traditional thought This misunderstanding is 
doubtless exaggerated as Nietzsche presents some of his most penetrating 
political reflections in the narrative format of Zarathustra. Although many 
of the themes found in Zarathustra are elaborated upon in Nietzsche's later 
works, particularly Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morality, 
the structure of Zarathustra as a progressive narrative is itself an important 
clue to Nietzsche's political theory.
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The most fundamental problem that renders interpretation of 
Nietzsche by political theorists difficult is Nietzsche's radically different 
perspective. Indeed, the presuppositions of political theorists coining from 
a classic or modem tradition are exactly what Nietzsche is reacting against 
As such, it is necessary to identify several key departures Nietzsche makes 
from conventional political thought
Most fundamentally, Nietzsche abandons the idea of the self as a 
discrete subject49 Therefore, it is impossible to understand the political 
reflections of Nietzsche if one clings to the idea that the self can be 
understood or even that the self is a relatively stable element of study. 
Generally, Nietzsche sees the individual as the product of a social matrix 
driven by repressive mechanisms beyond the conscious knowledge of the 
members of the society. Given this, it is impossible to understand the 
subject outside of this milieu. The self is tangential and therefore 
indefinable, as the matrix of which it is a part largely determines its actions 
and reactions.
However, Nietzsche does not see society or politics as natural.
Rather, society is an external construct that often acts in its own interest, 
often against the best interests of die individual. Politics can not be 
understood in terms of ontology, philosophical anthropology, or even in
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terms of the social contract as they all rely on some stable essence or human 
nature. Collectivity is seen as a pathology, arising from the need for 
protection and metaphysical consolation, not from noble sentiments or the 
desire to pursue the common good. Similarly, the notion of self- 
preservation leading to collectivity is illusory, as individuals bom into the 
society do not choose to combine: their selves have been created by this 
collectivity and they cannot opt out For Nietzsche, society is an abrogation 
of the will-to-power to others in the form of an abstract collective.
Nietzsche argues that these traditional political theories are often 
imbued with a creeping metaphysical element; whether an eschatology or 
notions of teleology; either explicit or implicit In traditional political 
theory, society is rarely questioned, it is seen as either part of the natural 
(divine) order or the product of an unfolding teleology of existence. This 
tendency is seen in the philosophical anthropology of Plato, and in the 
dialectic of Hegel. For Nietzsche, all meta-theories of politics are essentially 
flawed as they rely upon unquestioned concepts of the discrete subject or 
the fundamental innateness of politics.
In addition, Nietzsche argues that history cannot be understood as 
such. It is always to be understood as a hermeneutic exercise of the 
manipulation of symbols in service of some power relation or another. This
49 Besides Zarathustra, this is seen most prominently in The Genealogy o f Morality, in 
which Nietzsche presents an analysis of the origin of the modem subject and a critique of
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view of history destroys the idea of progress in the Kantian and Hegelian 
mode and brings into question the idea of the natural society that underlies 
theories of social contract50 History can be instructive, but it is not possible 
to draw teleological conclusions from the progression and evolution of 
power relationships in vastly different contexts.
Nietzsche therefore rejects many of the fundamental presuppositions 
of political theory. Perhaps most profoundly, Nietzsche argues that it is not 
necessary to conceive of politics only in connection to a theory of the state. 
Politics may be a function of power, but it is not necessary to conceive of 
power only as the relation of a subject to some exterior object Politics 
occurs in every conceivable context and situation, down to the functions 
within the individual consciousness. If political theory is to have any 
validity, it is necessary to abandon the obsession with the state and rather 
begin examination of the constituent elements of the individual, the most 
intimate and understandable arena of politics.
In keeping with these objections, it will be argued in chapter two that 
Zarathustra offers the possibility of accessing Nietzsche's political thought 
more directly than an analysis of widely-separated aphorisms or different
the idea of this notion of the independent subject
50 "The equally stiff and decorous Tartuffery of the old Kant as he lures us on the dialectical 
bypaths that lead to his 'categorical imperative'—really lead astray and seduce—this 
spectacle makes us smile, as we are fastidious and find it quite amusing to watch closely the 
subtle tricks of old moralists and preachers of morals." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 
$5.
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texts. It will be shown that Zarathustra is actually a coherent text with an 
underlying political theory, partly revealed in the structure of its narrative. 
Indeed, it is the central presupposition of this project that Zarathustra 
represents the major expression of Nietzsche's critical and positive political 
theory. This assertion is based upon several factors.
The departure point for Nietzsche's philosophy is a thoroughgoing 
critique of Western philosophy and culture, continuing even to the 
fundamental elements of language and imagery. Nietzsche employed 
several "masks" in the attempt to transcend the limits of language, 
including the aphoristic style and the use of allegory and irony.51 In order to 
reach the most profound elements of Nietzsche's thought, it is necessary to 
penetrate these masks. There is little doubt that Zarathustra represents 
Nietzsche's greatest departure from conventional philosophical writing, 
consisting of a highly symbolic narrative account of a spiritual and 
philosophical journey. It would follow that an analysis of this work would 
be most likely to reach the core of Nietzsche's philosophical and political 
views.
The structure of this project is largely dictated by an interpretation of 
Nietzsche's political argument in Zarathustra. Nietzsche examines various 
types of human interaction, critiques them, and then moves on to a more
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basic level. In this manner Nietzsche critiques the modem state, then 
examines the concept of the community, and finally presents an extended 
discussion of the possibility of new forms of selfhood. This dissertation will 
follow this structure to analyze Nietzsche's Zarathustrian political theory.
The "plot" of Zarathustra is somewhat disjointed, but it does follow a 
narrative progression that is vitally important to the political interpretation 
advanced in this dissertation. Zarathustra's journey can be interpreted as 
the prototypical example of Nietzsche's theory of self-overcoming.
Therefore, the character's actions within the text and the order in which 
Nietzsche presents them are indicative of the political argument that will be 
extrapolated from the text Although this dissertation does not strictly 
follow Zarathustra in a chronological manner, the order of the chapters in 
the dissertation is based upon the narrative progression of the text
Zarathustra begins with a Prologue. Zarathustra is alone in his cave 
and decides to go down to the people to teach them the wisdom he has 
accumulated in solitude. This is a direct reversal of Plato's cave analogy: the 
philosopher has gained knowledge within the cave, and must go down to 
others who dwell below. Immediately, Zarathustra encounters problems 
arising from the social nature of ordinary human existence. It is in this
51 As Nietzsche states: "What is profound loves masks; what is most profound hates even 
imago and parable." Beyond Good and E vil §40.
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beginning section that Zarathustra elaborates his critique of collective 
existence.
Accordingly, the first exegetical chapter, chapter three, will center 
upon these important critiques and the political implications arising 
therefrom. "The Cold Monster" will examine Nietzsche's critique of the 
modem state and mass culture. Nietzsche concludes that the modem state 
is given to usurping the identities of its members, conditioning them into 
little more than cogs in the societal machine. The product of this state, 
symbolized by the "last man," is no longer capable of creative action, much 
less creative thought This renders the society stagnant, susceptible to the 
ravages of nihilism, and ultimately self-destruction. Nietzsche argues that 
this process is largely unavoidable within any mass society and can 
therefore not be the home of the "authentic" self.
After his short sojourn in the town, Zarathustra abandons the notion 
of mass education and leaves civilization. However, in his travels he meets 
several characters who decide to follow him, to learn what they can. 
Essentially, this part of the narrative is a discussion of smaller social groups 
and the concept of friendship. Chapter four, "The Higher Men" will explore 
Nietzsche's flirtation with the possibility of a community of equals. 
Frustrated at his failure to teach self-overcoming to those in mass society, 
Zarathustra attempts to teach this knowledge to those who actually want to 
learn: a group of disciples. However, this mode of collective existence is
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soon abandoned, as its members all too quickly fall into the old traps of 
repression and bad conscience that plagues the state. Nietzsche argues that 
the small community of friends is less problematic than mass society, but 
ultimately not capable of providing the context for the emergence of the 
creative self.
It is Zarathustra's firm resolve to reclaim solitude that represents a 
major turning point in the political argument of the narrative and this 
dissertation. Chapter five, 'The Great Nausea," begins discussion of 
Nietzsche's positive political thought, both within the text and the 
dissertation. Finding community lacking, Nietzsche moves on to the last 
level of human existence, the solitary individual. The mechanism by which 
the individual can sever relations with the herd is that of existential nausea. 
Through the great nausea, Zarathustra becomes aware of the absence of 
order to existence and realizes that his quest for authentic humanity can 
only take place within the individual self. It is only when the individual 
embraced the horror of the meaninglessness of existence that a new 
beginning is possible, free from the repression and normalizing mechanisms 
of the Other. Because of this existential realignment, Zarathustra abandons 
his disciples and begins a journey of self-discovery.
Chapter six, "The Ethics of Absurdity," discusses Nietzsche's 
apparently separatist theory of politics. It is only in solitude that die 
repressive mechanisms endemic to human existence can be mitigated.
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Nietzsche elaborates some concrete methods by which the individual can 
begin this process of self-creation. This chapter centers upon the ethical 
considerations of the concept of the eternal recurrence. It will be argued 
that the concept of the eternal recurrence is intended as a guide to action, a 
type of Nietzschean categorical imperative. Through the confrontation with 
mortality and finitude the individual is able to begin the process of creating 
the self as a work of art This chapter explores Nietzsche's elaboration of an 
aesthetic ethics arising out of resistance to social norms and culminating in 
individual self-creation.
Chapter seven, "Metamorphosis: The Transmuted Self," discusses 
what this exceptional individual may actually resemble. Although 
Nietzsche's elaboration of self-transcendence and self-creation is highly 
speculative, it has great theoretical importance. This chapter centers upon 
the symbol of Noontide, a central metaphor in the narrative. It is argued 
that noon represents the consciousness ordered by a realization of the 
primacy of the will-to-power, finally free from the constraints of societal 
mechanisms.
The conclusion will argue that in Zarathustra Nietzsche offers a 
comprehensive theory of politics taking all levels of human existence into 
account, albeit a political theory centered upon the individual self. By 
following the structure of the narrative, this study stays close to Nietzsche's 
thought process and allows him to guide the analysis of his most important
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work. Rather than imposing preconceived models of political theory upon 
Zarathustra or attempting to extract elements of the narrative to support a 
conclusion, it is the purpose of this project to reveal the radical departure 
from such interpretive strategies that have plagued previous Nietzsche 
interpreters.
Importantly, this study of Zarathustra also reveals why Nietzsche did 
not put forth a positive political theory of the state. Indeed, Nietzsche's lack 
of a positive political theory is telling, as it is intentional. Any positive 
political theory of collective action is inimical to the model of selfhood that 
Nietzsche proposes. Nietzsche's model of selfhood, as revealed in the 
progression of Zarathustra, is one of individual resistance to the social realm 
and the socially-created self. Therefore, a Nietzschean political theory is 
oxymoronic. Nietzsche's political relevance is in individual resistance and 
self-overcoming, not collective existence.
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Ch apter  n 
Th e H erm eneutics o f Existence 
Nietzsche's philosophical texts are unconventional to be sure. They 
are fragmented, polemic, and occasionally contradictory. Zarathustra is 
radically different from even Nietzsche's usual "style." It contains a main 
character, Zarathustra, and has a loose plot following his wanderings from 
solitude through society and back into solitude. However, it is far from 
being a conventional novel. Much of the text is concerned with 
Zarathustra's internal dialogue and a series of what could be most 
accurately termed visions. Further, the text is not linear and is confusing at 
best Nietzsche's writing style is not overly complex in Zarathustra, but his 
use of rather obscure imagery, much of which draws from classical and 
Asian sources, calls for a great effort on the part of the reader. Arguably, the 
most important element of the text is Nietzsche's shunning of the 
prepositional model of philosophy in favor of a symbolic and metaphorical 
presentation.
This chapter will argue that the narrative structure of Zarathustra is a 
conscious attempt to illustrate Nietzsche's thoroughgoing critique of 
conventional philosophical discourse. The symbolic and metaphorical 
language Nietzsche employs in the text is an intentional response to the 
inadequacies of philosophical language; and the fragmented structure of the 
narrative is a direct result of Nietzsche's epistemological and existential
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
presuppositions. Zarathustra, as a free-flowing narrative, is designed to be 
representative of the actual operations of the human consciousness, which 
Nietzsche argues are impossible to depict within the confines of the 
discursive model employed by conventional philosophy.
There is no doubt that Zarathustra is a remarkable work, even more 
so considering Nietzsche's unique view of the nature of language and 
communication. Nietzsche actually seems contemptuous of the language of 
philosophical discourse, writing in Zarathustra: "you do not speak: thus you 
proclaim your wisdom."1 As a professional philologist, Nietzsche's critique 
of language is especially compelling. Nietzsche was familiar with both the 
intricacies and vicissitudes of language; therefore his condemnation of the
1 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, m:4. It is a poor reflection on Anglophone scholarship that a 
century after Nietzsche's death there is not yet a standard edition of Nietzsche's complete 
works. The widely-accepted German edition of Nietzsche's works, the Kritische 
Cesamtausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, is only now being issued 
in English by Stanford University Press. This edition is proceeding at a glacial rate, with 
only three volumes out of twenty appearing over the past decade. Although good 
translations of Nietzsche's major published works have been completed, most notably by 
Walter Kaufmarm and R. J. HoQingdale, there remains no complete translation of 
Nietzsche's NachJass his vast collection of notes, lectures, and personal and professional 
correspondence. This creates a nightmare for citation as each reader may have different 
editions, each with different pagination and idiosyncratic translation. Fortunately, a rough 
consensus on citing Nietzsche's works has developed over the past few years. Where 
possible, especially in the aphoristic works, it is standard to cite by aphorism or section 
number rather than by page number. Similarly, it has become standard to cite Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra by book number and section number. Thus, the citation "Zarathustra, 111:8" 
refers to the eighth section of Book Three," Vor Sonnen-Aufgang(Before Sunrise)." 
Subdivisions that occur within a section, when specifically delineated by Nietzsche, are also 
included in citations. I have relied heavily on the translations of both Kaufmann and 
Hollingdale for assistance, and have placed linguistic and translation concerns within 
footnotes wherever practicable.
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possibility of traditional philosophical language to communicate
philosophical insight must be examined carefully.
Nietzsche's apparent love-hate relationship with language and its
relation to philosophical thought renders Zarathustra a unique challenge to
interpretation/ as well as offering the opportunity to explore Nietzsche's
strategy for communicating philosophical knowledge. In order to present a
comprehensive analysis of Zarathustra, it is therefore necessary to analyze
the reasons Nietzsche chose to present his central philosophical work in the
form of a narrative laced with obscure symbols and metaphors. This task is
informed by Nietzsche's own reflections on Zarathustra, both in terms of die
process of its creation and its content
Nietzsche asserts that even the metaphorical language employed in
Zarathustra cannot convey the essentially incommunicable experiences
within the self. "Precisely in this width of space and this accessibility for
what is contradictory, Zarathustra experiences himself as the supreme type
o f all beings: and once one hears how he defines this, one will refrain from
seeking any metaphor for it"2
I do not yet have an objective impression of the whole thing; yet I feel 
that it presents a not insignificant victory owes the "spirit of gravity," 
considering how  difficult it is to present the problems in it  That the 
first part comprises a circle of feelings which forms a basis ior the
2 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §6.
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circle of feelings in the second part this seems to me to be easily 
recognizable and a "good job of work" (To talk like a carpenter).3
It is important to note that Zarathustra was the product of distinct
moments of inspiration that occurred during two of his frequent walks, it
was not the product of a well-reasoned and outlined philosophical study.4
Nietzsche refers to the origin of Zarathustra almost as if it arose from his
unconscious mind: "It was on these two walks that the whole of Zarathustra
/occurred to me, and especially Zarathustra himself as a type: rather, he
overtook me.”5 Nietzsche uses the narrative to attempt to communicate
inner philosophical and psychological knowledge that transcends the
boundaries of rational discourse. In this sense, Zarathustra is the
quintessential postmodern text the presentation of the unpresentable.6 As a
3 Nietzsche, letter to Peter Gast, August, 1883, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 217.
4 Nietzsche reflected on the amount of personal agony evoked by the remembrance of this 
process: "When I have looked into my Zarathustra, I walk up and down in my room for 
half an hour, unable to master an unbearable fit of sobbing." Ecce Homo, 11:4.
5 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §1.
6 "The postmodern would be that which, in the modem, puts forward the unpresentable in 
presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a 
taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; 
that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart 
a stronger sense of the unpresentable. A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a 
philosopher the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by 
preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by 
applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what 
the work of art itself are looking for. The artist and writer, then, are working without rules 
in order to formulate the rules of what w ill have been done. Hence the fact that the work 
and text have the characters of an event hence also, they always come too late for their 
author, or, what amounts to the same thing, their being put to work, their realization 
always began too soon. Postmodern would have to be understood according to the 
paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo)." Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, Vi.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
quasi-dramatic presentation, Zarathustra represents the mnemonic attempt 
to achieve the integration of the conscious and unconscious within the 
concrete text that Nietzsche envisions as the ultimate goal of his 
philosophical project "This indeed is the secret of the soul: only when the 
hero has deserted the soul does there approach it in dreams—the 
superhero."7 Nietzsche is referring to visionary images, the dialogue of the 
subconscious mind. Zarathustra represents the attempt to reintegrate 
Dionysus into the Apollonian realm of philosophy. "A little wisdom is no 
doubt possible; but I have found this happy certainty in all things: that they 
prefer—to dance on the feet of chance."8
Nietzsche's critique of traditional philosophy proceeds partly from 
these observations. The philosopher must have faith in his own internal 
experiences, it is impossible to substitute the experiences of another. The 
mind must retain some integrity, even if it is masked and continuously in 
flux. "You are unfruitful: therefore you lack belief. But he who had to 
create always had his prophetic dreams and star-auguries—and he believed 
in belief!"9 Nietzsche incorporated imagery into Zarathustra because it 
existed in his mind alongside traditionally accepted philosophical elements.
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:13.
8 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, m:4.
9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:14.
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Through incorporation of these elements, the text becomes intensely
personal, agonizingly so. Nietzsche writes of Zarathustra:
Probably I would, from artistic motives, have chosen darker and 
more somber and garish colors for the first two parts, if I had kept my 
soul serene and bright this year—for the sake of what happens at the
end The detail contains an incredible amount of personal
experience and suffering which is intelligible only to me—there were 
pages which seemed to me to drip with blood.10
Nietzsche's writings are so intimate that he begrudges his readers.
"If a man draws up the sum of a deep and hidden life, as I have been doing,
then the result is meant for the eyes and consciences of only the most select
people."11 Few will be able to understand Zarathustra enough to interpret it
in the manner Nietzsche wishes: intensely. Nietzsche envisions Zarathustra
as a crucible for interpretation, changing the reader permanently. "It is a
sort of abyss of the future—something to make one shudder, especially the
joy in it Everything in it is my own, without model, kindred, precursor; a
person who has lived in it will return to the world seeing things
differently."12
Nietzsche envisions that Zarathustra is destined to be misunderstood, 
partially because it contains so much of his personal experiences and 
imagery bom from his unconscious mind. Nietzsche's pessimism extends
10 Nietzsche, letter to Peter Gast, August, 1883, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 218.
11 Nietzsche, letter to Franz Overbeck, March 31,1885, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 239.
12 Nietzsche, letter to Erwin Rohde, February 22,1884, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 220- 
221.
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even to his closest personal friend, to whom he writes: "[Zarathustra]. . .  is 
an unintelligible book, because it is based on experiences which I share with 
nobody. If only I could give you a sense of my solitude! Among the living, 
as among the dead, I have nobody with whom I have any affinity."13
Nietzsche seems to indicate that Zarathustra will only make sense to 
someone who has already broken free of the strictures of conventional 
philosophy and stands in opposition to concretized truth. In his last 
productive year, Nietzsche wrote: "Of my Zarathustra, I tend to think that it 
is the profoundest work in the German tongue, also the most perfect in its 
language. But for others to feel this will require whole generations to catch 
up with the inner experiences from which that work could arise."14 
Zarathustra is a work which is always ahead of its time; it must be the right 
time to each reader for it to be significant
Nietzsche can certainly be criticized for placing too much faith in the 
reader. He relies upon the emergence of a competent reader who has 
internal experiences similar to his own.15 Is Nietzsche, therefore, a type-
13 Nietzsche, letter to Franz Overbeck, August 5,1886, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 254.
14 Nietzsche, letter to Karl Knortz, June 21,1888, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 299.
15 Nietzsche seems to realize this problem, and delights in the problems his writings cause 
seemingly "sophisticated" readers: "When Dr. Heinrich von Stein once complained very 
honestly that he didn't understand a word of my Zarathustra, I told him that this was 
perfectly in order having understood six sentences from it— that is, to have really 
experienced them—would raise one to a higher level of existence than 'modem' man could 
attain. Given this feeling of distance, how could I possibly wish to be read by those
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former who seeks to produce like-minded individuals through the clever 
use of archetypal symbols? If Nietzsche is not attempting to communicate 
genuine internal philosophical experience, Zarathustra is little more than a 
catharsis. However, if Nietzsche is correct and philosophical insight is 
indeed based upon essentially incommunicable internal experience, it must 
be asked why Nietzsche attempts to write at all, even in the narrative 
format Nietzsche seems to be undermining his own critique of traditional 
philosophy by embracing the myth of philosophical discourse that 
emphasizes communication and concretization. By concretizing his own 
internal experience, Nietzsche is violating his own injunctions.
Nietzsche's narrative form may be characterized as an attempt to 
rehabilitate the discursive form that characterized philosophy in its original 
Greek form. In this sense, Zarathustra represents an interpretive 
conversation between the reader and the writer, both on their own footing. 
Zarathustra then represents the attempt of Nietzsche to present to the 
reader, on a level as equally as possible, his unique insights gained through 
internal experiences that can never be described. Zarathustra is therefore an 
absurd document, proposing to communicate the incommunicable. This 
absurdity is not lost on Nietzsche; indeed he revels in it  It makes no sense
'moderns' whom I know!" Ecce Hoorn, 111:1. Further, Nietzsche's mockery of Wagner's 
inability to understand his works is legendary.
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to attempt to divine Nietzsche's "true" philosophy or his philosophical 
intent to do so is a betrayal of his message.16
The narrative structure of Zarathustra is therefore the epitome of 
Nietzsche's philosophical style, as he consciously structured his entire 
mature philosophical oeuvre to defy cursory reading or superficial 
interpretation.17 Even in his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
avoided the scholarly strictures of meticulous citation and commentary on 
previous philosophical and philological works, presenting his argument in a 
series of polemical essays requiring some element of conscious 
interpretation on the part of the reader. After his rejection by his colleagues 
in philology and the beginning of his career as an itinerant writer, Nietzsche 
became even more acutely aware of the role of the reader as an active 
participant the process of philosophy. "He who knows the reader, does 
nothing further for the reader. Another century of readers—and the spirit 
itself will stink. That everyone can read will ruin in the long run not only 
writing, but thinking as well."18
16 Nietzsche explicitly speaks to this point in his reevaluation of his own philosophical 
project: "Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already 
knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear." Ecce Homo.
nti.
17 "The most recent view that Nietzsche is at bottom a systematic thinker is just as correct, 
and just as wrong, as the older view that he is an aphoristic literary author." Ltiwith, 
N ietzsche's Philosophy o f the Eternal Recurrence o f the Same, trans. J. Harvey Lomax 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1997), 13.
18 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
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Nietzsche asserted that breaking away from the passive discourse 
encouraged by conventional philosophical writing was the only possibility 
for advancing the boundaries of human perception. Creation, as Nietzsche 
argued consistently from The Birth o f Tragedy to Ecce Homo, is the proper 
goal for human life, and can only progress through the synthesis of all 
modes of human experience, including the poetic and artistic elements 
neglected or rejected by philosophy. The manner of philosophical discourse 
must therefore be open to radical experimentation, not bound to tradition 
and regimented forms. With philosophy, the text cannot present a secure 
and definite conclusion; instead the text must be dynamic and provoke 
interpretation rather than imposing doctrines.19
Nietzsche employed the aphoristic format in a majority of his works 
for this reason. Radically different from ordinary philosophical texts,
Human All To Human, Daybreak, The Science of Joy, and Beyond Good and 
Evil are collections of varyingly connected aphorisms and meditations on a 
multitude of subjects. Although it is not accurate to label Nietzsche's style
19 "From this perspective, philosophy follows the same movement as the other activities; 
whereas romantic philosophy still appealed to a formal synthetic identity ensuring a 
continuous intelligibility of matter (a priori synthesis), modem philosophy tends to 
elaborate a material of thought in order to capture forces that are not thinkable in 
themselves. This is Cosmos philosophy, after the manner of Nietzsche. The molecular 
material has even become so deterritorialized that we can no longer even speak of matters 
of expression, as we did in romantic territoriality. M atters o f expression are superceded by 
a material o f capture. The forces to be captured are no longer those of the earth, which still 
constitute a great expressive Form, but the forces of an immaterial, nonformal, and 
energetic Cosmos." Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism  
and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987), 342-343.
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in these works as "stream of consciousness," Nietzsche is trying to break
free of the bounds imposed by "rational" discourse, which he ultimately
attempts to demonstrate is itself an artifact of language.20 Nietzsche is
therefore not writing to advance a set of propositions as die "truth"; rather
he is inviting the reader to ask these questions as well:
He who writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read, he 
wants to be learned by heart In the mountains the shortest route is 
from peak to peak, but for that you must have long legs. Aphorisms 
should be peaks, and those to whom they are spoken should be big 
and tall of stature.21
In other words, many may read these works but only a few will 
understand that the aphorisms are only guideposts along the way. Of 
course, Nietzsche can be faulted for not giving guidance in this process of 
interpretation that he claims to be so vital to his philosophical project If the 
point of Nietzsche's philosophy is to create a self-critical stance within the 
mind of the reader, then there may be no actual "point' to his texts beyond 
the creation of this existential mood. The implication of this interpretation is 
that the essential element of Nietzsche's philosophy is what occurs within 
the mind of the reader. Only those who confront the text in this manner 
have a chance to grasp philosophical insight from Nietzsche's works. Those 
who seek to find "answers" or "a point" in Nietzsche's philosophy have
20 "A fragment is an implicit system; a system is an explicit fragment" Paul Tillich, 
Systematic Theology, VoL 1 (London: Nisbit, 1953), 65.
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
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seriously misunderstood his intentions and have demonstrated their own
intellectual m ediocrity: "it needs greatness of soul for a person to stand my
writings at all. I have the good fortune to make all weak and virtuous
people embittered against me/'22 As Deleuze and Guattari note:
The aphorism, for example, is very different from the maxim, for a 
maxim, in a republic of letters, is like an organic State act or sovereign 
judgement, whereas an aphorism always awaits its meaning from a 
new external source, a final force that must conquer and subjugate it, 
utilize it23
Philosophy for Nietzsche is therefore less of a search for truth or 
essences and more of an interpretive act, an act which permanently changes 
the reader.24 This is demonstrated most specifically in Zarathustra. The 
reader, following Zarathustra's journey of self-discovery, is himself 
travelling the same road. The character of Zarathustra is therefore the 
reader by proxy. Philosophical writing in the Zarathustrian mode is an 
agonal challenge. Reading of a philosophical text should be an intense 
exercise undertaken seriously. The narrative structure helps the reader 
achieve this attitude. As Zarathustra says: "of all writings I love only that
22 Nietzsche, letter to Malwinda von Meysenburg, July, 1888, in Selected Letters, ed. and 
trans. Christopher Middleton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 303.
23 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 376-377.
24 "In Nietzsche, values must be interpreted because they are expressions of the strength 
and the weakness of the will to power. Moreover, in Nietzsche, life itself is an 
interpretation: in this way, philosophy itself becomes the interpretation of interpretations." 
Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict o f Interpretations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1974), 12
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which is written with blood. Write with blood: and you will discover that 
blood is spirit"25 This is not a paean to the VOlksgeist, but rather a call to an 
especially intense, self-searching interpretation of Nietzsche's texts.
Needless to say, this is a difficult and dangerous task, both for the reader 
and the writer.26
Nietzsche is certainly open to criticism for this position. His reliance 
upon the reader and his call for a more active encounter with philosophical 
texts is necessarily vague. Indeed, Nietzsche's emphasis upon style could be 
blamed for his misappropriation by ideological movements or the 
mischaracterization of his thought With so much open to interpretation, 
there is little stability inherent in Nietzsche's philosophy that would allow 
for a thoroughgoing analysis of Nietzsche's philosophical project 
Nietzsche's interpretive philosophy can be no other than a hermeneutic 
nightmare, but this is what Nietzsche seems to intend. His philosophy is no 
less than the attempt to break the cycle of dogmatism that has grown up 
around all of the pioneers of philosophy through the ages.
It must be asked whether Nietzsche can actually overcome the 
strictures of traditional philosophy he despises. The radical style of 
Zarathustra could be seen as a desperate attempt to transcend the linguistic
25 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
26 Nietzsche had his own problems with Zarathustra from the beginning as well 
"Zarathustra /had been delayed, to Nietzsche's great annoyance, by the publication of 
500,000 hymn books." Middleton, Selected Letters, 213n.
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trap that has rendered philosophy an academic pursuit rather than a 
practical application of knowledge to the individual life. That Nietzsche 
must resort to such a non-traditional format as the narrative to convey 
philosophical insight highlights this proposition. However, if Nietzsche's 
thought is to be constantly interpreted by each reader, can it be said that 
there is in fact a philosophy that is genuinely Nietzsche's? As the text is 
constantly reinterpreted, as Nietzsche's seems to desire, where is the line of 
demarcation between Nietzsche's philosophy and that of the reader? 
Nietzsche might argue that this is a false dichotomy, but the problem 
remains nevertheless. Nietzsche does not provide us with the information 
necessary to determine which interpretations are more valid, if this type of 
determination is indeed possible.
The validity of Nietzsche's decentering of philosophy is certainly 
bold, but it is also questionable. However, Nietzsche's emphasis upon 
interpretation fits with his emphasis upon action over reactive modes of 
discourse. Nietzsche does not seek to inform the reader, he seeks to 
provoke the reader. In this sense, Nietzsche's philosophical style represents 
the logical extension of his presuppositions regarding the perspectival 
nature of philosophical insight
However, it could be argued that Nietzsche's attempt to force the 
reader to think through philosophical problems independent of the text
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represents the call to a type of second-order philosophizing, in which die 
reader confronts philosophical problems in a manner already framed by 
another Nietzsche. If this is the case, Nietzsche has failed in his gamble and 
is simply setting up a more insidious power relation than traditional 
philosophy. Nietzsche forces the reader to think through problems; that is 
to be sure. But these problems have been selected by Nietzsche and framed 
in a manner that will lead the reader to certain conclusions at the expense of 
other possibilities. This criticism is difficult to overcome, but Nietzsche may 
not be claiming such a dramatic break with traditional philosophical 
writing. Nietzsche's narrative style represents an attem pt to prod the 
reader; it is not a perfect vehicle to convey the necessity for interpretation.
However successful or unsuccessful, Nietzsche's interpretive 
philosophy stands in radical opposition to traditional philosophical forms. 
This disjunction is the artifact of a thorough critique of philosophy and its 
reliance upon language. Further, Nietzsche's own communicative scheme is 
based upon his critique of traditional epistemological presuppositions, 
partially stemming from his larger critique of language. It is therefore 
necessary to examine Nietzsche's criticism of traditional philosophy in order 
to understand his novel approach to the communication of ideas and his 
subsequent de-centering of philosophy.
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L
Nietzsche identifies several significant problems with traditional 
academic philosophy. Both the content and the style of his writings are 
largely in opposition to these "fundamental errors." The most fundamental 
problem with philosophy is its reliance upon what could be termed the 
"tyranny of language."
Language, taken as a tool for communication, is not itself the 
problem. The difficulty arises when philosophers forget the limitations of 
language and begin to believe that language can indeed serve as an 
adequate vehicle for expressing philosophical insights, which are largely 
abstract and subjective. Language that does not confront the reader with the 
demand for independent interpretation, typified by the traditional text 
taken to have an independent and definite meaning, is the prime example of 
this problem. Philosophy, in its original form, was a discursive discipline, 
not the presentation of fixed ideas. Philosophy was therefore a fluid pursuit 
of individual insight, well-suited to the interpretation of a radically- 
uncertain universe. Non-discursive language, petrified in the form of a text, 
is insufficient for this task, given the contingent nature and genealogical 
origin of grammar. It has been forgotten that language is not an objective 
set of signs with discrete codified meanings; it is rather an organic system of 
communication that has arisen and developed over centuries as file result of 
a random and sometimes irrational process.
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As a philologist, Nietzsche was acutely aware of the contingent 
nature of language. Indeed, the first essay of The Genealogy o f M orality is 
devoted to the development of the linguistic symbols "good" and "evil," 
demonstrating in each a set of attached psychological and moral 
implications far beyond the seemingly simple definitions commonly 
attached. Nietzsche views language as a set of symbols that have become 
more or less detached from their original meanings and have taken on a life 
of their own.27
Truly, men have given themselves all their good and evil. Truly, they 
did not take it, they did not find it, it did not descend to them as a 
voice from heaven. Man first implanted values into things to 
maintain himself — he created the meaning of things, a human 
meaning!28
Therefore, although language is a natural expression and outgrowth 
of human existence, it remains marked by the experiences of its creator, who 
created the linguistic symbol that is now taken for granted and imbued with 
an independent meaning apart from the perceiving subject29 Importantly,
27 "The whole range of available narrative and even stylistic operators is put into play 
without concern for the unity of the whole, and new operators are tried. The grammar and 
vocabulary of the literary language are no loner accepted as given; rather, they appear as 
academic forms, as rituals originating in piety (as Nietzsche said) which prevent the 
unpresentable from being put forward." Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition; 
A Report on Knowledge trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1964), The Postmodern Condition, 80-81.
28 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
29 "For if language is the product of the artistic activity of the human subject—the sole 
author of these metaphors—then it necessarily conceals a 'natural' element Words, 
expressing through their sounds and rhythms the movements of the psyche manifest some 
type of Will to Power and thus reflect not only the essence of things, but also the essence of
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philosophers have largely ignored the contingent nature of the symbols they 
use and therefore open themselves up to an entire array of problems.
Most importantly, language, as a system of symbols long detached 
from their original meanings, essentially devalues itself. This tendency is 
especially seen in modem academic philosophy, which has sought to attach 
more and more stable meanings to words in an attempt to foster a scientific 
view of reality. Language, as it is called upon to place more and more 
specific meanings to phenomena, further demonstrates its fundamental 
inadequacy.30 In the realm of philosophy this is fatal. The more philosophy 
calls upon language to explain abstract concepts in concrete terms, the more 
language reveals its impotence. This insidious process has largely been 
ignored by philosophy, but it threatens to destroy the philosophical 
enterprise.
subjectivity Linguistic fictions disguise their fictive character; language consists of dead
fictions become independent of their author through amnesia. Hence, any return to the 
'origin' of language, to the metaphoric activity of the artistic Will to Power, is impossible—
at least within the ordinary use of the linguistic code Not only is language intrinsically
ill, it is also the carrier of the universal illness: nihilism, the triumph of the reactive forces.. 
.. But in what sense is language a'symbol'? It is a symbol in that it is a radically unfaithful
replica. . .  but it is also a relation of analogy, from which all exact imitation is excluded__
Language suffers from a fundamental powerlessness to reveal what it claims to reveal: 
'Language, as an organ and symbol of manifestation (i-e., as a symbol of a symbol) can 
never bring forth the most intimate [basis].'" Haar, Nietzsche and M etaphysics, 69-71.
30 "Modernity, in whatever age it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and 
without discovery of the 'lack of reality' of reality, together with the invention of other 
realities. What does this'lack of reality'signify if one tries to free it from a narrowly 
historidzed interpretation? The phase is of course akin to what Nietzsche calls nihilism." 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 77.
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Philosophers, trapped by the tyranny of language, essentially censor
themselves because of the lack of sufficient language.31 Unable to
communicate what cannot be written, the deepest and most personal truths
regarding existence and ontology remain unexpressed. Rational
philosophical discourse simply cannot come to terms with the most innate
features of existence, and must therefore concern itself with shallower
pursuits. "Neither in the incomprehensible nor in the irrational can you be
at home."32 As Nietzsche argues:
We no longer esteem ourselves sufficiently when we communicate 
ourselves. Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could 
not communicate themselves if they tried. That is because they lack 
the right word. Whatever we have the right words for, that we have
already gone beyond With language the speaker immediately
vulgarizes himself.33
Philosophical insight becomes petrified through language and the 
reliance upon the text a tendency that can be traced to Plato's commitment
31 "What provokes one to look at all philosophers half-suspidously, half-mockingly, is not 
that one discovers again and again how innocent they are—how often and how easily that 
make mistakes and go astray. . .  but that they are not honest enough in their work, 
although they al make a lot of virtuous noise when the problem of truthfulness is touched 
even remotely. They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions 
through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to 
the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish—and talk of'inspiration'); 
while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of 'inspiration'—most often a 
desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract— that they defend with reasons 
they have sought after the fact" Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §5.
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
33 Nietzsche, Twilight o f the Idols trans. Walter Kaufinann in The Portable N ietzsche (New 
York: Viking Penguin 1954)530-531.
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to paper of Socrates' dialogues.34 Through the creation of an independent
text philosophers have created an external signifier which stands in
opposition to the reader. Haar notes:
The essence of Nietzsche's distrust is rather that language tends 
inevitably to vulgarize, to make herd-like. The dominant language is 
always reactive—simultaneously reducer and castrater as well as 
protector of the weak against "dangerous" impulses and the 
emergence of explosive differences. Language becomes the means to 
this end thanks to the invention of logical, grammatical, and 
metaphysical categories that effect the triumph of reactive forces.35
Language, then, is innately political. It is formed through once
concrete and identifiable power relations, which over time become obscured
or forgotten. At the same time, it is forgotten that linguistic communication
is an essentially interpretive endeavor attempting to explain or define an
innately mutable existence. Language is a power relation, operating in
furtherance of the creeping marginalization of philosophy. The failure of
language to communicate philosophical insight is not seen as the failure of
language, but rather as the failure o f philosophy. Philosophy, by becoming
34 "The purifying, consecrating influence of literature, the destruction of the passions 
through knowledge and the word; the idea of literature as the highway to understanding, 
to forgiveness, and to love; the saving power of speech; the literary spirit as the noblest
manifestation of the human spirit altogether; the literary man as man fulfilled, as saint___
But in Nietzsche's terminology, as announced in The Birth o f Tragedy, this precisely was 
the character of Socrates, Socratic man, as prototype and protagonist of'the Decadence,' in 
the sense of the intellect subduing, disorienting, and dissolving life, unloving of its 
imperfection, sterilized to its mystery. . .  those who attribute to local, temporal conditions 
the ills inherent in life itself, and, in their zeal to correct, discompose the life they would 
save." Joseph Campbell, The Masks o f Cod: Creative M ythology (New York: Penguin, 
1968), 377.
35 Haar, Nietzsche and M etaphysics 74.
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tied to language, has chosen a medium through which it can never fulfill its 
goals.
As Klossowski states: "Nietzsche says that we have no language to 
express what is in becoming Thought is always the result of a momentary 
relation of power between impulses, principally between those that 
dominate and those that resist"36 Words demand meanings; there is no 
vocabulary for flux or that is capable of recognizing the epistemological 
uncertainty inherent in the Nietzschean outlook. Jaspers notes "Nietzsche 
recognizes the reason why the essential—the truth itself—is 
incommunicable: Only that which can be said can be communicated; only 
the intelligible can be said, but what is intelligible is always interpretative... 
. What is said, as such, has already ceased to be true."37
Rather than accepting die incommunicability of philosophy through 
language, philosophy still clings to language as the only valid 
communicative form. It is this insistence that has let to the stagnation of 
philosophy and its tendency towards increasing concretization. Because of 
the limits of language, philosophy has become dominated by the demand to 
produce acceptable, fundamental precepts, in other words, "truth." 
Nietzsche terms this tendency die "will-to-truth."
36 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 49-50.
37 Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to H is Philosophical A ctivity, trans. Charles 
Wallraff and Frederick Schmitz (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965), 404.
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Nietzsche argues that this fundamental need for philosophical 
stability is not completely the fault of language. Humans m ust have a belief 
in stability; the will-to-truth is a psychological precondition for society.38 
The concretizing effect of language and its disastrous implications for 
philosophy are but one outgrowth of this innate need. Essentially,
Nietzsche argues that language, philosophy, even societal institutions are 
the handmaidens of the will-to-truth, fostering a belief in the stability of 
existence. Specifically, philosophy has become chained to several 
fundamental errors that have delivered it into the hand of dogma and 
Dekadenz.
We must draw up a list of these illusions, just as Nietzsche. . .  listed 
the "four great errors" . . .  First of all there is the illusion of 
transcendence, which, perhaps, comes before all others (in its double 
aspect of making immanence immanent to something and of 
rediscovering a transcendence within immanence itself); then the 
illusion of universals when concepts are confused with the plane.. . .  
Then there is the illusion of the eternal when it is forgotten that 
concepts must be created . . .  the illusion of discursiveness when 
propositions are confused with concepts. It would be wrong to think 
that all of these illusions logically entail one another like 
propositions, but they resonate or reverberate and form a thick fog 
around the plane.39
38 "Judgements concerning truth and falsehood are at bottom assertions of belief.
Assertions of belief are, in turn, valuations. Valuations, in their turn, express covert 
conditions of preservation and growth. Nietzsche argues further that all organs of 
knowledge and our senses as well are, without exceptions, developed in terms of 
preservation and growth. And then, perhaps, Nietzsche's most striking observation 
surfaces: he argues that stability, security, predictability, permanence, are preconditions for 
every living being. Doubt concerning essential values is impermissible. Something must be 
held to be true—that is our common weal." Bemd Magnus, N ietzsche's Existential 
Imperative (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1978), 193.
39 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomplinson and 
Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 49-50.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
The errors of philosophy, grave though they are, are essentially
driven by the need for stability and the longing for transcendence. These
tendencies are essentially unhealthy as they repress the questioning
necessary to open human perception beyond tradition and to challenge the
will-to-truth. Philosophical errors fostered by the will-to-truth hamstring
philosophy and deliver it into the hands of the hypocritical:
There have always been many sickly people among those who invent 
fables and long for God: they have a raging hate for the enlightened 
man and for that youngest of virtues, which is called honesty. They 
are always looking back to the dark ages: then, indeed, illusion and 
faith were a different matter; raving of the reason was likeness to 
God, and doubt was sin.. . .  That is why they hearken to preachers of 
death and themselves preach afterworlds.40
Thus, the positing of an external signiffer, whether God, Absolute
Reason, or the Forms, is the product of intellectual laziness or dishonesty.
"Weariness, which wants to reach the Ultimate with a single leap, with a
death-leap, a poor ignorant weariness, which no longer desires even to
desire: that created all gods and afterworlds."41 Nietzsche's dictum "God is
dead" is more than an expression of theological inadequacy, it extends to
the failure of all the external signifiers to which humans have attached
themselves. Science, theology, metaphysics, even history are all entrapped
by the tyranny of language. All of this is a manifestation of the will-to-
40 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
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truth.42 "But that 'other world', that inhuman, dehumanized world which is
a heavenly Nothing, is well hidden from men; and the belly of being does
not speak to man, except as man."43 Nietzsche argues that the "other
world" is silent we mistake our concrete consciousness for the transcendent
"God is a supposition: but I want your supposing to be bounded by
conceivability."44 However, the will-to-truth refuses to allow for the
possibility of philosophical error, leading even to the concretization of the
Beyond:Could you conceive a god?—But may the will-to-truth mean this to 
you: that everything shall be transformed into the humanly- 
conceivable, the humanly-evident, the humanly-palpable! You 
should follow your own senses to the end! And you yourselves 
should create what you have hitherto called the World: the World 
should be formed in your image by your reason, your will, and your 
love!45
Nietzsche asserts that rather than a concrete independent reality, the 
world is an undifferentiated field of force. The world is not a totality of 
entities and things, as these cannot be understood independently, much less 
together. Hearkening back to Heraclitus, Nietzsche emphasizes die
42 "Nietzsche's godlessness is the most extreme expression of his total breakvritix traditional 
historical substance insofar as the language of this latter lays claim to universal validity. All 
human ideals seem to him to have come to nothing: He wishes to reject morality and 
surrender reason and humanity. He views truth as a universal lie; previous philosophy as 
an established deception; Christianity as the triumph of the misfits and the failures, the 
weak and the impotent; there is nothing holy or valid that he does not condemn." Jaspers, 
Nietzsche, 441.
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
44 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
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contingent nature of existence. However, because of the vast array of
societal and philosophical crutches that have been constructed to reassure
humans of the essential stability of existence, this epistemological insight is
incomprehensible to most people:
When water is planked over so that it can be walked upon, when 
gangway and railings span the stream: truly, he that says "everything 
is in flux" is not believed. On the contrary, even simpletons
contradict him "Over the stream everything is firmly fixed, all
the values of things, the bridges, concepts, all 'Good' and 'Evil': all 
are firm ly  fixed ."
The will-to-truth therefore fosters the needed belief in stability to
insure the continued existence of prevailing power mechanisms. However,
just as language eventually becomes devalued as its inadequacy is
demonstrated, the will-to-truth simply cannot repress the chaotic nature of
reality. Nietzsche continues:
"Fundamentally, everything stands still"—that is a proper winter 
doctrine, a fine thing for unfruitful seasons, a fine consolation for 
hibemators and stay-at-homes . . .  the thawing wind, however, 
preaches to the contrary. The thawing wind. . .  a destroyer that 
breaks ice with its angry horns! Ice, however — breaks gangwayd. O 
my brothers, is everything not now influx? Have not all failings and 
gangways fallen into the water and come to nothing? Who can still 
cling to "good" and "evil"? "Woe to us! Hail to us! The thawing 
wind is blowing!"47
For Nietzsche, it makes no sense to speak of the universe as such, as 
the Um welt is inextricably connected to the observer. The individual is a
46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.8.
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, III:12il.
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part of the universe he seeks to observe. This makes independent or 
empirical research an impossible task. A//knowledge, whatever it purports 
to be, is by necessity individual knowledge. By extension, therefore, 
knowledge is always perspectival and contingent Since the individual and 
the universe are tied together, knowledge is an uncertain task. Deleuze and 
Guattari note: "As Nietzsche succeeded in making us understand, thought is 
creation, not will to truth."48
However, the exigencies of the will-to-truth preclude the 
acknowledgement of the perspectival reality of knowledge. As such, the 
"truth" advanced by philosophy is no more than a widely-accepted 
interpretation, although it is bolstered by an entire societal apparatus 
devoted to fostering its legitimacy. This does not however, change the 
underlying epistemological uncertainty that spurs the will-to-truth.
Stripped of its legitimating mechanisms, "truth" is shown to be a selective 
and reductionist notion devoted to suppressing questioning of the 
prevailing conceptual power structure, the primacy of reason. In the 
modernist mindset, philosophy has become devoted to fostering the illusion 
of metaphysical and epistemological stability necessary to maintain the
48 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?
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modem ideology of progress. As Nietzsche notes: "Hitherto all knowledge 
has grown up beside bad conscience!"49
Despite its ideological manipulation, Nietzsche does not seek to 
destroy the notion of "truth," but to inform us of its misuse as an ideological 
and metaphysical tool. Nietzsche argues that inasmuch as we seek to posit 
truths which are eternally stable and reliable, we are setting ourselves up for 
disappointment at best, manipulation at worst50 The "true world" fostered 
by the will-to-truth is nothing more than a mythological construct51
Nietzsche, although he is a perspectivist does not deny the value of 
knowledge. Some perspectives or interpretations are indeed more 
persuasive or reliable than others. This attitude of interpretation and 
evaluation is healthy and useful. However, by attaching the linguistic 
symbol of "truth" to an interpretation, the entire meaning of die interpretive 
argument is changed and a whole variety of power mechanisms come into 
play to support the validity of that particular interpretation.
49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.7.
50 "Expressed exotically, Nietzsche's understanding of truth is a fluidly protean, quasi- 
aesthetic, mytho-poietic ideal of nonexclusive truth. Expressed simply, simplistically, we 
may also say that for Nietzsche there is no truth. The only truth is die lie of truth and the 
truth seeker is condemned to such a lie, where at its best one has the truth that there is no 
truth." Babette E. Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy o f Science (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1994),15.
51 "Nietzsche reveals so-called ideal being as a 'realm' that is exterior and superior to 
human volition. Prohibition and condemnation come down to man from this realm of the 
outside and up-above. But this'realm 'is, after all,'nothing.' It emerges only from the 
weakness of the slave morality, which projects itself into the heavens. The task of the
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Nietzsche counters that absolute knowledge is oxymoronic. Since
reality itself is not stable, knowledge must be supple by definition.
However, metaphysics and science can never accept or even acknowledge
the chaotic state of the universe. Philosophy is therefore delivered into
hands of the ideology of truth, the tyranny of the will-to-truth:
Into the bondage of false values and false scriptures! Ah, that 
someone would redeem them from their Redeemer! Once, as the sea 
tossed them about, they thought they had landed upon an island; but 
behold, it was a sleeping monster! False values and false scriptures: 
they are the worst monsters for mortal men—fate sleeps and waits 
long within them. But at last it comes and awakes and eats and 
devours all that have built their huts upon it52
Inasmuch as truth is an ideological tool, philosophy has become the
servant of the prevailing power structure. Devoted to the search for truth,
philosophy cannot become anything but Even philosophy that is
apparently critical never really attacks the presuppositions that underlie the
will-to-truth: "You have served the people and the people's superstitions,
all you famous philosophers!—you have not served truth! And it is
precisely for that reason that they paid you reverence."53
Caught in the trap of the will-to-truth and its attendant institutional
structures, philosophy has receded further into the absurdity of concretizing
philological and genealogical method is to reveal this ideal source as a nothingness." 
Ricoeur, The Conflict o f interpretations, 443.
52 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:4.
53 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:8.
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"truth." The "philosophical embarrassment" of the dialectic is perhaps the 
ultimate expression of the will-to-truth. It seeks to concretize reality in an 
all-encompassing formula, and devalues or absorbs all that is not in accord 
with its precepts. The dialectic, which purports to eliminate all but the 
essential in its quest for absolute truth, has become a parody. Taken to its 
logical concussion, the dialectic becomes an overtly reductionist mechanism 
for further repressing the possibility for instability.54
Theological worldviews are even more constrictive, as they do not 
generally allow for reinterpretation or the advancement of new hypotheses. 
Theology, when coupled with philosophy in the guise of metaphysics, takes 
the will-to-truth to a new level. Rather than a "search-for -truth", truth is 
taken as already revealed, preventing the need for further exploration. The 
fear of instability leads to the exclusion of entire sections of human 
experience and the disallowing of unacceptable interpretations. As
Nietzsche states: "Churches they call their sweet-smelling caves Who
created such caves and penitential steps? Was it not those who wanted to 
hide themselves and were ashamed before the clear sky?"55
54" According to Nietzsche's self-understanding, this real dialectic may be characterized as 
follows: (1) the movement is not an arbitrary and undirected process, it is self-related. 
Nietzsche calls i t ' ovenx>nung(Uberwindun$.' (2) Due to its connection with the possible 
£ustenzwhich inspires life, this thinking is substantial and quite distinct from intellectual 
arbitrariness. (3) It is constructive in its purpose, though by its very nature it is in constant 
danger of sinking into negation. (4) It has direction but no terminus, and the ground that is 
lost is never regained; its substantiality consists simply in its being-on-the-way." Jaspers, 
Nietzsche, 390.
55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:4.
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Coupled with theological elements, philosophy is exceptionally
selective as to the manner in which it will sanction knowledge. The will-to-
truth, as an ideology that actually operates to repress serious questioning,
has hampered philosophy and made moral or political theory impotent and
bound to prevailing power structures. Philosophy, in the guise if the will-
to-truth, is hypocritical: "And let this be called by me immaculate
perception of all things: "that I desire nothing of things, except that I may lie
down before them like a mirror with a hundred eyes." Oh, you sentimental
hypocrites, you lustful men!"56 The ultimate outcome of the will-to-truth is
complacency, the enemy of knowledge. The role of the philosopher is to
reassure and to console, not to question and provoke:
His wisdom is: stay awake in order to sleep well Now it is clear
to me that what people were once seeking above all when they 
sought the teachers of virtue. They sought good sleep and opium 
virtues to bring it about! To all of these lauded wise men of the 
academic chairs, wisdom meant sleep without dreams: they knew no 
better meaning of life.57
For Nietzsche, it is necessary to realize that all symbolizations, 
whether linguistic or moral, are necessarily mutable. "For all things are 
baptized at the fount of eternity and beyond good and evil; good and evil 
themselves, however, are only intervening shadows and damp afflictions
56 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:15.
57 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:2.
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and passing clouds."58 Philosophy, however, is unable or unwilling to 
accept the essential instability of existence and clings to pipe dreams of a 
comprehendible universe.59 The drive to find the truth, the will-to-truth 
devalues contradiction and leads to the petrifaction of ideas into "concepts" 
and "doctrines."60 It is this concretization that Nietzsche reacts against 
through his de-centering of philosophy and critique of truth. Nietzsche 
does not seek to destroy philosophical errors or deny transcendence in order 
to collapse societal mechanisms; he seeks to cause people to question for 
themselves the foundations of truth.61 Haar notes: "Nietzsche's style aims 
finally at destroying, or at least checking, all logical and, especially,
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ni:4.
59 "Without knowledge of what knowledge is, the possibility of absolute truth becomes a 
metaphysical fantasy—a 'fable' in Nietzsche's words." Babich, N ietzsche's Philosophy o f 
Science, 78.
60 "Our logical and psychological categories derive their falsehood precisely from this 'will 
to find out the truth,' i.e., what is fixed, stable, identical, and noncontradictory. But by 
devaluing contradiction, we bring into evidence a m oralprejudice A  the very basis of 
knowledge. This prejudice can be summed up as follows: what is always stable, always 
identical, is not only True, but also Good, and in a twofold way: knowledge claims to bring 
salvation and is itself haunted by an ideal of ethical honesty. It is as shameful to deceive as 
it is to be deceived, and the true has more ethkalvalue than the false. If the will to know 
the true is the will to be good and to be saved, this will is, then, a way of negating 'life.'" 
Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, 16-17.
61 "Nietzsche does not mean to sacrifice God for the sake of Nothing, for while recognizing 
the deadly truth that God died he aims at transforming it into a life-inspiring one or rather 
to discover in the depth of the deadly truth its opposite. Sacrificing God for the sake of 
Nothing would be an extreme form of world-denial or of pessimism." Leo Strauss, "Note 
on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and EviT in Studies in Platonic Political 
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 180.
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dialectical 'seriousness/ the goal of which is always to establish identities or
to reveal the one absolute Identity."62
Nietzsche argues in Zarathustra that it is necessary to break free of
herd philosophy the will-to-truth, which necessarily denigrates individual
insight "And we believe in the people and its 'wisdom' as if there were a
special secret entrance to knowledge which is blocked to him who has
learned anything."63 Philosophical knowledge can only be valuable if it is
gained outside of traditional philosophy, in the agonal sphere of individual
contemplation and activity:
They wrote letters of blood on the path they followed, and their folly 
taught that truth is proved by blood. But blood is the worst witness 
of truth; blood poisons and transforms the purest teaching to 
delusion and hatred of the heart And if someone goes through fire 
for his teaching—what does that prove? Truly, it is more when one's 
own teaching comes out of one's own burning!64
It is only through this separation that real knowledge can be
obtained. Therefore, as Magnus notes, Nietzsche's critique of philosophy is
much more than a critique of the inadequacy of language, it is an
indictment "Nietzsche's critique is certainly not restricted to nor motivated
by linguistic considerations alone. Such considerations play a role, to be
62 Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, 4.
63 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:17.
64 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:4.
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sure. But the habits which Nietzsche would have us transform are habits of 
living."65
IL
Nietzsche therefore argues that the degeneration of academic 
philosophy into ideology is inescapable, as authentic philosophical 
knowledge is only to be gained by intense individual reflection and activity. 
It is foolish to expect to gain philosophical insight from abstract speculation 
or rumination on texts, as this is merely the reflection upon another's 
insight As Nietzsche writes: "it is not an easy thing to understand 
unfamiliar blood: I hate the idling reader."66 The task of philosophical 
reading in its passive, conventional sense is impossible. Communication of 
essential philosophical insight simply cannot be accomplished through 
traditional linguistic or communicative forms.
Communication of philosophy through a text is essentially the 
production of a semblance of individually-gained knowledge, expressed 
symbolically through linguistic forms. The further philosophy moves away 
from its individual and discursive roots, the less effective it becomes and the 
more danger it faces of becoming vulgarized. As individual philosophical
65 Magnus, N ietzsche's Existential Imperative, 71.
66 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7. The interpreter, as opposed to the "reader" is an active 
participant in the text, he makes it a part of himself.
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insights become interpreted and reinterpreted, the reader is faced with a 
difficult problem: the existence of the original, rigidly constructed text
The text and by extension the writer, becomes an external signifier 
that stands in opposition to the reader. It is essentially impossible to escape 
the tendency of the experience of philosophical interpretation to degenerate 
into a repressive power relationship.67 Nietzsche is therefore faced with the 
challenge of constructing a new type of philosophical discourse that will not 
degenerate into an external signifier. Thus, he must deal with language and 
therefore symbol.
Nietzsche is open to criticism on this point He can certainly not be 
naive enough to assert that he is capable of producing a new milieu of 
symbolic discourse that will not fall into the traps he identifies and criticizes. 
Nietzsche's main critique of traditional philosophy is that it tends to 
concretize symbols and cause them to become detached from their original 
meaning, while at the same time legitimating their practical force. If 
Nietzsche is correct and symbols arise out of the concrete experience of 
individuals, he is falling prey to this same problem. Nietzsche is certainly 
concretizing philosophical experience in the guise of a symbolic discourse,
67 As Foucault notes: "For Nietzsche, it was not a matter of knowing what good and evil 
were in themselves, but of who was being designated, or rather who was speaJdngwben 
one said Agathos to designate oneself and D eilosto designate others. For it is there, in the 
holder oi the discourse and, more profoundly still, in the possessor o f the word, that 
language is gathered together in its entirety." The Order o f Things: An Archaeology o f the 
Human Sciences Qiew York: Vintage, 1970), 305.
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even if he is up front about this fact However, he does not fully heed his
own imperative to avoid the tyranny of language. If Nietzsche's
metaphorical discourse is to remain attached to the original experiences that
engendered them, it is necessary for him to insure that these symbols are
capable of representing die internal experiences they represent without
become vulgarized.
In order to overcome this criticism, Nietzsche must argue that the
symbols in Zarathustra are not the type of symbols that can be the substrate
for a new philosophical language. Unlike mythological experience, these
symbols are not intended to explain the world or universals. They are
rhetorical tools designed to evoke in the mind of the reader a semblance of
Nietzsche's internal philosophical experience. As Jaspers notes:
The fact that he used an abundance of symbols, especially in 
Zarathustra, must not mislead us. These do not have the weight of 
symbols that are really believed; they represent a less formal 
language and, in their intention and effect, never anything more. In 
his youth, Nietzsche as a classical philologist often spoke of myths, 
but in later life he seldom so much as used the word.68
Thus, Nietzsche's symbolic language is not a mythical discourse
designed to replace traditional language. Nietzsche is attempting to
transcend the strictures of language as much as possible, not to reform i t 69
68 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 371.
»  "Still, although he never mentions an intentional creation or replacement of myths, he 
sees with increasing clarity a new, virtually mythical reality: the dynamic presence of 
landscape and weather, of nature and life, and of the entire infra-human world." Jaspers, 
Nietzsche, 371.
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Nietzsche's version of interpretive philosophy demands a communicative 
form which is capable of that which both myth and language are incapable: 
the elaboration of internal thought patterns and cognitive structures which 
are at the same time irrational and inextricably connected to the individual's 
personal experiences.
How can one hope to communicate philosophical ideas in the form of 
discourse bounded by an artificial ordering principle—reason? If the 
philosopher is to reach the mind of the reader, it must be in terms that the 
human consciousness will intuitively recognize. This will necessarily render 
the text confusing and even self-contradictory.70 However, contradiction is 
valuable to uncovering philosophical errors, as it is innately part of the 
human cognitive experience.71 A coherent, non-contradictory text is by 
definition contrived. As Nietzsche notes: "With all things one thing is
70 "Of course, self-contradictions within a text are inevitable from Nietzsche's point of view, 
and he makes no claim to being exempt The inevitability of contradiction justifies 
Nietzsche's refutation of the 'internalist' perspective's attempt to establish norms of rational 
acceptability based on coherence, simplicity, common sense, or other contextually accepted
standards For Nietzsche, the conditions of rational acceptability have been culturally
produced and always stand in danger of immanent contradiction." John McGowan, 
Postmodernism and Its Critics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 74.
71 "Man's 'sickness' is shown by the fact that human development rests upon radical errors. 
Man became 'human' only through illusion and folly. Consequently, man is 'a highly 
mendacious, artificial, and opaque animal.' The disease of humanity, 'in contrast to the 
condition of the animals, all of whose instincts are adapted to very specific tasks,' is 
expressed by the fact that man, being a mere bundle of unfulfilled possibilities of 
'indeterminate nature,' 'abounds in contradictory evaluations and, consequently, in 
contradictory desires.' What makes man sick is precisely that which constitutes his value. 
The sickness itself becomes the bearer or value " Jaspers, Nietzsche, 130.
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impossible— rationality!"72 Traditional philosophy ignores the fact that 
there are at least two participants in the task of philosophy: the writer and 
the reader. The original action, the creation of the text is only the first step. 
The interpretation of the text is of equal importance. Conventional 
philosophical discourse ignores the subjective role of the reader as 
interpreter, as Deleuze and Guattari note: "signifier enthusiasts take an 
oversimplified situation as their implicit model: word and thing. From the 
word they extract the signifier, and from the thing a signified in conformity 
with the word, and therefore subjugated to the signifier."73
Traditional philosophical writing is therefore somewhat naive, as it 
assumes that the text is imbued with objective meaning separate from the 
reader. Nietzsche realizes this fallacy and attempts to find a solution. By 
acknowledging the reader as the actual site of philosophy, Nietzsche is able 
to mitigate the problem of the text as a signifier and the problem of 
symbolism. However, Nietzsche also places a great deal of emphasis upon 
the act of reading. It is ultimately the responsibility of the reader to confront 
the text and engage in the act of serious interpretation.
In this sense, the narrative format of Zarathustra is the natural next 
step in Nietzsche's desire to confound the casual reader. It is simply not 
possible to approach Zarathustra as a traditional philosophical text
72 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IIL4.
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Nietzsche demands serious attention on the part of the reader "It disgusts 
me to think of Zarathustra going into the world as a piece of literary 
entertainment; who will be serious enough for it!. . .  [N]ow nobody can 
save me from being cast among the writers of belles lettres. Hell!"74 
Zarathustra is not to be read as a diversion, it is to become a diversion.
Most fundamentally, Nietzsche envisioned the narrative form 
employed in Zarathustra to be the only method available to convey his own 
internal experiences. Because the narrative by its very nature demands 
interpretation rather than merely comprehension, it is qualitatively different 
from the ordinary philosophical text Rational, logical thought is an 
inaccurate representation of the operation of the human mind. Humans do 
not think in the manner of carefully-constructed, tightly argued texts. 
Human thought is more organic, composed of images and feelings not 
rationally tied together. Nietzsche argues that discourse must be freed from 
the creeping reductionism inherent in philosophical language. As Foucault 
notes:
And now, in this philosophical-philological space opened up for us 
by Nietzsche, language wells up in an enigmatic multiplicity that 
must be mastered. There appear, like so many projects (or chimeras, 
who can tell as yet?), the themes of a universal formulation of all 
discourse, or the themes of an internal exegesis of the world which 
would at the same time be its total demystification, or those of a
73 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 66.
74 Nietzsche, Letter to Peter Gast, April 6,1883, in Middleton, Selected Letters o f Friedrich 
Nietzsche, 212.
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general theory of signs; or again, the themes (historically probably 
the first) of a transformation without residuum, of a total 
reabsorption of all forms of discourse into a single word, of all books 
into a single page, of the whole world into one book.75
The creation of the narrative is itself an act of critical judgement and
aesthetic creation.76 Through this creative act Nietzsche hopes to transcend
the logical requirements of language and communicate internal images
through a communicative systems of metaphor and symbol that are not tied
to the exigencies of the will-to-truth. Nietzsche speaks of the process by
which he chose the narrative format for his most important philosophical
work in these terms:
Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a clear idea of what 
poets of strong ages call inspiration?. . .  in the sense that suddenly, 
with indescribable certainty and subtlety, something becomes visible, 
audible, something that shakes one to the last depths and throws one 
down—that merely describes the facts. One hears, one does not seek; 
one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like lightning, a thought 
flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its form—I 
never had any choice.77
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche describes the metaphorical language of 
Zarathustra as a complex web of image and that which it supposedly 
represents:
75 Foucault, The Order o f Things: An Archaeology o f the Human Sciences, 305.
76 "The world is not the mere appearance of the will-to-power, for as we know, the 
distinction between a phenomenal 'apparent' world and a transcendent 'real' world is 
rejected by Nietzsche. But more than that The very positing of a distinction between'teal' 
and 'apparent' is part of the problem, not a contribution to the solution. The positing of 
that distinction is a symptom of decadence, of the decline of life. The world is no illusion." 
Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative, 22.
77 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
The involuntariness of image and metaphor is strangest of all; one no 
longer has any notion of what is an image or a metaphor, everything 
offers itself as the nearest, most obvious, simplest expression. It 
actually seems, to allude to something Zarathustra says, as if the 
things themselves approached and offered themselves as 
metaphors.78
In Zarathustra Nietzsche hopes to use metaphorical language to 
express the essentially inexpressible: internal experience. Nietzsche argues 
that imagery, metaphor, and symbols unadulterated by the conceptual 
constraints of grammar can communicate philosophical insight more 
accurately than language. Essentially, Nietzsche uses a convergence of 
imagery to inspire in the mind of the interpreter a semblance of Nietzsche's 
own internal experience. "There is no wisdom, no investigation of the soul, 
no art of speech before Zarathustra: what is nearest and most everyday, here 
speaks unheard-of things. Epigrams trembling with passion, eloquence 
become music, lightning bolts hurled forward into hitherto unfathomed 
futures."79
Nietzsche describes the metaphorical language employed in 
Zarathustra as beyond the capacity of normal language. "The most 
powerful capacity for metaphors that has existed so far is poor and mere 
child's play compared with this return of language to the nature of
78 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §3.
79 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §6.
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imagery."80 Nietzsche creates concepts, to be sure, but not mythological
ones designed to be adopted by others or developed into dogma.81 Through
this attack on language, Nietzsche repudiates analytic and speculative
philosophy as incapable of reaching authentic knowledge. Instead, one
must actively engage philosophical problems directly, not through the
writings of others:
For this is the truth: I have left the house of scholars and slammed the 
door behind me. Too long did my soul sit hungry at their table; I 
have not been schooled, as they have, to crack knowledge as one 
cracks nuts . . .  they sit cool in the cool shade: they want to be mere 
spectators in everything and they care not to sit where the sun burns 
upon the steps, like those who stand in the street and stare at the 
people passing by, so they too wait and stare at thoughts that others 
have thought82
Similarly, it is impossible to use the methods of discourse favored by 
these modes: dialectics, empiricism, and mysticism. A new mode of 
communication must be advanced: self-communication. Only discourse 
taking place within the self can be of success, as it alone can recognize the
80 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §6.
81 "It might be thought that Nietzsche renounces concepts. However, he creates immense 
and intense concepts ('forces,' 'value/ 'becoming,' 'life'; and repulsive concepts like 
ressentim ent and T*ad conscience'), just as he lays out a new plane of imminence (infinite 
movements of the will to power and eternal return) that completely changes the image of 
thought (criticism of the will to truth). . .  But in Nietzsche, the conceptual personae 
involved never remain implicit It is true that their manifestation for themselves gives rise 
to an ambiguity that leads many readers to see Nietzsche as a poet thaumaturge, or creator 
of myths. But conceptual personae, in Nietzsche and elsewhere, are not mythical 
personifications or historical persons or literary or novelistic heroes." Deleuze and 
Guattari, What is Philosophy? 65.
82 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:16.
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fact that the individual cannot seek understanding outside of interpretation. 
Internal dialogue can only be communicated through imagery, but it is in 
the end the most effective type of communication as it is the most intimate. 
Nietzsche's self-communication takes the form of anamnetic meditation. 
Nietzsche is therefore writing for himself, but the fact that he chooses to 
publish his works demonstrates that Nietzsche's internal dialogue is to be 
shared.83
Nietzsche argues that in order to foster this internal interpretive 
dialogue, it is necessary to return to the most concrete, fundamental 
experiences. "Truly, all being is hard to demonstrate; it is hard to make it 
speak. Yet tell me, brothers, is not the most wonderful of all things most 
clearly demonstrated?"84 It makes more sense to interrogate existence that is 
the closest to us and the most comprehensible, our concrete consciousness. 
However, we have fooled ourselves by buying into the myth of 
transcendence. This leads to a rank ordering of types of insight, ranking
83 It is reported that Nietzsche actually tried to get the few copies of his published works 
back before is breakdown in 1888. If so, this would strengthen my point However, I 
cannot find definitive evidence for this outside of the secondary literature, and so have 
reserved judgement on this matter. Nietzsche, at the end of his career, states: "I am one 
thing, my writings are another matter.. . .  Some day institutions will be needed in which 
men live and teach as I conceive of living and teaching; it might even happen that a few 
chairs will then be set aside for the interpretation of Zarathustra. But it then would 
contradict my character entirely if I expected ears and hands for my truths today: that today 
doesn't hear me and doesn't accept my ideas is not only understandable, it even seems 
right to me. I don't want to be confounded with others—not even by myself." . . .  My 
triumph is precisely the opposite of Schopenhauer's: I say, 'non legor, non legar. (I am not 
read, I w ill not be read.'" Ecce Homo, 111:1.
M Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
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externally-actuated form of insight, often concretized in "authoritative"
texts, as superior to the experiences of the individual consciousness in
relation to the cosmos. This has led to the neglect of internal experience as a
ground for knowledge:
Once the soul looked contemptuously upon die body: and then this 
contempt was the supreme good—the soul wanted the body lean, 
monstrous, emaciated. So the soul thought to escape from the body
and from the earth But tell me, brothers: what does your body
say about your soul? Is not your soul poverty and dirt and miserable 
escape?85
The narrative format may offer an answer, as it requires the conscious
act of interpretation, unlike the philosophical format that is not honest in its
need for interpretation. Zarathustra does not have a meaning as such, and
the reader does not expect to find one outside of the individual
interpretation. The reader expects to have to interpret the text, as opposed
to reading for the philosopher's intended meaning.
Nietzsche refers to this type of interpretive endeavor as "being-
masked." The mask is a necessity because of the inexpressibility of
knowledge; one must take on the mask in order to experience existence from
a different perspective. As Jaspers notes:
The necessity of being masked throws its shadow on the meaning of a 
work: No thoughts that go into a work can convey the truth itself. 
The lack of authenticity in everything determinate results in the 
ambiguity of the authentic; incommunicability produces the
as Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
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loneliness that hides behind masks. The work of a thinker who has 
allowed this boundary-experience to permeate his very being is 
identifiable, as it were, by stigmata.86
The metaphor of the mask suggests a much deeper level of
engagement than mere reading. Being masked necessarily destroys the
impulse to the will-to-truth, representing a conscious choice to expand the
level of perception and engage in an interpretive endeavor. The mask
operates on a more primal level than speech, it signifies a change in
perception on the level of consciousness itself. Klossowski states:
The mask, which forms a determined physiognomy all the same, 
even when it hides its absence, belongs to external interpretation, but 
corresponds to an internal desire of suggestion. Even more, it reveals 
that the person who appears to wear the mask must also have 
decided on such-and-such a face with regard to "himself'. . .  Just as 
the mask hides the absence of a determinate physiognomy—and thus 
conceals Chaos, the richness of Chaos—so the gesture that 
accompanies the mask (the histrionic gesture) is strictly related to the 
designation of the lived emotion before it is signified by speech.87
Unlike language, the idea of the mask retains an innate authenticity.
Since the mask becomes a part of the interpreter, it is in each case genuine.88
However, this is not to imply some sort of passive adoption of a different
perspective. The adoption of masks is a constant flux of identity, in keeping
with the reality of internal experience. Much as internal dialogue is
86 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 409.
87 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle 224.
88 "Nietzsche distinguishes the mask, of which he approves, from histrionics, in which all 
genuineness in lost" Jaspers, Nietzsche, 406.
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fragmented and irrational, Nietzsche constructs his works faithful to the
disjointed character of the mind. Haar notes: "the fragmented, aphoristic,
and bursting character of the text corresponds to Nietzsche's own grasp of
the world: it is a world scattered to pieces, teeming with explosions. . .  a
world made of moving and light surfaces where the incessant shifting of
masks is named laughter, dance, game."89
A vital element in Nietzsche's interpretive philosophy is the act of
critique. Critique is a creative act that places the reader in opposition to the
text or the philosophy at hand.90 Eventually, Nietzsche calls upon the
individual to turn the critique inward and investigate the possibilities of
personal metamorphosis, which will be discussed at length in Chapter
Seven. This takes the form of an enduring interpretation of the
manifestations of the will-to-power as it manifests within the self, which are
at bottom the internal experiences Nietzsche discusses:
The world is a process of becoming, conceived as a unity. It is will- 
to-power in the sense that will-to-power is its intelligible character.
89 Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, 4.
90 "Nietzsche contrasts the activity of critique with revenge, grudge or ressentim ent 
Zarathustra will be followed from one end of the book to the other by his ape, his 'buffoon', 
his 'demon'; but the ape is as different from Zarathustra as revenge and icssentim entare 
from critique itself. To be confused with his ape; this is what Zarathustra feels as one of the
frightful temptations held out to him Critique is not a re-action of re-sentim ent\m t the
active expression of an active mode of existence; attack and not revenge, the natural 
aggression of a way of being, the divine wickedness without which perfection could not be
imagined This way of being is that of the philosopher precisely because he intends to
wield the differential element as critic and therefore as a hammer." GiOes Deleuze, 
Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1983), 3.
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We presumably can see will-to-power expressing itself in and as 
everything if we modify our perspective, if we abandon traditional 
habits of thought and speech. Will-to-power is therefore to be 
understood only as existing in and through "its" manifestations.91
By relocating the site of philosophy to the critique of internal
manifestations of the will-to-power, Nietzsche brings his thought full circle.
All of existence is seen to be an interpretation of the will-to-power in its
varied permutations. Philosophy, therefore, is nothing if it is not the
interpretation of these interpretations.92 Ricoeur states:
Where positivism says, There are only facts, Nietzsche says, There are 
no facts, only interpretations. In extending the critique to so-called 
internal experience, Nietzsche destroys in its principle the exceptional 
character of the cogito with respect to the doubt that Descartes 
directed to the distinction between the world of dreams and the 
world of waking. To assume the phenomenality of the internal world 
is, in addition, to align the connection of inner experience with 
external "causation," which is also an illusion that conceals the play 
of forces under the artifice of order. It is, as well, to posit an entirely 
arbitrary fiction called "thinking," apart from the bristling 
multiplicity of instincts. And finally, it is to imagine a "substratum of 
subject" in which the acts of thought would have their origin.99
Perpetual critique of this kind leads to a philosophical project that is
never complete. As each reader confronts the text the imagery is
91 Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative^ 22.
92 "Indeed [one] will doubt whether a philosopher could possiUyhave 'ultimate and real' 
opinions, whether behind every one of his caves there is not, must not be, another deeper 
cave—a more comprehensive, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abysmally deep 
ground behind every ground, under every attempt to furnish 'grounds.'. . .  Every 
philosophy also concealsa philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout every word also a 
mask." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, § 289.
93 Paul Ricoeur, O neself as Another, brans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 15.
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reconstituted according to the experiences of the reader and is interpreted 
accordingly. Jaspers confirms this point, "But at the same time we find here 
a philosophy that exists only in Nietzsche and cannot be transmitted, one 
that speaks without disclosing the way and that /s without being a model."94
This interpretation argues that Zarathustra represents Nietzsche's 
conscious attempt to remedy the seeming impossibility of philosophical 
communication.95 The first sections of Zarathustra, concerning the state and 
community, are largely critical The symbolic language in these sections is 
negative, consisting of metaphors of destruction of the self and immersion in 
the dehumanizing social matrix. On the contrary, Nietzsche's metaphors 
concerning the possibility of self-creation are much more positive, if more 
problematic. It is therefore necessary to look to the structure and images of 
Zarathustra itself to determine the insights that can be gained through
94 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 449.
85 In his autobiography, Nietzsche writes of this problem: "To communicate a state, an 
inward tension of pathos, by means of signs, including the tempo of these signs—that is the 
meaning of every style; and considering that the multiplicity of inward states is 
exceptionally large in my case, I have many stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art 
of style that has ever been at the disposal of one man. Good is any style that really 
communicates an inward state, that makes no mistake about the signs, the tempo of the 
signs, the gestures—all the laws about how long periods are concerned with the art of 
gestures. Here my instinct is infallible. Good style in itself—& pure folly, mere 'idealism/ 
on a level with the 'beautiful in itself/ the 'good in itself/ the 'thing in itself.' Always 
presupposing that there are ears—that there are those capable and worthy of the same 
pathos, that there is no lack of those to whom one m ay communicate oneself.—My 
Zarathustra, for example, is still looking for those—alas, it will have to keep looking for 
some time yet!. . .  And until then there will be nobody to understand the art that has been 
squandered here: nobody ever was in a position to squander more new, unheard-of artistic 
devices that has actually been created only for this purpose." Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 111:4.
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careful interpretation, and which reveal themselves to be manifestly 
political.
The overarching purpose of Zarathustra is to evoke a hyperaware 
self-critical awareness, and through this existential stance to provoke the 
possibility of personal transmutation. However, Nietzsche asserts that the 
self is largely made through collective forces and social interaction; political 
forces that exist independently from the individual but are internalized. 
Since the self is therefore largely socially-created, it must be deconstructed 
in order to reveal the substrate of the individual self. This project is 
demonstrated specifically through the narrative progression in Zarathustra. 
As the most influential actor of social creation, the state receives Nietzsche's 
most virulent attack.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter  in
Th e  c o l d  Monster: Th e  S tate a n d  M ass C ulture 
Nietzsche's political analysis in Zarathustra does not proceed in a 
linear fashion; nevertheless it is a dearly-defined argument Within the 
course of the narrative, Zarathustra moves from solitude to sodety and back 
to solitude. This begins within the Prologue when Zarathustra leaves the 
solitude of his cave and goes down to human society below. He encounters 
a town, where he attempts to teach die inhabitants die knowledge he has 
accumulated through his years of solitary introspection. The fact that he 
chooses to leave the town is also important, as it indicates that Nietzsche 
does not view collective existence as the end of Zarathustra's journey, but 
rather as a necessary part of his journey towards personal insight and 
growth.
Implied in this narrative progression is Nietzsche's rejection of 
collective forms of existence and his call to a self-actualized mode of being. 
In Zarathustra Nietzsche criticizes the various levels of human collective 
existence from the greatest level of aggregation down to the most basic 
levels of association. Nietzsche identifies two major elements of collective 
existence for his critique: die state and mass culture. However, Nietzsche 
does not make fine distinctions between these two; they are seen as 
interdependent and symbiotic.
83
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For Nietzsche, the most fundamental element of collective existence is 
K u ltu r (culture), understood as the symbolic underpinnings of a given 
society. The culture of a society need not be concretely institutionalized in 
terms of political power, but these symbolic associations invariably become 
concretized as they are prime resources for political manipulation. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that culture exists independent of 
prevailing political forms. Importantly, Nietzsche argues that modem 
culture is no longer a creative factor, but is largely a product of and a tool of 
the modem state. As such, Nietzsche largely offers a critique of "mass" 
culture, which is therefore the handmaiden of the state. It is therefore 
proper to examine Nietzsche's critique of the state first
Nietzsche's concept of the state is directly connected to the idea of 
institutionalized power.1 Nietzsche treats the state separately from mass 
culture in part due to his ongoing genealogical analysis of the modes of 
human association. Nietzsche examines the origins of institutionalized 
government as early as The Birth o f Tragedy, and the correspondence 
between the character of a culture and the governmental structures that 
grow out of it remains an enduring theme, culminating in the essays that
1 It is dear that Nietzsche is not speaking only of Prussian nationalism, although it is a 
prime example of the spirit underlying the runaway bureaucratic state. As Nietzsche 
argues in Daybreak "How degenerate in its taste, how slavish before dignities, classes, 
decorations, pomp and splendor, must a people have been when it evaluated the Schlkhte 
[the simple] as the ScMechte[the bad], the simple man the bad man! The moral arrogance 
of the Germans should always be confronted with this little word'schlecht: nothing further 
is needed." §231.
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form The Genealogy of Morality. Throughout his work Nietzsche 
continuously emphasizes the essential separation that necessarily grows 
between the people and their government as the institutions of government 
grow more and more detached horn the culture underlying the society. The 
most essential of the institutions is the "law/' which Nietzsche argues is a 
mythological construct which derives its legitimacy from the society's belief 
in its transcendent rectitude. Although it is a state construct, the law gains 
an epistemological independence that becomes unquestioned by the 
masses.2
This separation of the people and the state is exacerbated by the 
tendency of societies to concretize existing power relations into stable 
institutions. Originally, these state institutions reflect the cultural prejudices 
and presuppositions underlying a society. However, the nature of 
institutions undercuts the essential fluidity of human culture and society. 
The symbols that support state institutions lose their original meanings and 
are simply taken for granted. Furthermore, the state actively seeks to 
promulgate its legitimacy by co-opting religious, cultural, and ethnic
2 "There are moralities which are meant to justify their creator before others. .. .This 
morality is used by its creator to forget, that one to have others forget him or something 
about him. Some moralists want to vent their power and creative whims on humanity; 
some others, perhaps including Kant, suggest with their morality: 'What deserves respect in 
me is that I can obey—and you ought not to be different from m e/—In short, moralities are 
also merely a sign language o f the affects.” Nietzsche, Beyond Good and E vil §187.
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symbols. The state structure that emerges from this process is an essentially 
independent political actor with its own agenda and sense of survival.3
This conclusion foreshadows Max Weber's analysis of the 
bureaucratic state, which is in sympathy with Nietzsche's critique of the 
institutionalized state. Nietzsche's views on the origin and operation of the 
state also mirrors the methodological debate within the field of comparative 
politics, which has for some time been struggling with whether political 
culture or political structures are predominant in determining political 
change. Nietzsche's analysis suggests that political culture, or mass society, 
provides the superstructure of symbols and constraints that ultimately 
determine the type of political structures that can be institutionalized. In the 
Nietzschean sense, culture begets structure, and structure then shapes 
culture.
Nietzsche therefore envisions the "state" as a relatively fixed 
constellation of concrete power relations that exists independently from the 
essentially psychological normalizing mechanisms of mass culture, upon 
and from which the state was originally founded. This concretization of 
power relations in the state, because it now has an independent stable 
existence, is self-replicating and resistant to change. As such, the state 
becomes a radically disconnected political actor that seeks to usurp the
3 Nietzsche refers to the belief in the validity and independence of the state as "insanity" 
and a form of "pathological estrangement." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §256.
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original normalizing mechanisms of mass culture in order to retain and 
maximize its own power within the confines of the society as a whole. As 
the culture of a society changes over time, the state structures are threatened 
and become more deeply entrenched, causing a rupture which undermines 
the legitimacy of the state.4 As Nietzsche later argues: "Our institutions are 
no good anymore: on that there is universal agreement However, it is not 
their fault but ours. Once we have lost ail the instincts out of which 
institutions grow, we lose institutions altogether because we are no longer 
good for them."5
The state is, then, an artifact of preceding generations. It is a creature 
of myth, but one with very real power and the willingness to destroy in 
order to maintain its existence. Indeed, the state is die true opiate of the 
masses, cultivating a sense of dependence not unlike addiction. 
Unfortunately for its citizens, the state has through the generations
* "How the tradition has arisenis here a matter of indifference, and has in any event 
nothing to do with good and evil or with any kind of immanent categorical imperative, it is 
above all directed at the preservation of a community, a people; every superstitious usage 
which has arisen on the basis of some chance event mistakenly interpreted enforces a 
tradition which is in accordance with custom to follow; for to sever oneself from it is
dangerous, and even more injurious to the community than to the individual Every
tradition now continually grows more venerable the farther away its origin lies and the 
more this origin is forgotten; the respect paid to it increases from generation to generation, 
the tradition at last becomes holy and evokes awe and reverence; and thus the morality of 
piety is in any event a much older morality than that which demands unegoistic actions." 
Nietzsche, Human all too Human § 96.
5 Nietzsche, The Twilight o f the Idols, 939.
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conditioned them to be an unquestioning audience to this political theatre of
symbols and noise:
The State, Zarathustra teaches, is to be held in suspicion, for its claim 
to speak for all can only be maintained by its concealing its origins in
the act of creation The people, those gathered like a herd in the
market-place, have little appreciation of greatness and creativeness, 
they have only a taste for good actors.6
Nietzsche's contempt for die state, therefore, is based upon his 
conviction that the state is the most ruthlessly efficient destroyer of human 
potentiality possible. "I call it die state where everyone, good and bad, 
drinks poison: the state where everyone, good and bad, loses himself: the 
state where universal slow suicide is called—life."7 The state not only 
quashes individual initiative and creativity, but it actively seeks to cause its 
citizens to internalize the values of conformity and quiescence. Reared and 
trapped within the confines of the state, individuals are infantilized and 
have become the vassals of an oppressor more concrete than religion and 
more cruelly repressive. Nietzsche writes, "there are still peoples and herds 
somewhere, but not with us, brothers: here there are states. The state?
What is that? Well then! Now open your ears, for I shall now speak to you 
of the death of peoples. The state is the coldest of all cold monsters."8
6 Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, 163.
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, t i l .
8 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Lll.
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Nietzsche attacks the central myth that supports the state, whether its 
theoretical justification is founded in consent or divine right This is the 
myth that the state actually represents or is in some way constitutive of die 
people, rather than being a mechanism designed to preserve prevailing 
power relations:
Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: "I, the state, am 
the people." It is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung 
a faith and a love over them: thus they served life. It is destroyers 
who set snares for many and call it the state: they hang a sword and 
a hundred desires over them.9
The modem state is the legacy of its founders, and the modem 
manifestation of these relationships as embodied in institutions is still 
manipulated by those in power. However the rulers of the state, as 
products of it, are themselves constrained within die institutional structures 
they claim to control. Indeed, the leaders of modem society are often the 
most corrupted by the mythology surrounding the state. As great actors, 
they are master manipulators but do not possess creative energy which 
would allow them to supercede their subservient status.
This corruption of leadership is a symptom of die state, but also leads 
to the increasing vanity of die masses. The ethos of conformity becomes a 
positive virtue, further ensuring mediocrity and the repression of the 
individual:
9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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There is no harder misfortune in all human destiny than when the 
powerful of the earth are not also the first men. Then everything 
becomes false and awry and monstrous. And when they are even the 
last men and more beast than man, then die value of die rabble rises 
higher and higher and at last the rabble-virtue says: Behold, I alone 
am virtue!10
Nietzsche therefore consistendy refers to the state as die triumph of 
the "superfluous," essentially meaning complacent dependent mediocrity.11 
The state creates willing subjects, draws them in, and then uses their labor 
and devotion to promulgate itself into the next generation. "Many too many 
are born: the state was invented for the superfluous! Just see how it lures 
them, the many-too-many! How it devours them, and chews them, and re­
chews them!"12
Just look at these superfluous people! They steal for themselves the 
works of inventors and the treasures of the wise: they call their theft 
culture—and they turn everything to sickness and calamity. Just look 
at these superfluous people! They are always ill, they their bile and 
call it a newspaper. They devour one another and cannot even digest 
themselves.13
It is difficult to believe that vital, creative individuals could arise out 
of this mire, as Nietzsche seems to hope. Zarathustra himself laments the 
difficulty of this hope: "I myself, to be sure—I have never yet seen a great
10 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:3.
11 "Superfluous" could also be rendered as "parasites"; or perhaps more poetically "co­
dependent vampires."
12 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Lll.
13 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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man. The eye of the subtlest is crude today for what is great It is the
kingdom of the mob Today belongs to the mob: who still knows what is
great what small! Who could successfully seeks greatness there! Only a
fool: a fool would succeed."14 Nietzsche's critiques of the state are therefore
not designed to provide practical reforms that would make collective
institutionalized existence less repressive.15 Nietzsche instead turns to a
critique of the individual created by the confluence of mass culture and state
action. Because of the culture of conformity, these individuals seek to
corrupt others with their own Dekadenz in furtherance of the state:
What is this man? A heap of diseases that reach out into the world 
through the spirit there they want to catch their prey. What is Bus 
man? A knot of savage serpents that are seldom at peace among 
themselves—thus they go forth alone to seek prey in the world.16
Politics and society in the classical sense is inimical to the state.
Whereas Plato and Aristotle linked the polis and die just individual,
Nietzsche argues that the modem state and perhaps society in general are
inevitably coercive and therefore destructive of the individual self. Healthy
individuals, and by extension healthy cultures, intuitively recognize the
14 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:5.
15 Several Nietzsche interpreters make the opposite argument, particularly Strong and 
Ansell-Pearson. However, I argue that if Nietzsche wanted to present a political theory of 
the state he would have simply done so. Rather, Nietzsche consistently focuses on the 
status of the individual and presents his positive thought accordingly. Nietzsche critiques 
the state unmercifully, but reserves his recommendations and hope for the future for the 
individual.
16 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:6.
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pathological nature of the institutionalized state. "Where a people still 
exists, there the people do not understand the state and hate it as the evil 
eye and sin against custom and law."17 Because it is no longer connected to 
the fundamental elements of its indigenous culture or the citizens currently 
comprising the populace, the state is actually an impediment to the search 
for justice or positive political change, contrary to the prevailing statist 
myth. This is primarily due to the desire of the state to prevent its citizens 
from venturing outside of accepted parameters.
The state proffers pre-existing collective social identities that usurp 
the innate identities of its citizens. This is carried out largely through the 
use of political myths such as nationalism, the belief in equality, or cultural 
and ethnic superiority. Group identity subsumes all and leads to needless 
(valueless) conflict with little opportunity for personal glory. This conflict 
serves to strengthen ties to the institutions of the state while preventing 
either meaningful interpersonal relationships or a meaningful dialogue with 
the self.18
Nietzsche argues that the most pernicious political myth arising from 
this disconnection is that of human equality. Nietzsche does not seem to
17 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
18 "To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practice obedience 
towards a law or tradition established from of old. Whether one subjects oneself with effort 
or gladly and willingly makes no difference, it is enough that one does i t  He is called 
"good" who doers what is customary as if by nature, as a result of a long inheritance, that is 
to say easily and gladly." Nietzsche, Human a ll too Human §96.
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imply that humans should necessarily be ranked or that human life is
meaningless apart from greatness. Rather, Nietzsche objects that the myth
of equality has been manipulated by those in power to prevent the
emergence of creativity or greatness within a society. Partially motivated by
bad conscience, leaders promulgate the notion of equality in order to
disguise their own mediocrity: "Thus do I speak to you in parables, you
who make the soul giddy, you preachers of equality. You are tarantulas and
dealers in hidden revengefulness!"19 This is the hypocrisy of those who
preach equality; they seek to level others so they no longer feel inadequate.
Indeed, the state relies on the institutionalized belief in equality to
regulate human behavior. As the generations progress, this belief becomes
less questioned until it has become a quasi-religious dogma. However, the
belief in equality remains in some sense attached to the feelings of guilt and
inadequacy from which it sprang:
You preachers of equality, thus from you the mad tyranny of 
impotence cries for "equality': thus your most secret tyranny of 
appetite disguises itself in words of virtue. Soured self-conceit, 
repressed envy, perhaps your fathers' self-conceit and envy: they 
burst from you as a flame and madness of revenge.20
Nietzsche's critique is not aimed at putting individuals in their place
or setting up a new class structure. However, Nietzsche seeks to inform the
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
20 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
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individual that the belief in equality is no more than a myth. Because his
goal is to emancipate the individual from the psychological grip of mass
culture and the confines of the state, he must destroy file fundamental errors
underlying their grip on the person. "I do not want to be confused with
these preachers of equality, nor taken for one of them. For justice speaks
thus to me. "Men are not equal." And they should not become so, either!
For what were my love of the Obermensch if I spoke otherwise?"21
The state and mass culture, however, are composed of these overly
normalized individuals who are not able to recognize, or chose not to
perceive, the mythological basis underlying governmental institutions.
Because of this, the state is preoccupied with petty questions, and, at the
same time, prohibits individuals from taking positions or asking questions
injurious to the status quo. As such, the search for knowledge is stunted:
The marketplace is full of solemn buffoons—and the people boast of 
their great men! These are their heroes of the hour. But the hour 
presses them: so they press you. And from you too they require a 
Yes or a No. And woe to you if you want to set your chair between 
For and Against Do not be jealous, lover of truth, because of these 
inflexible men! Truth has never yet clung to the arm of an inflexible 
man.22
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL7.
22 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
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The ultimate product of mass culture is the paragon of collective 
being, referred to by Zarathustra as the "Ultimate Man."23 The defining 
characteristic of the Ultimate Man is smug self-satisfaction. This inertia, 
linked with pride, leads to a lack of self-critical ability. "The time of the 
most contemptible man is coming, the man who can no longer despise 
himself. Behold! I shall show you the Ultimate Man."24 The Ultimate Man 
may be afflicted by bad conscience or existential guilt but is not able to 
conceive of different possibilities. This narcissism inevitably extends into 
arrogance: "They have something of which they are proud. What is it 
called that makes them proud? They call it culture, it distinguishes them 
from goatherds."25
Nietzsche, however, speaks with great contempt for the Ultimate 
Man, which he considers to be a pitiful waste of human existence. Society 
has become a vehicle for the continuance of physical comfort, at the expense 
of the struggle that produced greatness in heroic societies. '"We have 
discovered happiness/" say the Ultimate Men and blink. They have left the
23 This phrase has been popularly translated as the "last man", although this does not have 
the connotation that I believe Nietzsche intends. The "Last Man" connotes that human 
development is at an end. However, Nietzsche wants to transcend the metaphor of human 
progress altogether with his philosophy of overcoming. Hence, the "Ultimate Man" is the 
pinnacle of social development, the social man par excellence.
24 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $5.
25 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
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%places where living was hard: for one needs warmth. One still loves one's
neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth."26
Society has become an uninspired herd, dedicated to the lowest
common denominator. Rather than seeking cultural advancement the state
serves as a sopoforic, ensuring its citizens that they have reached the
pinnace of societal development "A little poison now and then: that
produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last for a pleasant
death."27 In turn, the citizens become lazy and easily led:
They still work, for work is entertainment But they take care that die 
entertainment does not exhaust them. Nobody grows rich or poor 
anymore: both are too much of a burden. Who still wants to rule? 
Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one 
herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever 
thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the asylum.28
The myth of progress is also bound up with the state, imbuing a
teleology to social existence that is manifestly contrived. As such, the state
is invested with legitimacy arising from the perception of inevitable social
evolution or the increasing rationalization of human life.29 As long as
individuals accept the state as a rational construct or an inevitable product
26 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5. In this sense Nietzsche agrees with Hobbes that 
people cluster together out of fear and convenience.
27 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
28 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
29 It is possible to read this as an implicit critique of Hegel, who envisioned the state as the 
embodiment of perfect reason and therefore the ultimate goal of societal evolution.
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of the laws of history, rather than the embodiment of concrete and
identifiable power relations, they have little interest in resistance.
"Formerly all the world was mad," the most acute of them say and 
blink They are clever and know everything that has ever happened: 
so their mockery is endless. They still quarrel, but soon reconcile— 
otherwise indigestion would result They have their little pleasure by 
day and their little pleasure by night but they respect health. "We 
have discovered happiness," say the Ultimate Men and blink30
Laziness, complacency, and social pressure keep people from
straying too far. This leads to mediocrity and stagnation. This misreading
of history, or the manipulation of history into justification of the state, is an
impediment to the individual's possibility of self-overcoming
(Selbstiiberwingdung'f1 "Thus all that is past is handed oven for the mob
could one day become master, and all time be drowned in shallow waters.
Therefore, O my brothers, is a new nobility needed', to oppose all mob-rule
and all despotism and to write anew upon new law-tables the word:
'Noble'."32
Perhaps the most telling episode in Zarathustra concerning the 
psychological imperatives of mass culture occurs after Zarathustra's critique 
of the Ultimate Man. The crowd actually begins to call for Zarathustra to
30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
31 Nietzsche specifically deals with this question in his early essay The Use and Abuse o f 
H istory/or Lite.
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.11.
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bring them this paragon of social being, demonstrating their predisposition 
to mediocrity:
"Give us this Ultimate Man, O Zarathustra"—they cried—"make us 
into this Ultimate Man. You can have die Obermensch." And all die 
people laughed and shouted. But Zarathustra grew sad and spoke to 
his heart: They do not understand me: I am not the mouth for these 
ears. Perhaps I lived too long in the mountains, listened too much to 
the trees and the streams: now I speak to them as goatherds.33
Thus, the masses actively aspire to this pitiable condition, they no
longer desire self-advancement Indeed, the possibility of such
contemplation is seen as undesirable, if not criminal or insane. The state, by
robbing the desire for individual improvement from its citizens, has
triumphed. Zarathustra realizes that he cannot speak to the masses as a
leader. This is not the type of quest that he is proposing, a new power
relationship. Nussbaum mirrors this point
[Nietzsche's] description of the so-called "last man" in Zarathustra 
predicts for the future of human morality in European bourgeois 
democracy the extinction of recognizable humanity, precisely 
through the extinction of the Platonic longing for self-transcendence. 
"The time of the most despicable man is coming," says Zarathustra, 
"he that is no longer able to despise himself." As one might expect, 
Zarathustra's audience, much like some of Plato's contemporary 
critics, ignored the fact that his speech was a praise of the "great 
longing" and called out, "Give us this last man."34
The psychological condition of the Ultimate Man demonstrates the
essential Dekadenzoi society as fostered by the state. For Nietzsche, the
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
34 Martha C  Nussbaum, The Fragility o f Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 163.
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state offers an inversion of essentially healthy values and a replacement
doctrine of obedience and salvation through adherence to statist dogma.
These inverted values are inimical to any type of authentic human life,
leading instead to die inevitable eclipse of the self and the destruction of
human possibility: "Everything about it is false, it bites with stolen teeth.
Even its belly is false. Confusion of the language of good and evil; I offer
you this sign as the sign of the state. Truly, this sign indicates the will to
death! Truly it beckons to the preachers of death!"35
Ultimately, the state has usurped the language of morality and
incorporated religious and psychological models of guilt into its matrix of
normalizing mechanisms. Nietzsche ultimately concludes that mass culture
and the state are no more than parasites, draining the vitality of its citizens
to create mere shadows of the potential individual:
Parasite: that is a worm, a creeping, supple worm, that wants to grow 
fat on your sick, sore places. And it is its art to divine the weary 
spots in climbing souls: it builds its loathsome nest in your grief and 
dejection, in your tender modesty. Where the strong man is too 
weak, where die noble man is too gende, there it builds its loathsome 
nest . . .  For the soul which possesses die longest ladder and can 
descend the deepest how should the most parasites not sit upon it?96
Nietzsche's analysis of the state is open to criticism on several levels.
He does not take into account any of die positive actions that die state could
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
36 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.19.
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take even to foster the goal of the transmuted individual. Nietzsche seems 
to dismiss out of hand the possibility of rehabilitating state structures to 
become less repressive or even constructive. He refuses to even entertain 
state action on behalf of the individual, instead arguing that mass existence 
is necessarily corrupting. If the state is so repressive, how was Nietzsche 
able to transcend this repression enough to critique the problem of mass 
existence? The state can therefore not be as repressive as Nietzsche argues, 
his analysis seems exaggerated and somewhat contrived.
More fundamentally, Nietzsche seems to imbue the state with too 
much intentionality. Although he defines the state in terms of a collection of 
mythological elements, he treats the state as if it were an independent 
political actor acting in a self-conscious manner. The state could not then be 
a vague collection of mythological elements; indeed it is even more than an 
aggregation of concrete power relations. For Nietzsche to be correct, he 
must demonstrate that there is a conscious element to the operations of the 
state that is identifiable. Nietzsche never attempts to provide a framework 
for this analysis, although he implies that mass culture is nothing but the 
symbolic legitimization of the ascendancy of the dominant power structure.
Nietzsche is partially able to address these criticisms by pointing to 
the individuals that compose society rather than centering upon state 
actions. The state does not really have intentionality, but its citizens act as 
thought it does. In the vacuum left by the collapse of theological
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interpretation of reality, individuals have instead made the state their 
external signifier and thereby imbue the state with the semblance of 
intentionality.
L
The greatest success of the state has therefore also been its most 
brilliantly insidious: the state has replaced the deceased idol of God as the 
ultimate object of bad conscience. "Once spirit was God, then it became 
man, and now it is even becoming the mob."37 The location of perfect 
reason within the dictates of the vox populi or the bureaucratic state has 
made government a type of "religionized secularity," fostering the cult of 
the state. It is in Zarathustra that Nietzsche fully explores this fascinating 
proposition. "The New Idol" is the metaphorical phrase that Nietzsche uses 
in his most specific and complete critique of the psychological mode 
underlying the state. The title of this section foreshadows Nietzsche's 
analysis in The Genealogy of Morality, in which he later provides a detailed 
analysis of the mechanism of bad conscience as it operates in regards to 
morality.
Bad conscience is the internalization of the desire to punish, which in 
modem society has been co-opted by die state through increasing levels of 
restriction on both individual action and thought This tendency has been
37 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
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exacerbated by the presence of Christianity, which stresses the essential
wretchedness of the soul as well as the unredeemable corruption of the
world. Caught between a society that restricts cruelty and the irrepressible
desire to express this same cruelty, the self has no choice but to turn this
impulse upon itself. Because the external signifier, God, is posited as
infinitely larger and more perfect than the individual, and it is taught that
the soul cannot be redeemed other than through the sacrifice of this perfect
God, the individual has no hope to alleviate this existential guilt
Nietzsche therefore argues that bad conscience is also partially the
outcome of the degeneration of one of the most integral characteristics of the
mediating process within the psyche: forgetfulness. Nietzsche does not
mean mere thoughtlessness or some form of dementia. For Nietzsche,
forgetfulness is necessary for health; it is a type of mental hygiene.
Forgetfulness allows for peace, no happiness would be possible without it38
Nietzsche's concept of forgetfulness is similar in application to Freud's
concept of the unconscious mind, which also results in a type of mental
economy operating to preserve sanity. Nietzsche expresses a similar
sentiment in his earlier work:
The Greeks gradually learned to organize the chaos by following the 
Delphic teaching and thinking back to themselves, that is, to their real 
needs, and letting their pseudo-needs die out Thus they again took
38 Nietzsche offers an extended analysis of forgetfulness, or "mental parsimony," in On the 
Genealogy o f M orality, 38. This analysis undoubtedly influenced psychoanalytic theories 
of repression and sublimation.
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possession of themselves;. . .  This is a parable for each of us: he must
organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs.39
The task of making man into this reliable creature, "answerable for 
his own future," has been accomplished through the customs of society.40 
The "conscience" of man is socially constructed and designed to preserve 
the prevailing social order; it does not emanate from some divine source 
outside of convention. The repression of the self by society ultimately leads 
to a form of self-loathing: bad conscience. "All instincts which are not 
discharged outwardly turn inwards—ibis is what I call the internalization of 
man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his 'soul.'"41
Nietzsche determines that the triumph of "slave morality7' in the 
modem age has left society incapable of responding to the challenge of 
nihilism engendered by the collapse of the modem worldview, primarily 
because the individual is caught up in the personal torments of "bad 
conscience," rendering him incapable of realizing his true potential. For 
Nietzsche, modem society is missing the ability to produce a culture based 
upon positive, aesthetic values rather than the repression of natural, healthy 
drives.
39 Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", in Untimely 
M editations, trans. R.J. HoDingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 123.
40 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morality, 39.
41 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morality, 61.
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Nietzsche concludes that the transfer of bad conscience to the state is
largely a function of the inherent unreliability of the masses, which renders
them easy to manipulate. Herd morality, the vox populi, is really nothing
other than the echoes of previous state teachings, inculcated over the
generations by governmental institutions. Despite the state's protestations
to the contrary, political truth has become little more than a rhetorical
exercise in which leaders placate the masses by appealing to their vanity:
In the world even the best things are worthless apart from him who 
first presents them: people call these presenters "great men." The 
people have little idea of greatness, that is to say: creativeness. But 
they have a taste for all presenters and actors of great things. The 
world revolves around the inventor of new values: imperceptibly it 
revolves. But the people and the glory revolve around the acton that 
is "the way of the world."42
Because of its lack of creativity and therefore its philosophical 
impotence, mass culture cannot hope to resist "Does this present not 
belong to the mob? The mob, however, does not know what is great or 
small, what is straight and honest it is innocently crooked, it always lies."43 
The masses do not wish to seek truth, and are inevitably resistant to social 
criticism. "Who could overturn with reasons what die mob has once 
learned to believe without reasons? In die marketplace, one convinces with
42 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12. Nietzsche argues that greatness is creativity, but the herd 
sees greatness as persuasive power. Therefore, the people shun substance in favor of 
presentation (example: Hitler).
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.8.
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gestures. However reasons make the mob distrustful."44 Instead, the
masses have made as their external signifier the voice of the state, as
embodied in such institutions as the law.
"There is nothing greater on earth that I, the regulating finger of 
God"—thus the monster bellows. And not only the long-eared and 
short-sighted sink to their knees! Ah, it whispers its dismal lies to 
you too, you great souls! Ah, it divines the abundant hearts that like 
to squander themselves! Yes, it divines you too, you conquers of the 
old God! You grow weary in battle and now your weariness serves 
the new idol!45
As an external signifier, the state acts in the same manner as the
monotheistic God who inspired bad conscience. Individuals, unsure of how
to express or alleviate their existential guilt and feelings of inadequacy,
transfer these feelings from God to the state. The state is all too willing to
accept this devotion from its citizens:
It would like to range heroes and honorable men about it, this new 
idol! It likes to sun itself in the sunshine of good consciences—this 
cold monster! It will give you  everything if you  worship it, this new 
idol: thus it buys for itself the luster of your virtues and the glance of 
your proud eyes. It wants to use you to lure the many-too-many.
Yes, a cunning device of Hell has been devised, a horse of death 
jingling with the trappings of divine honors! Yes, a death for many 
has been devised that glorifies itself as life: truly, a heart-felt service 
to all preachers of death.46
Thus, the essentially empty institutions of the state derive a measure 
of legitimacy otherwise unattainable from this development Trapped in
44 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.9.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, t i l .
46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
bad conscience, the individual is unable to escape the debt owed to the state
and can never forget this supposed obligation. Therefore, in a sense, the
individual internalizes and perpetuates his own serfdom. "To overth row —
to him that means to prove. To drive frantic—to him that means: to
convince. And blood is to him the best of all arguments. A truth that
penetrates only sensitive ears he calls a lie and a thing of nothing. Truly, he
believes only in gods who make a great noise in the world!"47
Thus, the analysis of existential debt ultimately leads to Nietzsche's
conclusion that the State has become the signifier of eternal bad conscience.
This has occurred through the evolution of debt into a type of subconscious
memory, passed down through generations as encouraged by the state. As
Deleuze and Guattari note:
Nietzsche says: it is a matter of an active faculty of forgetting (oubli), 
by means of a repression of biological memory, must create an other 
memory, one that is collective, a memory of words (paroled) and no 
longer a memory of things, a memory of signs and no longer of 
effects. This organization, which traces its signs directly on the body, 
constitutes a system of cruelty, a terrible alphabet48
Deleuze and Guattari go on to confirm Nietzsche's genealogical
analysis of the usurpation of ancient signifiers of bad conscience by the
institutions of the state. However, unlike religion, the state also has file
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
48 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robery Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen Lane 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1963), 145.
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monopoly on force, rendering the reign of the state virtually unassailable.
Through symbolic appropriation, the state incorporates all that it can into its
own sphere, constantly seeking to totalize the political arena within its
institutional confines. This totalization causes the state to replace the
infinitely larger deity as the perfect object of bad conscience:
And Nietzsche suggests how this new socius proceeds: a terror 
without precedent, in comparison with which ancient forms of 
cruelty, the forms of primitive regimentation and punishment, are 
nothing. A concerted destruction of all the primitive codings, or 
worse yet, their derisory perversion, their reduction to the condition 
of secondary parts in the new machine, and the new apparatus of 
repression. All that constituted the essential element of the primitive 
inscription machine—the blocks of mobile, open finite debts, "the 
parcels of destiny"—finds itself taken into an immense machinery 
that renders the debt infinite and. no longer forms anything but one 
and the same crushing fate.. . .  The earth becomes a madhouse.49
As Nietzsche argues, "the good have to crucify him who devises his
own virtue!"50 Mass culture, crippled through its own repressive
mechanisms, cannot create, and therefore must prevent any act of creation
on the part of the individual. Convinced that it is the embodiment of
transcendental reason, die state feels justified in quelling creative action,
especially in the realm of politics. The political gadfly is therefore viewed as
a traitorous enemy, who must be destroyed to preserve the stability of the
state:
49 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 192.
50 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IU:1Z26.
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They hate the creator most him who breaks the law-tables and the 
old values, tire breaker—they call him the law-breaker. For the 
good—cannot create they are always the beginning of die end: they 
crucify him who writes new values on law-tables, they sacrifice the 
future to themselves— they crucify the whole human future! The 
good—have always been die beginning of the end.51
Mass culture and its progeny, the state, rely upon this culture of
repression for their survival. This is especially true for theories of the
organic or V&lkish State with which Nietzsche was all too familiar. This is
also an implicit critique of German Idealism as expressed in the political
theory of Kant and Hegel, in which the state is seen as the teleological
outcome of human existence. Under these theories, the purpose of human
existence is the attainment of an ideal collective consciousness.52
This idealistic thought imbues the state with a transcendental, even
mystic, character, placing it in the position high above mere mortals that
God previously held. The state is therefore an even better object for bad
conscience than God, as it is made a part of the phenomenal and pneumenal
realms, a concrete object rather than an abstract one. Because of its tendency
towards totalization and repression, Nietzsche concludes that the state and
the mentality underlying it are the principal impediment to human
development In the name of the public good, mass culture has condemned
itself to mediocrity:
51 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.26.
52 Marx carried this line of thought to its fruition. It is therefore possible to read Nietzsche 
as an implicit critique of Marx.
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Oh my brothers! With whom does the greatest danger for die whole 
human future lie? Is it not with the good and just? With those who 
say and feel in their hearts: "We already know what is good and just 
we possess it too; woe to those who are still searching for it!" And 
whatever harm the wicked may do, the harm the good do is die most 
harmful!53
Indeed, the mentality of the Ultimate Man reveals an uneasy truth 
about human society. The state, repressive though it may be, has not so 
much conquered humanity as it was encouraged to conquer by the masses. 
Centuries of embedded power mechanisms and normalizing practices have 
created a culture in which the highest desire of the common man is to be 
led, not to leadI54 Virtue is not to be found in creativity, but in obedience 
and duty. The noise of the state and society drowns out the internal 
conversation of the self.
What would Nietzsche have us do? Nietzsche argues that it is not 
possible to separate the culture from the institutional practices that arose 
from it; this symbiotic relationship is too firmly embedded within the state 
and the individual mind. The modem state is indeed modem man writ 
large; both are irretrievably Dekadent However, because this cycle of 
institutionalization of concrete practices has occurred throughout history, it 
is also not possible to reform politics in its modem sense. For Nietzsche, 
there is only one possibility: separation.
53 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1226.
54 Foucault terms this "internal fascism."
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It can be argues that Nietzsche's critique of the state is overly 
simplistic. Nietzsche may be too drastic in his assessment of the repression 
fostered by the state. If Nietzsche is correct; the state possesses repressive 
power that is unmatched in the history of existence. Such a state, 
legitimated by bad conscience, would be so psychologically powerful as to 
destroy the possibility of free will. The individual, socially-created and 
hampered by internalized repression, would have no possibility' of 
resistance. Indeed, the desire to resist would be a foreign thought to such an 
individual, much less the inclination to separate from the comfort of the 
state and begin the painful process of self-overcoming.55
IL
In order to counter this criticism, Nietzsche reverses the myth of the 
state in a fundamental manner. As opposed to the statist myth fostered by 
bad conscience, Nietzsche asserts that the state has no independent 
existence; it is a merely a collection of self-replicating power relations. As 
such, the state can be dismissed by the individual as an object of knowledge
55 " Selbsttlberwingdung or 'self-overcoming' is related to Nietzsche's other notions of 
Sublimierung or 'sublimation', Vergeistigung or 'spiritualization' and Selbstaufhebung- 
A ufhebung being a term that defies translation by a single English word: as Kaufmarm 
observes, Nietzsche uses it with its Hegelian sense in mind of a dialectical process involving 
' a simultaneous preserving, canceling, and lifting up.' However, in Nietzsche's usage the 
lifting-up is not necessarily to something higher. Unlike Hegel's Geist, whose dialectical 
movement is progressive and hierarchical, Nietzsche's basic force, the will to power—at 
least when human consciousness enters the process—can degenerate: man has evolved 
from the ape, but may also degenerate back into the ape." Robert Morrison, Nietzsche and 
Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism  and Ironic A ffinities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997).157-158.
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or as a signifier for truth. In her analysis of the political implications of
existentialism, Hazel Bames mirrors Nietzsche's critique of the state:
Existentialist writers agree in rejecting any society in which some 
men are sacrificed either for a privileged minority or for a mystic 
State. They disagree with regard to the extent to which they are 
willing to compromise in order to achieve a classless society, but they 
are alike in condemning either fascism, unrestrained capitalism, or a 
communism which sets a mystical Whole above existing individuals. 
They oppose the view of a Serious World in which one is bom with a 
particular place prepared for him and in which social values are pre- 
established and not to be questioned. They are against the principle 
of sacrificing persons to abstractions. The State is nothing but the 
individuals who compose it56
However, Nietzsche argues that collectivities are not inclined to allow 
the myths that they rely upon to be deconstructed. Further, individuals, 
insofar as they are socially constructed beings, are not inclined to respond to 
critiques of the state they revere. Nevertheless, individuals can recognize 
the holes in the statist myth, especially as the state continues to extend its 
monopoly over the political realm.
Nietzsche paradoxically argues that the totalizing impulse of the state 
actually leads towards an individually based impulse to resist57 In a sense, 
external coercion fosters an individual compulsion to explore the forbidden
56 Hazel Bames, Humanistic Existentialism  (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959), 
75.
57 Nietzsche's argument on this point foreshadows Heidegger's discussion of the call to 
authenticity. Because of the importance of this point to Nietzsche's political thought, it is 
thoroughly discussed in Chapter Six and the Appendix.
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facets of one's own nature. This begins though the individual's
confrontation with the normalizing effect of mass culture.
Collective existence as found in the state paradoxically leads toward
individual existence by fostering the sense of revulsion at the masses. This
revulsion is essentially instigated by a realization of the hypocrisy of
modem virtue. To individuals, who have the inescapable impulse to
exercise their will-to-power through acts of creation, the reactive slave
mentality of the herd can do no less than inspire derision:
Alas, how ill the word "virtue" sounds in their mouths! And when 
the say: "I am just;" it always sounds like: "I am revenged." They 
want to scratch out the eyes of their enemies with their virtue; and 
they raise themselves only in order to lower others. And again, there 
are those who sit in their swamp and speak thus from the rushes: 
"Virtue—that means to sit quietly in the swamp".58
It becomes apparent that the masses seek nothing less than the
appearance of virtue, even as the mob defines it  Whether the masses
conform out of a sense of duty or even out of coercion, there is no real
conviction behind their actions. The desire to punish dissent has become an
outlet to vent frustration: "mistrust all in whom the urge to punish is
strong!"59 Because the institutions of die modem state are essentially
hollow, political activity has become blind obsequience, and fear of chaos
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 115.
59 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:7.
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prevents the individual from seriously questioning the strictures of the 
culture.
And again, there are those who like posing and think: Virtue is a sort 
of pose. Their knees are always worshipping and their hands are 
glorifications of virtue, but their heart knows nothing of it  And 
again, there are those who hold it a virtue to say: "Virtue is 
necessary7'; but fundamentally they believe only that the police are 
necessary.60
Despite these powerful mechanisms of normalization, the individual 
necessarily recognizes the artificiality of the state and the cherished 
institutions of society. This leads to existential guilt that can break one free 
of society and cause one to recognize the need for self-exploration. The vast 
majority of individuals simply repress this realization out of fear or guilt 
However, for the few that choose to heed this internal call and recognize the 
need for the transvaluation of their own values; a metamorphosis of the self 
must begin which will necessarily lead them away from the institutions of 
society and which for them have now irretrievably collapsed.61
60 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:5.
61 "Every choice human being strives instinctively for a citadel and a secrecy where he is 
saved from the crowd, the many, the great majority—where he may forget 'men who are 
the rule,' being their exception—excepting only the one case in which he is pushed straight 
to such men by a still stronger instinct, as a seeker after knowledge in the great and 
exceptional sense. Anyone who, in intercourse with men, does not occasionally glisten in 
all the colors of distress, green and gray with disgust, satiety, sympathy, gloomishness, and 
loneliness, is certainly not a man of elevated tastes; supposing, however, that he does not 
take all this burden and disgust upon himself voluntarily, that he persistently avoids it, and 
remains, as I said, quietly and proudly hidden in his citadel, one thing is certain: he was not 
made, he was not predestined, for knowledge. If he were, he would one day have to say to 
himself’ 'The devil take my good taste! But the rule is more interesting than the 
exception—than myself, the exception!" And he would go down, and above all, he would 
go 'inside.'" Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §26.
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The argument in Zarathustra implies that it is therefore necessary for 
the individual to suffer collective existence in order to begin the quest for 
autocreated selfhood. "Human society is a trial: thus I teach—a long trial; 
and what it tries to find is the commander. A trial, O my brothers, and not a 
'contract' Break, break this word of the softhearted and the half-and- 
half."62
This is not to be understood, as statist interpreters have, that 
Nietzsche is calling for a reform or replacement of state institutions.63 "Go 
your own ways! And let the people and peoples go theirs—dark ways, 
truly, on which not a single hope flashes any more."64 Nietzsche, although 
espousing limited praise of pre-Socratic "heroic" societies, has little use for 
the modem state, which he consistently derides. Even Nietzsche's apparent 
praise of pre-Socratic heroic societies confirms this point, despite the 
protestations of Strong, Ansell-Pearson, and Conway. It is only in his early 
works that Nietzsche praises heroic societies as a model of human existence. 
However, it is often ignored by political theorists that Nietzsche uncovered 
the "tragic flaw" of Greek political society: the third archetype in the Birth o f
62 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.25.
63 As Voegelin argues: "Nietzsche's transvaluation of values. . .  is a conscious attempt to 
transcend the crisis and to find a firm ground for the erection of a new and stable order of 
values. The ground cannot be found by developing one more utopia of a new society, but 
only by creating in one's own personality—with the means at hand, and with precarious 
chances of success—a new order beyond the crisis." Eric Voegelin, (1944), "Nietzsche, the 
Crisis, and the War'', Journal o f Politics 6 (1944). 184-185.
64 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12^ 1.
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Tragedy. Socrates. Nietzsche argues that the impulse to rationalize life is so 
ingrained in humankind that not even die essentially healthy Greek model 
of politics was able to escape the assault by Socrates and his followers. By 
extension, while it may be possible to recreate a heroic society, it will 
inevitably become bureaucratic and therefore succumb to Dekadenz. As 
Jaspers notes:
Nietzsche approves the state when he looks upon the movements of 
peoples and when he sees culture and individual creativity as 
possible and only in and through it  But he rejects die state as die 
ruin of man when it functions as a solidifying force in favor of mass 
and mediocrity and when it is no longer concerned about the unique 
and unmatched but only about the replaceable "superfluous ones."65
Ultimately, it becomes clear in Zarathustra that Nietzsche is not
interested in "humankind"; it is precisely the aggregation of individuals that
has led to the sorry state of humanity. Rather, Nietzsche is primarily
concerned with the fate of the individual struggling against drowning in the
totalizing field of power that is the "cold monster" of die state. The great
political imperative of Zarathustra is summed in Nietzsche's exhortation:
"Flee, my friend, into your solitude! I see you deafened by die uproar of the
great men and pricked by die stings of die small ones."66
Essentially, Nietzsche argues that individuals have been conditioned
to drag down or demonize those that seek to rise above die lowest common
65 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 256.
66 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12
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denominator. The quasi-religious devotion of die masses to die state 
ensures that they will assist this normalization protocol. However, die 
masses also harbor a secret jealously against the individual who defies 
convention, hearkening back to their own repressed knowledge of the 
emptiness of the state: "Flee, my friend, into your solitude: I see you stung 
by poisonous flies. Flee to where the raw, rough breeze blows! Flee into 
your solitude! You have lived too near the small and pitiable men. Flee 
from their hidden vengeance! Towards you they are nothing but 
vengeance."67
The masses therefore try to drag down the exceptional individual and 
they are dangerous; not necessarily from any great action, but from constant 
noise: "No longer lift your arm against them! They are innumerable and it 
is not your destiny to be a fly-swatter. Innumerable are these small and 
pitiable men; and raindrops and weeds have already brought about the 
destruction of many a proud building."68 Essentially the masses suffer from 
frustrated will-to-power, they naturally must seek to drive down those who 
rise above:
I see you wearied by poisonous flies, I see you bloodily tom in a 
hundred places; and your pride refuses even to be angry. They want 
blood from you in all innocence, their bloodless souls thirst for 
blood—and therefore they sting in all innocence. But you, profound
67 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, LIZ
68 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, LIZ
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man, you suffer to profoundly even from small wounds; and before 
you have recovered, the same poison-worm is again crawling over 
your hand.69
This "innocence" Nietzsche discusses is not a conscious process, but 
driven by herd mentality, as is all the state and its apparatus.
Normalization operates as the political subconscious of the state and mass 
culture: all impulses are directed towards it but only a few are recognized.
It is impossible to determine which of the institutions and interactions 
necessarily to collective existence are harmful. For Nietzsche, aggregated 
existence in a societal sense is necessarily and inherently contaminated, and 
will continue to infect the individual with its Dekadenz,
Nietzsche sees hope only in the separation of politics from this type 
of collective existence. Indeed, the authentic human being cannot tolerate 
the company of the masses and the contempt they provoke. This is not only 
because the masses represent the worst of humanity, but the pathological 
nature of repressive society may prove detrimental to the struggling free 
spirit
Their idol, that cold monster, smells unpleasant to me: all of them, all 
these idolaters, smell unpleasant to me. My brothers, so you want to 
suffocate in the fumes of their animal mouths and appetites? Better 
to break to windows and leap into the open air! Avoid this bad odor! 
Leave the idolatry of the superfluous! Avoid this bad odor! Leave the 
smoke of these human sacrifices!70
49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
70 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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The great opiate of mass existence, materialism, must also be
confronted. The great effort expended in the struggle for material
possessions and success exhausts the individual and clouds his perspective,
rendering him more susceptible to societal pressures.
Just look at these superfluous people! They acquire wealth and make 
themselves poorer with it  They desire power and especially the 
lever of power, plenty of money—these impotent power! See them 
clamber, these nimble apes! They clamber over one another and so 
scuffle into the mud and the abyss. They all strive towards the 
throne: it is a madness they have—as if happiness sat upon the 
throne! Often filth sits upon the throne—and often the throne upon 
filth, too.71
Nietzsche is certainly not advocating an ascetic lifestyle, but warns 
the individual against becoming entwined in societal priorities: "Many 
places—the odor of tranquil seas blowing about them—are still empty for 
solitaries and solitary couples. A free life still remains for great souls.
Truly, he who possesses little is so much the less possessed: praised be a 
moderate poverty!"72
In effect Nietzsche warns the individual to avoid interaction with 
mass existence like the plague that it is. It is only in solitude that the 
individual can avoid the temptations and normalizing mechanisms of mass 
culture. "Where solitude ceases, there the marketplace begins; and where
71 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
71 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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the marketplace begins, there begins the uproar of the great actors and the 
buzzing of poisonous flies."73
This extreme freedom from society is necessarily harsh. To what 
extent this appeal to separate from others is to be carried out will be 
examined in Chapters Four and Five. However, Nietzsche is without doubt 
advocating a negative definition of freedom.74 The individual can only be 
free to explore his or herself when there is an absence of restraints, 
especially the type of arbitrary and capricious restraints that abound in 
modem society.
The most spacious soul, which can run and stray and roam the 
furthest into itself; the most necessary soul, which out of joy hurls 
itself into chance—the existing soul which plunges into becoming; the 
possessing soul which wants to partake in desire and longing—the 
soul fleeing from itself which retrieves itself in the widest sphere; the 
wisest soul, to which foolishness speaks sweetest—the soul that loves 
itself the most, in which all things have their current and counter- 
current and ebb and flow—oh how should not the highest soul 
possess the worst parasites?75
It is only when the institutions that form modem society collapse in 
the individual consciousness that the individual is truly free. As Deleuze 
and Guattari note: "The breakup of the institutional structures that mask 
the society into a plurality of experimental spheres finally revealing the true
73 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
74 "Postmodernism inherits from Nietzsche an extreme version of negative freedom, the 
association of freedom with detachment from determinative wholes." McGowan, 
Postmodernism and Its Critics, 71.
75 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:12.19.
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face of modernity—an ultimate phase that Nietzsche saw as the end result of 
the evolution of societies."76
This is not a process of self-aggrandizement; it is a painfully slow 
process of withdrawal from what one has been taught to value towards a 
new set of self-created goals. "The experience of all deep wells in slow: 
they must wait long until they know what has fallen into their depths. All 
great things occur away from glory and the marketplace: the inventors of 
all new values have always lived away from glory and the marketplace."77 
This individual, finally free horn the noise of society, can set about 
retrieving an authentic selfhood. "Only there, where the state ceases, does 
the man who is not superfluous begin: does the song of the necessary man, 
the unique and irreplaceable melody, begin. There, where the state ceases— 
look there, brothers?"78
Is Nietzsche arguing that human life can only be valuable if it is lived 
alone? The narrative of Zarathustra suggests that this is not his assertion. 
Nietzsche's pessimism over die state stems in part from die essential divide 
between the imperatives of mass culture and the imperatives of the 
individual. Rather than embracing Zarathustra's individually-centered
76 Deleuze and Gnattari, Anti-Oedipus, 368.
77 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
78 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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teachings, the town sees it as a threat and drives Zarathustra out This is not 
a failure of Zarathustra as a teacher but rather of die utter impossibility of 
educating the public to transcend themselves. This realization leads to die 
political discussion of the next level of society, the small, voluntarily related 
group.
Nietzsche's critique of the state is certainly harsh, and it essentially 
precludes the possibility of an authentic collective existence. He does not 
offer any concrete suggestions to rehabilitate mass existence; indeed he 
seems ready to write off the state as inherentiy destructive. However, 
Nietzsche's critique of the state as the incarnation of unhealthy, reactive 
drives does fit within his rhetorical scheme.
Nietzsche does not otter any empirical examples of the corrupt state 
as he is actually producing ideal types for political analysis. The repressive 
state, with the attendant problems of bad conscience and normalization, is 
an ideal type that encompasses a collection of tendencies found in all 
governmental schemes. Likewise, the symbol of the Ultimate Man 
represents a collection of traits found in the smug, self-congratulating 
denizen of mass culture. Indeed, the symbol of the struggling, resisting 
individual is an ideal type for the person reacting against these repressive 
institutions and traits that seeks a more active attitude towards personal 
existence.
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Taken in this manner, Nietzsche's critique of the state is not to be 
taken as seriously as the rhetoric suggests, but is meant no less harshly. By 
positing these ideal types, Nietzsche hopes to spur the individual towards 
the contemplation of the very real problems of collective existence that often 
prove psychologically damaging to the individual. Nietzsche can be validly 
taken to task for the oversimplification of his critique of the state, but it is 
important to remember that this critique is only a means to an end. 
Nietzsche does not intend to present a positive political theory of the state, 
he therefore needs the ideal type of the repressive state to react against in 
the elaboration of his positive theory.
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C h apter  IV
The H igher Men: Fr iendsh ip a n d  th e Com m unity  
Nietzsche's criticism of the state occurs during Zarathustra's sojourn 
within the town, mostly found in the Prologue and Book One. Nietzsche's 
discussions of the state are overwhelmingly critical, giving credence to the 
assertion that Nietzsche does not wish to rehabilitate the state or modem 
society. However, the next section of Zarathustra is devoted to an extended 
narrative of Zarathustra's relations with several characters who seek to learn 
from him. This represents an important development in the narrative and 
Nietzsche's political thought, as he spends a great deal of time exploring the 
possibility of a community of superior individuals.
This is somewhat surprising, as despite Nietzsche's criticism of the 
state and his disgust at modem man, it is clear that one of Zarathustra's 
primary goals is to educate others about his project of self-overcoming. 
Indeed, Zarathustra decides to leave his solitude specifically for this reason: 
"I am weary of my wisdom, like a bee that has gathered too much honey; I 
need outstretched hands to receive i t . . .  To this end, I must descend into 
the depths . . .  I must go down—as men, to whom I want to descend, call 
it"*
1 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §1.
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It is necessary to determine to what extent Zarathustra's teachings 
may be meant to apply to a societal context This chapter will explore 
Zarathustra's attempt to communicate his findings to others, and why a text 
that emphasizes solitude and self-exploration begins with phrases like "the 
cup wants to be empty again, and Zarathustra wants to be man again."2 
Ultimately, however, Zarathustra's social experiment ends in failure and he 
once again seeks solitude, away from his friends and disciples. It is the 
development of Zarathustra's goal from one of education to apparent 
solipsism that is important to this political analysis.
It is poetic that Zarathustra's first proper "disciple" is a dead man, 
the tightrope walker. The tightrope walker appears after Zarathustra 
admits his failure to reach the masses, explored above, when they call for 
the Ultimate Man. The imagery of the tightrope walker further illuminates 
the horizontal nature of the consciousness, explored in a later chapter, as 
well as the dire peril of self-overcoming. "He had emerged from a little 
door and was proceeding across the rope, which was stretched between two 
towers and thus hung over the people and the market square."3 The two 
towers hark back to Zarathustra's earlier speech referring to man stretched 
between animal and die Vbermensch. The people below, die masses, are the
2 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §1.
3 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $6.
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abyss. Mired in the torment of societal bad conscience, they lust to express
their repressed vengeance upon the exceptional individual.
Behold the good and the just! Whom do they hate most? Him who 
smashes their tables of values, die breaker, die lawbreaker—but he is 
the creator. Behold the faithful of all faiths! Whom do they hate the 
most? Him who smashes their tables of values, the breaker, the law­
breaker —but he is the creator.4
The buffoon that leads to the death of the tightrope walker represents 
the problem of social consciousness, which is inextricably tied to bad 
conscience.5 He speaks to the tightrope walker "You belong in the tower, 
you should be locked up, you are blocking the way of a man better than 
yourself!"6 The buffoon is mocking the tightrope walker, suggesting that he 
has come from the mediocrity of the state, should remain locked in the 
tower of herd existence. The buffoon jumps over the tightrope walker, 
causing him to fall to die marketplace below.
This is a further elaboration of Nietzsche's assertion that the state 
cannot allow its members to transcend the herd, those who try must be 
discredited or destroyed. Is, then, the tightrope walker an example of failed 
transmutation? He has attempted to overcome societal identities and the
4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $9.
5 The buffoon or "dwarf' has been identified as symbolizing a veritable laundry list of 
psychological manifestations by various commentators. However, Nietzsche employs 
metaphors such as the dwarf consistently in his work, usually symbolizing socially-based 
self-doubt. See for example The Science o//qy §332. All such mockery is Schadenfrohes.
6 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $6.
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herd, but has been stupefied by the incessant droning of bad conscience, as
discussed in the previous chapter. However, Zarathustra does not react to
the tightrope walker as a failure or with the condescension given to the
Ultimate Man. Rather, Zarathustra reacts to the tightrope walker's fall
without pity, but as an honorable individual worthy of Zarathustra's most
fundamental knowledge. The tightrope walker bemoans his fate as a
failure, seeing it as an existential failure. Zarathustra's first disciple is the
recipient of the most chilling speech in the entire text
"On my honor, friend," replied Zarathustra, "all you have spoken of 
does not exist there is no Devil and no Hell. Your soul will be dead 
even before your body: Therefore there is nothing more to fear!" The 
man looked up mistrustfully. "If you are speaking the truth," he said 
then, "I leave nothing when I leave life. I am not much more than an 
animal which has been taught to dance by blows and starvation."7
Nietzsche here is attempting to demonstrate the essential nobility of
life, even apart from institutions of social acceptance or religious salvation.
The social realm seeks to define individual worth in terms of empty
affirmations. Rather, Zarathustra asserts that all of these constructs are
essentially meaningless. In effect, through the attempt to overcome the
tightrope walker has demonstrated his initial socially-constructed status to
be inauthentic. His failure to complete this task is not important
"Not so," said Zarathustra, "you have made danger your calling, 
there is nothing despicable in that Now you perish through your 
calling: so I will bury you with my own hands." When Zarathustra
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §6.
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had said this the dying man said nothing more; but he motioned with 
his hand, as if he sought Zarathustra's hand to thank him.8
The honorable death of this man encourages Zarathustra and causes
him to reaffirm his task as education. However, Zarathustra's limited
success with the tightrope walker has led him to believe that his teachings
are best suited to the individuals who have already heard the internal call to
self-exploration.9 Society is not willing to allow his teachings, and the
people who compose mass society are ill-suited to the task. Zarathustra
laments, "I want to teach men the meaning of their existence: which is the
Obermensch, the lightning from the dark cloud man. But I am still distant
from them, and my meaning does not speak to their minds. To men, I am
still a cross between a fool and a corpse."10
The buffoon, again representing societal bad conscience, warns
Zarathustra away. The bad conscience of the society still threatens to
subsume Zarathustra:
The good and the just hate you and call you their enemy and 
despiser; the faithful of the true faith hate you, and they call you a 
danger to the people. It was lucky for you that they laughed at you: 
and truly you spoke like a buffoon. It was lucky for you that you 
made company with the dead dog; by so abasing yourself you have
8 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $6.
9 This mechanism, nausea, arises from disgust at the Dekadenz of society and the 
realization of individual finitude. This is the subject of the next chapter.
10 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $7.
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saved yourself for today. But leave this town—or tomorrow I shall
jump over you, a living man over a dead one.11
Zarathustra's harrowing experience with the town and the buffoon 
certainly gives him pause, and enlightens him to die essential nature of 
social existence. Zarathustra's frustration with the inhabitants of mass 
society leads him to the realization that the state will not, indeed cannot^  
allow his teaching. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the state are so 
normalized into mass culture that they are incapable of understanding his 
teaching. They are only receptive to presentation and myth: "Must one first 
shatter their ears to teach them to hear with their eyes? Must one rumble 
like drums and Lenten preachers? Or do they believe only those who 
stammer?"12
L
Nietzsche therefore argues that his philosophy has no place among 
the masses. Rather, it is necessary to examine a smaller social milieu. 
Zarathustra, frustrated and depressed by his failure in the town must 
rethink his task. "But at length he opened his eyes: in surprise Zarathustra 
gazed into the forest and in the stillness, in surprise he gazed into himself. 
Then he arose quickly, like a seafarer who suddenly sees land, and rejoiced:
n Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §8.
12 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
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for he beheld a new truth."13 This new truth is that it is only possible for 
Zarathustra to teach those who wish, and are capable, of learning his 
message.
Zarathustra exclaims, "a light has dawned for me: I need
companions, living ones, not dead companions and corpses which I carry
with me wherever I wish."14 The "dead" represent the social beings
prevalent in mass society, who rely on the interpretation of reality by others
long gone. Concern for the state and others is a burden that must be shed;
but bad conscience, like the buffoon, dogs our steps. It is the hardest to
overcome. Zarathustra instead allows those who wish to learn to come to
him rather than seeking them out
But I need living companions who follow me because they want to 
follow themselves—and who want to go where I want to go. A light 
has dawned for me: Zarathustra shall not speak to the people but to 
companions! Zarathustra shall not be herdsman and dog to the herd! 
To lure many away from the herd—that is why I have come. The 
people and the herd will be angry with me: the herdsmen shall call 
Zarathustra a robber.15
By casting Zarathustra's new role as a fellow-traveler rather than as a 
traditional teacher, a subtle shift in Nietzsche's political thought can be 
detected. Unlike the institutionalization characteristic of the state, 
Nietzsche's political thought is not a replacement model for social existence.
13 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
14 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
15 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
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If Nietzsche is indeed proposing a community, it is a radically de­
centralized one, hopefully free of the constraints of bad conscience. 
Zarathustra, inasmuch as he is the herald of internal control and self­
creation, does not seek to impose himself on others. As Nietzsche writes: 
"the creator seeks companions, not corpses or herds or believers. The 
creator seeks fellow-creators, those who inscribe new values on new 
tables."16
Zarathustra has fully purged himself of the delusion that mass
society will listen to him, and in doing so has also purged himself of the
desire to speak to the masses. "I will not be herdsman or gravedigger. I will
not speak again to the people: I have spoken to a dead man for the last
time."17 Nietzsche's language in this respect could not be stronger; his
message is meant for a few select individuals who have come to the
realization of societal Dekadenz on their own, and seek a new path.
Nevertheless, there are a few individuals in the town who hear
Zarathustra's message and decide to follow him. However, Nietzsche will
have none of this.
When Zarathustra had taken leave of the town. . .  there followed him 
many who called themselves his disciples and escorted him. Thus
16 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
17 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $9.
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they came to a crossroad: there Zarathustra told them that from then 
on he wanted to go alone; for he was a friend of going-alone.18
Zarathustra therefore dismisses the first group of individuals who
seek to follow him, a point that is often overlooked. Zarathustra realizes that
they are not yet ready and must do some serious work on themselves first
Zarathustra then goes into a discourse on the importance of internal
symbolism in the act of self-creation. The implication of this episode is that
the masses, accustomed to the noise of the "great actors" in the marketplace,
are simply following Zarathustra with the same misguided devotion they
offer to politicians. The followers Zarathustra seeks will follow him because
of their own internal imperative; discovered from aesthetic reflection upon
themselves. In this sense, Nietzsche distinguishes himself from traditional
leaders and educators. Zarathustra does not impose his teaching upon
others, but seeks to instruct them when they are ready to hear his message.
It is only much later in the text that Zarathustra invites a few individuals,
called the "Higher Men", to learn from him. The dynamics of this group
form Nietzsche's examination and critique of the small social group. In
essence, this group of Higher Men forms a uniquely Nietzschean
community.
Nietzsche's analysis is this regard can be critiqued as undeniably 
elitist even down to die characterization of Zarathustra's followers as
18 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:22.1.
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"higher" men. It must be asked why Nietzsche chooses to present his 
discussion in these terms. Although Nietzsche denies that he is elaborating 
criteria for a new rank-ordering of humanity/ his discussion of the Higher 
Men certainly has this connotation. It is necessary to probe beyond the 
apparently elitist framework of Zarathustra's followers to grasp the 
philosophical justification for Nietzsche's apparently utopian vision of the 
community of the Higher Men.
n.
A "community" is by definition a group that shares some common 
aspect In the case of the Higher Men, it is their desire to learn self­
overcoming. This community has arisen out of the need to escape the 
corrupting elements of the state and the normalizing effects of others. "The 
earth is full of the superfluous, life has been corrupted by the many-too- 
many."19 If there is to be any hope for individual recovery, it must occur 
outside of this corrupted context and within a new, non-institutionalized 
environment
Nietzsche discusses the ideal of a healthy community liberally in his 
early works, especially "The Greek State", "Homer on Competition", and 
the Birth o f Tragedy. In these works, Nietzsche praises ancient Greek 
society as essentially healthy, fostering constructive values and reinforcing
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:9.
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the positive traits of the individual. While Nietzsche never loses his 
admiration of the pre-Socratic Greeks, it will be shown that die Higher Men 
do not represent a reestablishment of Homeric society.
The Greek mode of society as described by Nietzsche is composed of 
various practices designed to produce complete individuals. Throughout 
his productive career, Nietzsche looked back to the Greeks as an example of 
a healthy community. Beginning with his early essays on Greek society 
Nietzsche asserted that the community must provide outlets for creativity 
and competition without coupling these with repression and normalizing 
mechanisms. Nietzsche praised Greek political theory as the "profound 
secret study of the connection between state and genius."20 Although 
Nietzsche's thought is grounded along drastically different grounds than 
the ancients, he admires their focus upon individual greatness within the 
social realm. "Hellenic popular teaching commands that every talent must 
develop through struggle: whereas modem educators fear nothing more 
than the unleashing of so-called ambition."21 Nietzsche's model embraces 
the political elements of the heroic Greek model, even while denying its 
epistemological foundations.
20 Nietzsche, "The Greek State," in On the Genealogy o f M orality, 186.
21 Nietzsche, "Homer on Competition," in On the Genealogy o f M orality, 192.
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However, Nietzsche is not naive enough to assert that society should 
return to the Greek model. We must accept the circumstances of the current 
age, but we do not have to internalize them. It is up to individuals to move 
past their circumstances and work for a new type of self and community in 
the here and now. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to re- 
conceptualize politics. The focus of politics must shift from concern over die 
institutional arrangements of government which has characterized 
traditional political theory. The primary concern of politics should instead 
be the individual self. This new politics is concerned with the production of 
individuals who can relate to each other in a manner that is healthier than is 
possible in state-centered modem politics.
This argument, however, points to a fundamental tension in the 
theory of community. The causal lines between the sovereign individual 
and the healthy community are not clear. The heroic Greek model insisted 
that the positive task of the community was to produce complete 
individuals; it was doubted that individuals could become complete on their 
own. Nietzsche initially seems to be sympathetic to this assertion, but his 
radically individualistic outlook causes him to eschew even die heroic 
paradigm. Nietzsche is primarily concerned with separation from the 
modem idea of die state, and as such de-emphasizes the positive role of 
society in die completion of the individual self. The implication of this line 
of thought is that the new version of community can only arise from
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individuals who have been able to complete themselves through some form 
of aesthetic ethics. External processes can not create such a community, it 
must arise endogenously from within its future members.
This leads to a further tension in this line of thought Nietzsche 
presents a model of selfhood that is predicated upon resistance to societal 
norms. In essence, societal repression leads to selfhood. Is it possible, then, 
for a sovereign individual to emerge from a context of a non-repressive 
society or a context of no social interaction at all? This is a problematic and 
profound question. Nietzsche does not present a model of selfhood apart 
from social creation, except as an ethic of resistance. A possible conclusion 
is that there can be no selfhood apart from that initially created by the social 
realm. Without the social, therefore, there can be no resistance, and thus no 
self-creation.
The community of die Higher Men apparently mitigates these 
concerns. These individuals have already separated from larger 
aggregations of individuals. Further, it is clear that this community is not 
designed to replicate itself. This is not the prelude to the formation of a 
revolutionary cadre of exceptional humans.22 At no time does Nietzsche
22 Although not evangelical the Higher Men are certainly revolutionary in their 
epistemolo gical perspective: "The revolutionary pole of group fantasy becomes visible, on 
the contrary, in the power to experience institutions themselves as mortal to destroy them 
or change them according to the articulations of desire and the social field, by making the 
death instinct into a veritable institutional creativity. For that is precisely the criterion—at 
least the formal criterion—that distinguishes the revolutionary institutions from the 
enormous inertia which the law communicates to institutions in an established order. As
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discuss with the Higher Men any obligation to return to society and liberate 
it from repression. Rather, the Higher Men must resist the urge to help 
others, as this will only subject them once again to the dangers of mass 
society.
Unlike any type of society or state, the community of Higher Men is
an association of fellow-travelers, self-selected members. They were not
bom into customs or norms of the group. Rather, the Zarathustrian
community is a totally new associative form, with no predetermined roles
for its members or fixed patterns of association. This community is
therefore not imbued with inherited bad conscience and should offer a
conducive environment for self-exploration and overcoming.
It is important to note that the Higher Men are not identical to, or
perhaps even unrelated, to the Obermensch. The Higher Men are superior
human beings insofar as they have realized the need to separate from the
herd and seek self-overcoming. As Schutte notes:
The idea of the Obermensch results from an aesthetic-ontological 
conception of the will to power.. . .  On the other hand, the category 
of the 'higher man' results primarily horn a psychological-political 
interpretation of the will to power. Both types, however, have 
affinities toward one another. Nietzsche emphasizes the 
psychological superiority of the Obermensch with respect to human
Nietzsche says; churches, armies. States—which of all these dogs wants to die?" Deleuze 
and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 63. However, unlike Deleuze and Guattari's analysis, the 
Higher Men never attain a group consciousness necessary for a revolutionary movement 
The revolution remains internal and individual
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beings as well as the aesthetic superiority of the higher man with 
respect to the herd.23
The Higher Man thus feels the need to separate from the masses, 
though perhaps not for the right reason. Rebellion against political practices 
or even intellectualized oppression do not lead to the mentality necessary 
for self-overcoming. Rather, they lead to a reformist attitude and the 
establishment of new political institutions. Nietzsche seems to want to 
transcend practical politics altogether and move towards a mode of 
existence fundamentally different from those of traditional collective 
existence. Zarathustra seeks to educate the Higher Men to overcome 
themselves in aesthetic terms, rather than in practico-political terms.
This type of transformation is foreign to die Higher Men, who seem 
to misunderstand Zarathustra's message. The Higher Men, conditioned by 
society, do not have a perspective suited to Zarathustra's message. They 
must learn to supercede their identities through creative action, not solemn 
contemplation:
You Higher Men, the worst thing about you is: none of you has 
learned to dance as a man ought to dance—to dance beyond 
yourselves. . .  lift up your hearts, you fine dancers, high! Higher! 
And do not forget to laugh well. This laughter crown, this rose- 
wreath crown: to you, my brothers, do I throw this crown! I have 
canonized laughter; you Higher Men, team— to laugh!24
23 Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism : N ietzsche w ithout Masks, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 127.
24 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.20.
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In order for an aesthetic transformation to occur, the individual must 
confront the unpleasant truths that are varnished over by societal myths. 
Nietzsche identifies a tension that occurs within the Higher Men which 
threatens the possibility of their self-overcoming. There is a conflict within 
each individual—fear and vision; ambition and complacency. These dual 
impulses must be confronted and overcome in order to progress with self­
creation. However, Nietzsche argues that this conflict holds even the 
superior individual to others.
It is not the height but the abyss that is terrible! The abyss where die 
glance plunges downward and the hand grasps upward. There the 
heart grows giddy through its twofold will. Ah, friends, have you, 
too, divined my hearts twofold will? That my glance plunges into 
the heights and that my hand wants to hold on to the depths and lean 
there—that, that is m y abyss and my danger. My will clings to 
mankind, I bind myself to mankind with fetters, because I am drawn 
up to the Obermensch for my other will wants to draw me up to the 
Obermensch.75
This internal conflict is dangerous as it is easy for the struggling 
individual to fall back into the morass of social existence. This type of self­
exploration is certainly not a superficial exercise, and the potential 
Obermensch call easily be seduced into abandoning this difficult and 
painful quest Indeed, this is why Zarathustra's experience with the 
community is a disappointing failure. The knowledge he seeks to 
communicate to the Higher Men proves to be incommunicable without
25 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:21.
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resorting to the type of repressive mechanisms that characterize the state 
and mass culture. Indeed, Zarathustra is unable to explain any concrete 
methods of self-overcoming to the Higher Men, these are saved for 
Zarathustra's dialogues with himself and his animals.
m.
Rather than being an affirmation of community, Zarathustra becomes 
a condemnation of the possibility of communal action, even in a small, non- 
foundational context Zarathustra has failed to teach those who wish to 
learn, in an environment outside of the state. The failure of Zarathustra to 
teach the Higher Men represents the realization of the ultimate impossibility 
of collective self-overcoming. Nietzsche implies that even in this most ideal 
setting, the problems of aggregated existence continue to impede 
Zarathustra's message.
This tendency is demonstrated vividly in the Higher Men. The desire 
of the Higher Men to follow  Zarathustra is ultimately corrupted into the 
desire to be Me Zarathustra. This runs the very real risk of degenerating 
into a dogma, and is a betrayal of Nietzsche's individualistic project 
Zarathustra may be an ideal type for self-overcoming, but he is not a type­
setter. However, societal conditioning has set the stage for the desire to 
replicate Zarathustra, and the herd mentality inherent even in a small 
community contributes to this tendency.
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Each disciple only hears a portion of Zarathustra's message and
ultimately exaggerates this. Zarathustra realizes that none of the Higher
Men are fully separated from others, as demonstrated by their desire to copy
him. By copying Zarathustra, the Higher Men have simply constructed a
new cycle of power relations, superimposing Zarathustra's will over their
own. The inability of the Higher Men to realize Zarathustra's message as an
individually-actuated journey is indicative of their failure to fully overcome
the mechanisms of collective existence:
I need pure, smooth mirrors for my teaching; upon your surface even 
my own reflection is distorted. Many a burden, many a memory 
weighs down your shoulders; many an evil buffoon crouches in your 
comers. And there is hidden mob in you, too. And although you are 
of a higher type, much in you is crooked and malformed. There is no 
smith in the world who could hammer you straight and into shape 
for me.26
By following Zarathustra rather than accompanying him the Higher 
Men are little more than the parasites Zarathustra decries in his critique of 
the state. The Higher Men have come to the realization of the emptiness of 
the state and the hollowness of social existence, this is what makes them 
"Higher Men." However, they have not been able to realize that 
Zarathustra is not to be followed. He may be the voice in die wilderness, 
but he cannot instruct others how to overcome themselves.
26 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:11.
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The Higher Men seek an easy answer, an easy way to expunge their
existential pain. They therefore willingly allow their wills to be supplanted
by Zarathustra. This mirrors Zarathustra's critique of the denizens of the
state: "some of them will, but most of them are only willed. Some of them
are genuine, but most of them are bad actors."27 The Higher Men, inasmuch
as they desire self-overcoming, are pointed in the right direction. However,
their inherent weakness and desire for comfort eventually overcome them.
They eventually show themselves to be no better than the Ultimate Man. In
this sense, the Higher Men represent the failed Obermensch, who began the
journey but backslide into collective existence. They simply have not been
able to exert their wills over that of their teacher "Oh, that you understood
my saying: 'Always do what you will-but first be such as can w ill
Because Zarathustra (and indeed anyone) is unique, it is impossible for his
disciples to measure up. In setting themselves up as disciples of Zarathustra
rather than as companions on the journey to self-overcoming, they have
doomed themselves to failure:
The higher the type, the less often does a thing succeed. You Higher 
Men here, are you not all—failures? Be of good courage, what does it 
matter! How much is still possible! Learn to laugh at yourselves as a 
man ought to laugh!. . .  And truly, how much has already 
succeeded! How rich this earth is in good little perfect things, in 
well-constituted things!. . .  Perfect things teach hope.29
27 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:5.2.
28 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:5.3.
29 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.15.
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Rather than heeding Zarathustra's call to treat the failure to copy him
as a victory for themselves, the Higher Men seem ready to abandon their
quest and found a new mode of collective existence around Zarathustra.
Thus, each Higher Man is necessarily a parody of Zarathustra rather than an
authentic follower. Following from Nietzsche's critique of mass culture,
Nietzsche argues that Zarathustra becomes an external signifier to this
community and ultimately becomes the object for bad conscience.
Nevertheless, Zarathustra remains ambivalent concerning the Higher Men.
As Deleuze notes:
[E]ach character of the higher man has the two aspects in differing 
proportions; representing both reactive forces and their triumph, 
species activity and its product We must take this double aspect into 
account in order to understand why Zarathustra treats the higher 
man in two ways: sometimes as an enemy who will consider any 
trap, any infamy, in order to divert Zarathustra from his path and 
sometimes as a host almost a companion who is engaged in an 
enterprise close to that of Zarathustra himself.30
Zarathustra realizes that the Higher Men are the closest people he has
encountered to his goal, and does not wish to see them fail. Deleuze
continues:
Consider the way in which the higher men are presented: their 
despair, their disgust their cry of distress and their "unhappy 
consciousness". They all know and feel the abortive character of die 
goal that they attain, the failed nature of the product that they are.. . .
30 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 166.
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The shadow has lost its goal, not because it has reached it but because 
the goal which it has reached is itself a lost goal.31
It is in this sense that the Higher Men represent more than
Zarathustra's failure, they are also potentially his undoing. Indeed,
Zarathustra fears that his desire to communicate his knowledge to others
will ultimately be his undoing. "It is difficult to live among men because
keeping silent is so difficult Especially for a babbler."32 Zarathustra
identifies his greatest temptation towards others as pity. His pity for the
masses in society draws him to the town, and his pity for the Higher Men
leads him to tolerate these poor disciples. However, if Zarathustra is to
succeed in his own self-overcoming, he cannot drown in the pity that he
feels for these abortive Obermenschen.33
Indeed, Zarathustra's speeches to the Higher Men can easily be read
as a caution to Zarathustra himself. He cannot afford to attach himself to
the Higher Men, or he will destroy them as well as their teacher.
Zarathustra argues that all great individuals necessarily inspire bad
conscience in others:
31 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 168.
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:20.
33 "The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues: as 'Zarathustra's temptation' I 
invented a situation in which a great cry of distress reaches him, as pity tries to attack him 
like a final sin that would entice him away from him self. To remain the master at this 
point, to keep the eminence of one's task undefiled by the many lower and more myopic 
impulses that are at work in so-called selfless actions, that is the test; perhaps the ultimate 
test, which a Zarathustra must pass—his real proof of strength." Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, L4.
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Yes, my friend, you are the bad conscience of your neighbors: for they 
are unworthy of you. Thus they hate you and would dearly like to 
drain your blood. Your neighbors will always be poisonous flies: that 
about you which is great, that itself must make them more poisonous 
and ever more fly-like.34
Eventually, those who suffer from bad conscience begin to doubt the
greatness of their external signifier, deconstructing the original positive
power relation and replacing it with one of ressentiment and suspicion. A
young man on the mountainside says to Zarathustra: "Behold, what have I
been since you appeared among us? It is envy of you which has destroyed
me!"35 This demonstrates the tendency of the individual actively to seek out
a signifier for bad conscience. It is therefore only through the destruction of
the signifier that the individual can alleviate this existential envy:
They think about you a great deal with their narrow souls—you are 
always suspicious to them. Everything that is thought about a great 
deal is finally thought suspicious. They punish you for your virtues.
Fundamentally they forgive you only for—your mistakes Before
you, they feel themselves small, and their baseness glimmers and 
glows against you in hidden vengeance. Have you not noticed how 
often they become silent when you approached them, and how their 
strength left them like smoke from a dying fire?96
This highlights part of the reason that all human forms of collective
existence will eventually degenerate into bad conscience and normalization.
34 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12. The state has become the modem focus for bad conscience, 
but the potential Obermensch stands to be an even more problematic object of bad 
conscience, as he is more personal and imminently confrontational.
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
36 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
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Through his genealogical analyses Nietzsche has come to realize that
collectivities, in whatever form, must necessarily create evaluative criteria:
Zarathustra has found no greater power on earth than good and evil. 
No people could live without evaluating; but if it wishes to maintain 
itself it must not evaluate as its neighbor evaluates. Much that 
seemed good to one people seemed shame and disgrace to another, 
thus I found. I found that much that was called evil in one place was 
in another decked with royal honors. One neighbor never 
understood another his soul was always amazed at his neighbor's 
madness and wickedness.37
Zarathustra sees this dynamic forming among the Higher Men and 
himself, exactly the tendencies that Zarathustra urges the individual to 
avoid. This will lead his disciples to Dekadenz and destroy any possibility 
of their own self-overcoming. "They are a poor, sick, mob type: they look 
upon this life with an ill will, they have an evil eye for this earth.. . .  They 
have heavy feet and sultry hearts—they do not know how to dance. How 
could the earth be light to such men!"38
It is therefore clear that Zarathustra must abandon his disciples if he 
is to have any hope, either for them or himself. The last section of 
Zarathustra's dealings with the Higher Men, "The Last Supper," is more 
than a parody of Christ and his disciples. Nietzsche seeks to demonstrate 
that the only true follower of Zarathustra cannot be a disciple, and must 
actively oppose his teacher.
37 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.16.
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Unlike Christ, Zarathustra will not be a sacrifice for his followers. He 
will maintain his integrity and will neither be held back by others nor drag 
them down. By removing himself as a signifier for bad conscience, he 
achieves something Christ could not do. Zarathustra does not urge his 
followers to supplant their identities for his. He will not become a preacher 
of death, the tool of dogmatists. Zarathustra's message is a teaching-not-to- 
leam, essentially an anti-education. Zarathustra laments: "they take from 
me: but do I yet touch their souls? A gulf stands between giving and 
receiving; and the smallest gulf must be bridged at last"39 This gulf is 
bridged by Zarathustra giving the Higher Men the only thing that can save 
them: solitude.
It is through this pessimistic assessment of the Higher Men that 
Nietzsche abandons his early optimism regarding the revival of community 
in the Greek model. Heroic society is simply not possible, "the hero is to 
them an affliction and a terror."40 Greatness and supranormality are simply 
not tolerated in a collective context; even the much-venerated Greeks 
executed Socrates. The mechanisms of society are simply too strong for the 
individual to bear, and the exigencies of the will-to-power insure that new 
power relations will form in whatever new context is developed.
39 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL9.
40 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
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A community of exceptional individuals can therefore never replicate 
itself. Any community will eventually degenerate into mass society and 
become the breeding ground for mediocrity and repression. Nietzsche 
argues it is necessary to become separate even from a community of the 
most tolerant individuals in order to achieve a lasting and meaningful 
selfhood:
My children are still green in their first spring, standing close 
together and shaken in common by the winds, the trees of my garden
and my best soil Where such trees stand together, there the
blissful islands and But one day I will uproot them and set each one 
up by itself, that it may learn solitude and defiance and foresight 
Then it shall stand by the sea, gnarled and twisted and with supple 
hardness, a living lighthouse of unconquerable life.41
IV.
Does this separation from others, however, preclude the most basic of 
human associations, friendship? Zarathustra explicitly states: "I do not 
teach you the neighbor but the friend."42 This possibility of interpersonal 
connection on the most basic level may salvage collective existence albeit at 
a limited level. Nietzsche's conception of friendship is largely based upon a 
theory of power. As Nietzsche argues, it is not possible to be a friend to 
someone of unequal ability or power. This would be no more than an 
oppressive relationship:
41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:3.
42 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:16.
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Are you pure air and solitude and bread and medicine to your 
friend? Many a one cannot deliver himself from his own chains and 
yet he is his friend's deliverer. Are you a slave? If so, you cannot be 
a friend. Are you a tyrant? If so, you cannot have friends.43
The ideal friendship would be an adversarial relationship in which 
each individual challenges the other to higher and higher forms of self­
creation and overcoming. This is the true ideal behind the heroic 
community, which was lost through societal corruption. "If you want a 
friend, you must also be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you 
must be capable of being an enemy. You should honor even the enemy in
your friend In your friend you should possess your best enemy."44
Nietzsche, however, retains his pessimistic attitude. The conditions 
necessary for an authentic friendship are rare, and the desire to be with 
others is most likely to lead to ruin. Generally, individuals seek others for 
support and consolation. In this sense, friendship represents failure to 
communicate adequately with the self. "Our faith in others betrays wherein 
we would dearly like to have faith in ourselves. Our longing for a friend is 
our betrayer."45 The friend is therefore our own projected bad conscience, 
the creation of our need for an external signifier. Stripped of God, the state,
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:14. This conception of friendship has obvious parallels with 
Aristotle.
44 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:14.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:14.
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and the community, die friend remains the last temptation on the road to
self-overcoming:
Have you ever watched your friend asleep—to discover what he 
looked like? Yet your friend's face is something else beside. It is
your own face, in a rough and imperfect mirror Were you not
startled to see what he looked like? O my friend, man is something 
that must be overcome.46
Even more insidious is the fact that individuals perceive die "Other"
in an objective manner, lending undue concreteness to the presence and
identity of others. The unformed self is easily drawn into this inviting circle
and runs the risk of losing himself in the formation of collective identity.
You crowd together with your neighbors and have beautiful words 
for it  But I tell you: Your love for your neighbor is your bad love of 
yourselves. You flee to your neighbor away from yourselves and 
would like to make a virtue of it  but I see through your 
"selflessness." The "you" is older than the "I"; the "You" has been 
consecrated, but not yet the "I": so man crowds towards his neighbor. 
. . .  You cannot endure to be alone with yourselves and do not love 
yourselves enough: now you want to mislead your neighbor into 
love and gild yourselves with his mistake. I wish rather that you 
could not endure to be with any kind of neighbor or with your 
neighbor's neighbor; then you would have to create your friend and 
his overflowing heart out of yourselves.47
Rather than solitude becoming a possibility for self-growth, the
individual actually feels guilty about being alone. The individual feels that
being alone is a reflection of personal failure or inadequacy, rather than as a
triumph of the liberated self. "One man runs to his neighbor because he is
46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:14.
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:16.
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looking for himself, and another because he wants to lose himself. Your bad 
love of yourselves makes solitude a prison to you."48
Rather than affirming friendship, Nietzsche ultimately condemns it 
as yet another form of bad conscience. "Do I exhort you to love of your 
neighbor? I exhort you rattier to flight from your neighbor and to love of 
the most distant!"49 Any dealings with others, even on the most primal 
level, is necessarily repressive and ultimately dangerous. The path to self­
overcoming must be a lonely one. As Schutte argues, this conclusion is the 
logical outcome of Nietzsche's political analysis. "Nietzsche seems to have 
thought that as long as social conditions remain what they are—i.e. modeled 
upon a structure of domination—the person who seeks to go beyond good 
and evil must enter the path of solitude, leaving all social relationships 
behind."50
Zarathustra's time with the higher men has served only to muddy the 
waters and delay his progress. He must ultimately leave the company of all 
other humans if he is to complete his quest Zarathustra does not leave the 
company of others with sorrow or regret, but with an attitude of relief and 
liberation. It is telling that the animals reappear only when Zarathustra 
leaves the others:
48 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:16.
49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:16.
50 Ofelia Schutte, Beyond N ihilism  Nietzsche w ithout Masks, 127.
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And Zarathustra said again: "I love you, my animals!" But the eagle 
and the serpent pressed around him when he said these words, and 
looked up at him. All three stood silently together in this attitude, 
and sniffed and breathed in the good air together. For the air here 
outside was better than with die Higher Men.51
Zarathustra then leaves without fanfare. "But that night he went
away alone and forsook his friends."52 The Higher Men, it seems, are left to
sink or swim according to their own abilities and inclinations. Nietzsche is
sure, however, that they will be better off without Zarathustra. It has
become apparent that his example will overshadow the Higher Men and
lead to nothing but repression.
There is another, more nuanced reason that Nietzsche abandons the
possibility of the community of Higher Men. Zarathustra's project of self>
overcoming is essentially an internal aesthetic process. Zarathustra realizes
that it is simply impossible to communicate this experience, either to a small
group of like-minded individuals or even to a friend. Zarathustra asks
himself," why does Zarathustra speak to his pupils differently—than to
himself?"53 It is because he must, there is no other way. This, as much as
the concrete problems of collective existence, dooms the community to
51 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:14.1.
52 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:22. This is the end of Part II, and of Zarathustra's dealings with 
others. He must return to his solitude, and his internal conversation, in order to hilly 
comprehend the enormity of his repressed knowledge of the void.
53 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL20.
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failure. In order to have the individual experience of self-overcoming and 
self-creation, Zarathustra must return to his solitude.
In conclusion, the problems of communicating Zarathustra's theory 
of self-exploration to others prove insurmountable. The remainder of the 
narrative is devoted to the concrete experience of individual self­
overcoming and self-creation that is the core of Nietzsche's positive theory. 
Having dismissed the possibility of collective existence as inherently 
repressive, Nietzsche articulates an alternative vision of individual existence 
that seeks to locate sovereignty squarely within the individual 
consciousness and the responsibility for personal growth within the 
province of the individual self.
Nietzsche has often been accused of fostering a solipsistic view of 
politics, and this analysis seems to support this criticism. Nietzsche's 
critique of the state precluded mass existence, and his critique of the 
community precludes even small-scale voluntary association. Nietzsche 
seems to destroy the possibility for any type of human association that is not 
repressive. Even the most primal of human relationships, the one-on-one 
friendship, is discarded by Nietzsche as essentially destructive to toe self. 
Again, Nietzsche can be accused of exaggeration. Are we to believe that toe 
only possibility for self-overcoming is to abandon all forms of interpersonal 
association?
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Nietzsche certainly does not offer any positive guidance for 
reforming the community or rehabilitating personal relationships. If 
Nietzsche is to be taken seriously, the only hope for the individual seeking 
to overcome himself is to separate from other humans totally. Nietzsche 
does not even elaborate whether it is possible for the transmuted individual 
to someday rejoin society or whether he must remain apart perpetually.
However, if Nietzsche is taken to be offering an ideal type, that of the 
Higher Man, his critique of community becomes more plausible. As with 
the state, it is necessary to avoid concretizing Nietzsche's concepts. The 
Higher Men are essentially ideal types of individuals who are likely to 
attempt the process of self-overcoming. The fact that they fail is 
illuminating, as they are attempting this necessarily individual process 
within a social context, which allows power mechanisms to form. 
Nietzsche's discussion of the Higher Men is a thought experiment designed 
to test whether it is possible to create a non-repressive context for self­
overcoming in a collective environment Nietzsche's intent is not to destroy 
the possibility for collective existence, but to illuminate the problems 
inherent in even small groups. The Higher Men are therefore a warning to 
die individual to beware the influence of others, no matter how well- 
intentioned.
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Chapter V  
The Great N ausea 
Zarathustra's decision to return to solitude is the turning point of the 
text Indeed, it marks the beginning of Nietzsche's articulation of his 
positive thought of authentic selfhood. In the first sections of Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche provides the critical substrate on which to build his theory of 
selfhood: the pathological character of the state and mass existence, the 
danger of conformity, and the impossibility of reforming collective 
existence. Zarathustra returns to solitude and faces his greatest challenge, 
which proves to be a confrontation with nausea.
Nausea is featured prominently in Zarathustra, indeed it is one of the 
central metaphors found in die narrative. Nietzsche's concept of nausea 
represents an important element of a profound account of human existence 
within a seemingly chaotic and hostile universe.1 In addition, the discussion 
of nausea represents the turning point in the narrative of Zarathustra, 
representing the bridge between Nietzsche's critique of society and the
1 Existential nausea has become a philosophical tradition in the postmodern era. This 
concept has appeared most vividly in the works of Sartre, although it is found prominently 
in Dostoevsky and Kundera as well. In addition, there is a similar concept found in 
phenomenological thought, especially in Heidegger's concept of thro witness and factidty. 
For all of these authors, "nausea" is a profoundly disturbing state of uneasiness that follows 
a radical reorientation of the self towards the universe or existence as a whole. Existential 
nausea is more than the sense of tension experienced by Hegel's "homeless spirit" in search 
of philosophical truth. Nausea represents the destruction of preexisting meaning and the 
calling into question of both the individual's existence and the existential and ontological 
status of the universe. Nausea is therefore a violent and painful process, but one that can 
lead to the positive reevaluation of existence and self-worth.
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articulation of his theory of the transmuted self. Therefore, Nietzsche's
concept of nausea is vitally important to the understanding of his thought as
a whole. This chapter will examine the concept of nausea that Nietzsche
introduces in Thus Spoke Zarathustra as well as its essential relevance to the
understanding of one of Nietzsche's most controversial "doctrines": the
eternal recurrence of die same.
Nausea is an integral metaphor of Zarathustra, as well as one of the
enduring themes of Nietzsche's philosophy. Twice within the narrative
Zarathustra is recognized as the man without nausea, once at the beginning
of the text and again towards the end, yet he suffers this affliction in the
center. Therefore, an important development in the narrative can be
observed. Initially, Zarathustra is without nausea:
Yes, I recognize Zarathustra. His eyes are clear, and disgust does not 
lurk around his mouth. Does he not move along like a dancer? How 
changed Zarathustra is! Zarathustra has become—a child, an 
awakened-one: what do you want now with the sleepers? You lived 
in solitude as in the sea, and die sea bore you up. Alas, do you want 
to go ashore? Alas, do you again want to drag your body yourself?2
At the end of the narrative, Zarathustra is again recognized as the
man without nausea. However, he is also recognized as the one who has
conquered nausea. "This is the man without nausea, this is Zarathustra
himself, the overcomer of the great nausea"3 Indeed, nausea represents the
2 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §2.
3 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:8.
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turning point in Zarathustra, after which the entire tone of the work 
changes. After Zarathustra experiences nausea, the text changes from linear 
imager/ such as going-over and downgoing, to metaphors of circularity as 
seen in the movements of the animals and the return of the same. The 
overcoming of nausea is a therefore undoubtedly a central element in 
Zarathustra, and one that has been largely ignored. Nietzsche discusses 
nausea in other works, but not nearly to the extent that he does in 
Zarathustra. Nevertheless, the idea of nausea figures centrally both in 
Nietzsche's critical and positive thought, as will be demonstrated.
For Nietzsche, nausea has two interrelated causes. The first cause of 
nausea is particularly Nietzschean, and arises from contempt for those who 
have not allowed themselves to realize their existential and ontological 
condition. These masses live according to myth and dogma, too frightened 
to allow themselves to experience the painful and potentially destructive 
experience of self-reflection and existential nausea. These people thus lead 
lives of self-satisfied mediocrity, and are referred to by Nietzsche as 
"superfluous." However, even more nauseating to the exceptional 
individual is the realization that the superfluous man is ontologically equal 
to himself within the context of the meaningless universe. Thus, "social 
nausea" is essentially reactive, caused by external social factors that are not 
necessarily internalized into the individual consciousness.
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The second cause of nausea is similar to that discussed by the 
existentialists, particularly Sartre. Existential nausea, or the "Great Nausea," 
is the abject horror that arises from contemplation of the meaningless of 
existence. This occurs at a specific moment in time in which the individual 
is open to the realization of this deeply disturbing ontological and 
existential possibility. This specific existential mood is fostered by the first, 
socially-actuated nausea which allows the individual to separate from the 
herd and become open to new existential possibilities. However, existential 
nausea is much more personal, arising out of contemplation of the 
individual's own finitude, not reflection upon the abstract concept of death. 
Because of its innateness, existential nausea is not reactive but rather active, 
spurring the individual toward the possibility of self-creation.
L
In keeping with Nietzsche's presentation of the two varieties of 
nausea, it is proper to examine social nausea first Nietzsche's contempt for 
the mundane is well known. However, the extent of his revulsion at 
modem society cannot be overestimated. Nietzsche's social nausea is more 
nuanced than simple disappointment at the mediocrity of modem society; it 
extends to an ontological level Nietzsche is nauseated by die fact that the 
lowest of the rabble is ontologically equal to those with the greatest nobility 
of spirit
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I had seen them both naked, the greatest man and the smallest man: 
all too similar to one another, even the greatest all too human! The 
greatest too small!—that was my disgust at man! And eternal 
recurrence even for the smallest! That was my disgust at all 
existence! Alas! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea!4
This type of nausea is presented as a great challenge to Zarathustra.
His realization of the contemptibleness of humanity causes him to ruminate
on the status of the masses in relation to his own existence. In essence,
Zarathustra must determine the existential status of the exceptional
individual in relation to that of the masses. This takes the form of an
analysis of collective existence as a type of morass in which individuals lose
their identities in contact with die masses:
But once I asked, and my question almost stifled me: What; does life 
have need of the rabble, too? Are poisoned wells necessary, and 
stinking fires and dirty dreams and maggots in the bread of life? Not 
my hate but my nausea hungrily devoured my life! Alas, I often 
grew weary of the spirit when I found the rabble, too, had been gifted 
with spirit! And I turned my back upon the rulers when I saw what 
they now called ruling: bartering and haggling for power—with the 
rabble!5
Zarathustra's disgust is centered on the pettiness of humanity.6 
Individuals are no longer concerned with the betterment of themselves or
4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:13.2. Hollingdale renders this as "disgust"
5 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL6.
6 "Boundless and constantly recurring is Nietzsche's sorrow over men as they really are: 
"What arouses our repugnance today?. . .  That such vermin as human beings can 
predominate and multiply" . . .  Not one of them is a complete being: Tt is always the same: 
fragments and limbs and revolting monstrosities—but no men!' They ruin everything with 
their talk and betray everything.. . .  The paroxysm of disgust with man receives symbolic 
expression in the frightful sentence: Tt is doubtful that a world-traveler has anywhere in the 
world discovered an uglier region than the human face.'" Jaspers, Nietzsche, 125.
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the discovery of an authentic selfhood. Rather, individuals are concerned
almost totally with their acceptance by the mob. Political power is similarly
centered on this lowest common denominator. Social nausea is therefore a
further confirmation of Nietzsche's earlier critique of the state and mass
culture, but the emphasis is now shifted to die reaction of the exceptional
individual to these normalizing mechanisms. This is why the rule of the
mob is especially nauseating to Zarathustra, as it represents the triumph of
the reactive forces at the expense of the active individual:
For today the petty people have become lord and master they all 
preach submission and acquiescence and prudence and diligence and 
consideration and the long et cetera of petty virtues. What is 
womanish, what stems from slavishness and especially from the 
mob's hotchpotch: that now wants to become master of mankind's 
entire destiny—oh, nausea! Nausea! Nausea!7
This nausea at the masses causes a great sense of hopelessness in
Zarathustra, he realizes that society and the Ultimate Men who populate it
are unredeemable. The mob does not seek personal growth; it longs only for
solace and flattery. "The great nausea at man—it choked me and had crept
into my throat and what the prophet prophesied: 'it is all one, nothing is
worthwhile, knowledge chokes.'"8 Zarathustra realizes that the masses
ultimately pollute everything and corrupt the individual with their
Dekadenz.
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:133.
8 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, QL13.2.
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I once vowed to renounce all nausea; then you transformed my 
kindred and neighbors into abscesses. Alas, where did my noblest 
vow flee then? Once, as a blind man, I walked on happy paths; then 
you threw filth in the blind man's path: and now the old footpath 
disgusts him. And when I achieved my most difficult task and 
celebrated the victory of my overcomings: then you made those 
whom I loved cry out that I hurt them most Truly, all that was your 
doing: you embittered my finest honey and die industry of my finest 
bees.9
Nietzsche emphasizes that nausea cannot be overcome through mere 
contemplation, "and truly, if man should gain the whole world and learn 
this one thing, rumination: what would it profit him! He would not be free 
from his affliction. . .  nausea. Who today has not his heart, mouth, and eyes 
filled with nausea?"10 Nausea must be confronted for what it is and acted 
upon. Through this confrontation with social nausea, it is realized that the 
features of humanity that inspire disgust are essential traits of collective 
human existence.11 Collective existence leads inexorably to the type of 
sedated existence typified by the rule of the mob: "Much about your good 
people nauseates me, and it is not their evil I mean Truly, I wish their
9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:11.
10 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:8.
11 “ Ressentiment, bad conscience and nihilism are not psychological traits but the 
foundation of humanity in man. They are the principle of human being as such. Man,'skin 
disease' of the Earth, reaction of the Earth.. . .  It is in this sense that Zarathustra speaks of 
his 'great contempt' for man and his 'great disgust'. Another sensibility, another 
becoming—would they still be man's?" Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 64-65.
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madness were called truth or loyalty or justice: but they possess their virtue
in order to live long and in a miserable ease."12
Mass society prevents the existential analysis necessary for personal
growth through a retreat into transcendental fantasy. Nietzsche argues
against this escapism into metaphysical consolation brought about by
feelings of hopelessness at the realization of meaninglessness. "For truly,
there is also a wisdom that blossoms in darkness, a night-shade wisdom,
which is always sighing: 'all is vain!'. . .  such is the nature of cowardly
souls."13 This tendency causes those who seek insight beyond the herd to
lapse into guilt or despair.
And I saw a great sadness come over mankind. The best grew weary 
of their works. A teaching went forth, a belief ran beside ifc 
Everything is empty, everything is one, everything is past!. . .  We 
have harvested, it is true; but why did all our fruits turn rotten and 
brown? What fell from the wicked moon last night? All our work 
has been in vain, our wine has become poison, an evil eye has 
scorched our fields and our hearts. . .  we have grown too weary even 
to die; now we are still awake and we live on—in sepulchres!14
Within the realm of the mob, those who seek personal growth or
question the principles underlying mass culture are in some way
12 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:6.
13 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, HI:10.
14 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:19. Nietzsche is explicitly responding to Ecclesiastes 1:2-11, 
"Vanity of vanities. . .  AH is vanity! What do people gain from all the toil at which they toil 
under the sun?. . .  The sun rises and the sun goes down, and hurries to the place where it
rises All streams run to the sea, but the sea is not full What has been is what will
be, and what has been done is what will be done; there is nothing new under the sun___
The people of long ago are not remembered, nor will there be any remembrance of people 
yet to come by those who come after them." Properly confronted, this angstis liberating.
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condemned. Because of the institutionalized belief in metaphysics or even 
in progress, it is essentially impossible to move beyond bad conscience and 
mob existence:
Today I saw a sublime man, a penitent of the spirit oh, how my soul 
laughed at his ugliness!. . .  As yet he has not learned of laughter and 
beauty. This huntsman returned gloomily from the forest of 
knowledge.. . .  There is still contempt in his eye, and disgust lurks 
about his mouth. He rests now, to be sure, but he has never yet lain 
down in the sunlight15
However, mere disgust at humanity is not enough; it is necessary to 
confront the source of this loathing, both within the society and one's own 
self, in order to progress beyond disgust toward a self worthy of 
affirmation. "I love the great despisers. Man, however, is something that 
must be overcome."16 Although many may realize the necessity of this, few 
have the fortitude to actually complete the process of overcoming. "To be 
sure, there are sour apples whose fate is to wait until the last day of autumn:
and they become at the same time ripe, yellow, and shriveled It is
cowardice that keeps him fastened to his branch."17 In Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche further emphasizes the nausea arising from the denigration 
of man through modern idealistic dogma, a manifestation of this cowardice:
15 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:13.
16 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:7.
17 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, L21-
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The comprehensive denigration of man down to what today appears 
to the socialist idiots and flatheads as their "man of the future"—as 
their ideal—this denigration and diminution of man into the perfect 
herd animal (or, as they say, to the man of the "free society"), this 
animalization of the man into the dwarf animal of equal rights and 
claims, is possible, there is no doubt of it  Anyone who has once 
thought through this possibility to the end knows one kind of nausea 
that other men do not know—but perhaps also a new task!18
The type of escapism fostered by mass culture prevents the
individual from confronting the really hard questions of existence, which
might lead to the realization of the fictional character of such institutions.
However, once nausea is confronted, the individual is open to question
society and perceive it without the interference of inherited presuppositions.
Then, the individual can reevaluate himself:
The hour when you say: "what good is my happiness? It is poverty 
and dirt and a miserable escape. But my happiness should justify 
existence itself." The hour when you say: "what good is my reason? 
Does it long for knowledge as the lion for its food?" It is poverty and 
dirt and a miserable escape!" The hour when you say: "What good is 
my virtue? It has not yet driven me mad! How tired I am of my 
good and evil! It is all poverty and dirt and miserable escape!" The 
hour when you say: "What good is my justice? I do not see that I am 
fire and hot coals. But the just man is fire and hot coals!" The hour 
when you say: "What good is my pity? Is not pity the cross upon 
which he who loves man is nailed? But my pity is no crucifixion!"... 
In truth, man is a polluted river. One must be a sea to receive this 
polluted river and not become defiled. Behold, I teach you the 
Obermensch. he is this sea, in him your great contempt can go under. 
What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the 
great contempt The hour in which even your happiness becomes 
loathsome, and your reason and virtue as well.19
18 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, V£03.
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3. This is the calling for the great nausea and thus the 
separation from the herd.
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This "hour of the great contempt  ^is the culmination of social nausea. 
Once the individual realizes that all of the desires implanted by society are 
meaningless it is possible to abandon societal expectations and look within.
It is only then that the individual is able to begin contemplation of the self in 
an authentic non-foundational context Thus social nausea leads to the 
desire to separate from the herd. Although social nausea is primarily 
reactive, it is through the culmination of contempt that social nausea is 
capable of becoming creative and therefore constructive. "There is wisdom 
in the fact that much in the world smells ill: nausea itself creates wings and 
water-divining powers! Even in the best there is something to excite nausea; 
and even the best is something that must be overcome!"20
Social nausea therefore creates a substrate for the individual to react 
against and to inspire further action. The revolutionary spirit is alive in this 
concept, albeit on an individual basis. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche argues that 
the experience of nausea in Zarathustra demonstrates "what alone 'man' can 
be for him—not an object of love or, worse, pity—Zarathustra has mastered 
the great nausea over man, too: man is for him an un-form, a material, an 
ugly stone that needs a sculptor."21 Social nausea is therefore only reactive 
in the sense that it causes the initial rupture with society and realigns die
20 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.14.
21 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §8.
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individual's expectations away from societal objectives. Indeed, the very
prospect of social intercourse becomes deeply disturbing:
Now we are avoiding the mob, all these ranters and scribbling- 
bluebottles, the stench of shopkeepers, the struggles of ambition, the 
foul breath: faugh, to live among the mob, faugh, to pretend to be the 
first among the mob! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea!22
Social nausea is constructive in that it creates a void that must be
addressed by the individual. Nausea destroys the superstructure that has
grown up to support the myth of stability and transcendence. Social nausea
sets the stage for a much more complete sense of nausea that calls into
question the entirety of the individual's previous interpretation of reality:
To all of you, whatever honors you may bestow upon yourselves 
with words, whether you call yourselves “the tree spirits'' or "the 
truthful" or "the penitents of the spirit" or the "unfettered" or "the 
great desirers", to all of you, like me, suffer from the great nausea, for 
whom the old God has died and no new God lies in cradles and 
swaddling clothes—to all of you is my evil spirit and sorcery-devil 
well-disposed.23
Social nausea is therefore important from several Nietzschean 
perspectives. In order for the individual to begin the process of self- 
creation, it is necessary to abandon traditional ways of interpreting 
existence. As Nietzsche is all too aware, these interpretive schemes, and the 
comfort they provide, are exceptionally difficult for the individual to escape. 
It is only during the most painful episodes of human existence, such as the
22 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV3.
23 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:142.
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confrontation with personal mortality and by extension the void, that it is 
possible to see these myths for what they are: comforting stories. Without 
social nausea and the release from societal myths, it is impossible to move to 
the more comprehensive level of nausea, existential nausea.
IL
Existential nausea is much more disturbing than social nausea, as it
calls into question the basis for individual existence on the most personal
level. Nietzsche hopes that this questioning of the individual's existential
status can lead to a transmutation of the self to a higher leveL Nietzsche
argues this point consistently in his work; indeed the concept of existential
nausea is foreshadowed by Nietzsche's description of the Dionysian man in
The Birth o f Tragedy.
In this sense the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet both have once 
looked truly into the essence of things, they have gained knowledge, 
and nausea inhibits action; for their action could not change anything 
in the eternal nature of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or 
humiliating that they should be asked to set right a world that is out 
of balance. Knowledge kills action; action requires the veil of illusion 
. . .  true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any 
motive for action.24
By embracing the Dionysian ethic of the eternal flux of existence, the 
ancient Greeks were able to integrate a healthier ideal into their tragic model 
of life. The Dionysian mythology was explicitly structured to support the
24 Nietzsche, The Birth o f Tragedy, VHL7. Nietzsche then argues that the only possibility 
for Dionysian man to transcend this impasse is through the creative power of art.
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conclusion that life was meaningless outside of individual action.25 
Conversely, modernity explicitly denies the ascendancy of chance, leading 
to a static worldview incapable of dealing with die vicissitudes of life.26 It is 
only through the destruction of the modem worldview that Nietzsche hopes 
to free us from the essentially unhealthy ideology of progress that has 
become melded to the modem mindset Through the separation from 
society and its psychological imperatives, the first stage of nausea has freed 
the individual from the institutional manifestations of bad conscience and 
transcendental solace.
In this sense, nausea represents the moment at which the individual 
realizes the shortcomings of the myths built up over time by others and then 
adopted by the self to filter out the horror of meaninglessness. The 
destruction of the idea of a divine plan and its secular counterpart the 
human community is necessary before the individual is able to move 
forward. However, it is then necessary for the individual to free himself 
from a far more embedded myth: the illusion of the innate rationality of die
25 "Ariadne, the Labyrinth, the Minotaur, Theseus, and Dionysus—this whole area of 
mythology is repeatedly alluded to with all its mysterious ambiguity when he wishes to 
suggest the last secret of the truth: that the truth is death, or that it is something else 
desired with the passion for truth that will, in turn, end in death." Jaspers, Nietzsche, 225.
26 "Nihilism, the experience of the exhaustion of meaning, amounts to a great weariness, a 
'great disgust,' on the part of man, and directed at him as weU. Nothing is worth much 
anymore, everything comes down to the same thing, everything is equalized. Everything is 
the same and equivalent: the true and the false, the good and the bad. Everything is 
outdated, used up, old, dilapidated, dying: an undefined agony of meaning, and unending 
twilight: not a definite annihilation of significations, but their indefinite collapse." Haar, 
Nietzsche and M etaphysics, 11.
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universe.27 Underlying theological and secular accounts of existence is the 
idea that the universe in some way makes sense. The idea of the ordered 
cosmos must be accepted for what it is: a projection of the fear of lack of 
control onto a chaotic and sometimes hostile universe. This fear of 
meaninglessness and death is certainly not unnatural, as Tillich states, 
"everything finite is innately anxious that its substance will be lost"28
Nietzsche hopes to turn this anxiety toward a constructive purpose. 
First it is necessary for the individual to entertain the notion that the 
universe is indeed meaningless, and that there is no external ordering 
outside of the actions of the concrete will. As Camus states, "only power 
without purpose, only Heraclitus' 'chance/ is eternal."29 Paradoxically, 
Nietzsche argues that the realization of the meaninglessness of existence and 
its acceptance leads to a greater sense of individual freedom. Without 
external constraints, it is possible to seek new permutations of selfhood.
27 "When one gives up the moral universal that makes its demands with logically inflexible 
unconditionality, no return is possible. One is threatened by the possibility of sinking into a 
limitless void. The loss of the resistance afforded by immutable moral laws may as easily 
be followed by abandonment to caprice and accident as by emergence from the source of an 
authentic and historically unique possibility." Jaspers, Nietzsche, 155.
28 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (London: Nisbit, 1953), 219.
29 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in  Revolt bans. Anthony Bower (New York: 
Vintage, 1991), 73.
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Existential nausea is therefore not reactive, it is instead the impetus to 
action. "My abyss speaks, I have turned my ultimate depth into the light!"30
Through confrontation with the abyss of meaninglessness, the 
individual is able to move beyond contempt and despair towards 
constructive action.31 Thus, nausea does not represent destruction. If one 
can embrace the void, the opportunity opens for self-overcoming.
Existential nausea represents the complete stripping away of all previous 
orderings of the consciousness to reveal its underlying structure: the 
permutations of the will-to-power, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Only through the confrontation with and overcoming of existential nausea 
can the individual finally obtain the innocence necessary to begin the 
process of self-creation free from external interference. As Nietzsche writes: 
"the highest must arise to its height from the deepest"32 Thus, the reaction 
to nausea that affirms life is as natural as the nausea which arose from 
contemplating its wretchedness. Nietzsche praises nausea as a positive 
good: "O my soul, I taught you the great contempt that comes not as the
30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:13.1-2.
31 "When one has overcome, when one has come to face the dwarfing fear of the aby», one 
can dance around it, one can laugh at i t  Then one looks deep into life, then it becomes 
possible to embrace the end of, the edge of life—superficial now out o/profundity— 
absorbing the abyss that looks into one and, so transfigured by the lightness of light by the 
gold of existence, one is 'a transformed being, surrounded with light laughing. Never yet 
on earth had any man laughed as he laughed!' This is 'not human' but Dionysian 
laughter." Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy o f Science, 293.
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1.
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gnawing of a worm, the great loving contempt which loves most where it
despises most"33 Magnus notes:
" . . .  there is nothing in the nature of things which justifies nausea, 
justifies the estimate that life is a wretched stafce-of-affairs, anymore 
than there is anything in the nature of things which justifies joy, 
exultation, and the estimate that life is consummate celebration."34
This attitude that nausea is a constructive reaction to life is dependent 
upon the courage of the individual. This attitude is aggressive in its self­
valuation, even as it destroys external ordering. "For courage is the best 
destroyer—courage that attacks, for in every attack there is a triumphant 
shout"35 Mere acknowledgment the abyss is insufficient; one must gaze 
into it with full recognition of the existential implications. The horror of the 
stripping away of metaphysical consolation is enough to destroy even the 
most dauntless individual; indeed this is what fostered the diverse systems 
of metaphysical consolation that have been institutionalized over the 
millennia. As Nietzsche states, "he who sees the abyss, but with eagle's 
eyes—he who grasps the abyss with an eagle's claws: he possesses 
courage."36
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:14.
34 Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative, 174.
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2.1.
36 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.4.
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The individual must make the reality of the abyss a part of die self, in 
order to prevent re-concretization of newly formed insights. Through 
nausea the great myths of traditional metanarratives are destroyed, but they 
are not replaced with anything capable of taking their place. Nausea, 
therefore, is the internalization of the abyss. Through nausea, the individual 
is separated fully from not only previous ordering but from die notion of the 
possibility of external ordering. After gazing into the abyss, there is no 
possibility for redemption apart from internal ordering of consciousness. 
Once this step is taken, there can be no return. As Nietzsche writes, 
"courage also destroys giddiness at abysses: and where does man not stand 
at an abyss? Is seeing itself not—an abyss?"37
Taken together, these forms of nausea lead to the separation of the 
"self' from the "other." Nausea represents a fundamental turning point in 
an individual's life. People who have experienced the profound shock of 
existential nausea may re-emerge into the comfort of familiar systems of 
existential consolation. The other choice concerns Nietzsche. This is to 
confront the void and search for a new justification for existence based upon 
the creative self. This latter choice is ultimately more dangerous, but to 
Nietzsche much more rewarding. Nietzsche concludes that finitude is the
37 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2.1.
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great demarcation for individuality, and therefore nausea is the herald of 
self-overcoming.38
The experience of nausea is inextricably necessary for self- 
overcoming in the Nietzschean sense. The discussion of self-overcoming is 
dependant upon a specific understanding of what Nietzsche means by this 
problematic project It is instructive to examine the first instance in 
Zarathustra in which Nietzsche discusses the overcoming of man: "Ich 
lehre euch den Obermenschen. DerMensch istEtwas, das iiberwunden 
werden so/1"39 This is generally translated as "I teach you the overman. 
Man is something that should be overcome."40
Employing a somewhat different translation, it is possible to get a 
sense of the pathos of distance that Nietzsche is emphasizing: "mankind is
38 "And, generally speaking, the experience of individuality in modem culture is bound up 
with that of death: from Httlderlein's Empedocles to Nietzsche's Zarathustra, and on to 
Freudian man, an obstinate relation to death prescribes to the universal its singular face, 
and lends to each individual the power of being heard forever; the individual owes to death 
a meaning that does not cease with him. The division that it traces and the finitude whose 
mark it imposes link, paradoxically, the universality of language and the precarious, 
irreplaceable form of the individual. The sense-perceptible, which cannot be exhausted by 
description, and which so many centuries have wished to dissipate, finds at last in death 
the law of its discourse; it is death that fixes the stone that we can touch, the return of time, 
the fine, innocent earth beneath the grass of words. In a space articulated by language, it 
reveals the profusion of bodies and their simple order." Michel Foucault, The Birth o f the 
C linic An Archaeology o f M edical Perception, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: 
Vintage, 1994), 197.
39 Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
40 Translated by HoDingdale, (London: Penguin, 1961). Kaufmarm renders the passage 
"man is something that shall be overcome," thus blunting the imperative tone of the 
passage even more so than Hollingdale, and implying a teleology.
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something that m ust be overcome."41 hi this sense, Nietzsche is
illuminating the need to overcome those parts of the individual self that are
grounded in "mankind." As Jaspers notes, "Nietzsche's longing for the
genuine man, while giving rise to his contempt is nevertheless the force that
moves and consumes him."42 Thus, it is through nausea and the collapse of
everyday meaning that the transmuted self is possible. This overcoming of
existential nausea is only possible by confronting and accepting the
individual's own finite existence, thus making death no more than the
crowning achievement of a well-constructed life.
I shall show you the consummating death, which shall be a spur and 
a promise to living. The man consummating his life dies his death 
triumphantly, surrounded by men filled with hope and making 
solemn vows. Thus one should learn to die; and there should be no 
festivals at which such a dying man does not consecrate the oaths of 
the living!43
When the individual recognizes that death is not the passage to the 
next life or a socially-redeeming sacrifice, death becomes the limit of 
perception against which one can project a clearly-delimited endpoint for 
self-creation. Properly understood, therefore, the realization of die 
meaninglessness of existence is an invitation to an unheard of existential
41 Translation and italics mine.
42 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 126.
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
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freedom. "Free for death and free in death, one who solemnly says No 
when there is no longer time for Yes: thus he understands life and death."44
Nausea represents the birth pangs of the Ubermertsch. It is a 
necessary, and dangerous, passage the individual must journey through in 
order to become the child as discussed in the "Three Metamorphoses" and 
create himself. The great nausea is no less than the embracing of the void, 
something not to be feared but to be welcomed as the next stage for 
individual existence. Zarathustra cries, "Ah! You are coming—I hear you! 
My abyss speaks, I have turned my ultimate depth into the light! Ah! Come 
here! Give me your hand. . .  nausea, nausea, nausea—woe is me!"45
Although nausea begins as a reactive impulse against the 
loathsomeness of society and the masses, it ultimately becomes the 
affirmation of individual existence. Nausea is capable of destroying the 
impediments to individual self-creation, but it does not provide a structure 
or any guidance to re-order the consciousness. Nietzsche is acutely aware of 
the problems inherent in positive theory, and does not want to present a 
scheme for ordering the consciousness that might degenerate into dogma. 
Therefore, he articulates an alternative that is both individually-actuated 
and not concretizable. This leads to the formation of an imperative for
44 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:13.1-2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
175
action that ultimately arises from Nietzsche's emphasis upon the primacy of 
individual interpretation of existence: eternal recurrence.
m.
Nausea is not caused by die realization of the eternal recurrence: the 
concept of the eternal return instead arises from the vacuum left by the 
collapse of everyday systems of consolation.46 The articulation of the eternal 
recurrence is a response to die realization of the inherent meaninglessness of 
existence. Indeed, the overcoming of nausea and the realization of the 
eternal recurrence is the principal precondition for the aesthetic ethics 
capable of producing the Obennensch. This section will discuss the political 
implication of the eternal recurrence for Nietzsche's project of individual 
creation.
Importantly, Zarathustra does not come to the realization of the 
eternal recurrence on his own. The eternal recurrence is instead articulated 
first by his animal companions, the eagle and the serpent This has caused 
some to interpret the eternal recurrence as not arising from within the self, 
but rather as an external transcendental construct or metaphysical
46 "Zarathustra cannot articulate recurrence because he is overcome by nausea, to be sure. 
But remember Nietzsche's point that estimates of life are, in a very important sense, clues to 
the estimator, insights into the being of the assessor. So if the thought of eternal recurrence 
nauseates, as it does Zarathustra, that is because Zarathustra cannot will the eternal 
recurrence of the moment without devaluing it, and hence life, in the extreme. That 
Zarathustra must overcome his nausea is evidence of his decadence—recall Nietzsche's 
pithy observation that to have to fight instinct is itself a symptom of decadence." Magnus, 
N ietzsche's Existential Imperative, 173.
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cosmology.47 However, Nietzsche's presentation of the animals as the
heralds of this knowledge is a further outgrowth of his interpretive
philosophy. Nietzsche constructs the narrative in this way for rhetorical
effect and to separate the reader from the text As Ansell-Pearson notes:
It is thus not Zarathustra but his animals who relate the final version 
of doctrine of eternal return and who inform him that his down- 
going is over and has reached its end. The reason for this, I would 
argue, is that Zarathustra cannot himself declare that his down-going 
is at an end because, in order for him to become what he is, we must 
become those that we are too. In other words, his testing and 
recognition is dependant on our testing and recognition.48
The animals do not represent exterior forces or entities. Rather, the
animals represent parts of Zarathustra's consciousness, analogous to the
unconscious.49 In this interpretation, die animals represent knowledge that
has been repressed by the conscious mind, which Nietzsche has argued is
largely a social creation.50 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the
47 Heidegger is the most significant of these interpreters. Please see the appendix for an 
extended discussion.
48 Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, 183.
49 " . . .  they symbolize the re-united powers which are to open the way to the New Agp." 
Heinrich Zimmer, M yths and Symbols in Indian A it and Civilization, ed. Joseph Campbell 
(New York: Pantheon, 1963).
50 "From the perspective of the principle which conditions it, the eternal return depends 
upon a transmutation but, from the perspective of its unconditioned principle,
transmutation depends more profoundly on the eternal return This is why Zarathustra
is always in an inferior position in relation to the eternal return and the Overman. He is the 
cause of the eternal return, but a cause which delays producing its effect. A prophet who 
hesitates to deliver his message, who knows the vertigo and the temptation of the negative, 
who must be encouraged by his animals. Father of the Overman, but a father whose 
products are ripe before he is ripe for his products, a lion who still lacks a final 
metamorphosis, hi fact the eternal return and the Overman are at the crossing of two 
genealogies, of two unequal genetic lines." Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 192.
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animals are never present when other characters are present in the narrative. 
The animals only appear when Zarathustra is alone, engaged in an internal 
dialogue. When there are no other people around, either as objects of bad 
conscience or seeking to impose their will, Zarathustra is able to listen to his 
own instinctual knowledge that has been blocked by the repressive 
metanarratives of society.
Thus, because we often ignore these parts of our consciousness in the 
presence of others, it is only when the individual is stripped of the "all-too- 
human" parts of the consciousness that the repressed features again appear, 
represented by the animals. This cannot occur in die presence of others, in 
Heideggerian terms, the chattering of das Man shuts out the internal voice.
51 Zarathustra himself is uneasy about hearing this repressed voice: "Thus I 
spoke, and I spoke more and more softly: for I was afraid of my own 
thoughts and reservations."52 The animals elaborate the eternal recurrence 
as the expression of perpetual becoming; the validation of dance, play, and 
masks, which Nietzsche argues are the very operation of the consciousness.
51 "In and through the eternal return negation as a quality of the will to power transmutes 
itself into affirmation, it becomes an affirmation of negation itself, it becomes a power of 
affirming, an affirmative power. This is what Nietzsche presents as Zarathustra's cure and
Dionysus' secret "Nihilism vanquished itself' thanks to the eternal return It is no
linger a question of the simple thought of the eternal return eliminating from willing 
everything that falls outside this thought but rather, of the eternal return making something 
come into being which cannot do so without changing nature. It is no longer a question of 
selective thought but of selective being; for the eternal return is being and being is 
selection." Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 71.
52 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:22.
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"Oh Zarathustra," said the animals then, "all things themselves dance 
for those that think as we do: they come and offer their hand and 
laugh and flee—and return. Everything goes, everything returns; the 
wheel of existence rolls eternally. Everything dies, everything 
blossoms anew; the year of existence runs eternally.. . .  Existence 
begins in every instant; the ball There rolls around every Here. The 
middle is everywhere. The path of eternity is crooked."53
The awakening to the eternal recurrence is not therefore the
elaboration of a new cosmological scheme, it is even more profound. The
eternal recurrence is instead an anthropomorphic explanation of existence,
the highest expression of philosophical anthropology. As Magnus states:
The doctrine of eternal recurrence, in its principal sense, is offered as 
Nietzsche's principle illustration of the attitude of Obermenschheit 
It is the being-in-the-world of the Obermensch. I do not mean to say 
that it is one possible attitude among many. It is the attitude 
sim plidter Nietzsche wishes to portray as necessary to overcome 
passive nihilism.54
The eternal recurrence is a validation of existence as it is perceived by
the concrete human mind, with all of its visionary and disconnected
elements. Through the embracing of the eternal recurrence, the individual is
disconnected from previous temporal perception, time ceases to have an
ontological or existential meaning:
What has happened to me? Listen! Has time flown away? Do I not 
fall? Have I not fallen—listen! Into the well of eternity? What is 
happening to me? Still! It is stinging me—alas—in the heart?. . .  
When will you drink this drop of dew that has fallen upon all earthly 
things—when will you drink this strange soul—when, well of
93 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:132.
54 Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative, 140.
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eternity! Serene and terrible noontide abyss! When will you drink
my soul back into yourself?55
The key metaphor within the "doctrine" of the eternal recurrence is 
not the recurrence itself, but rather the concept of the "Moment"56 Through 
the destruction of the traditional narrative of temporality, Nietzsche 
articulates a new narrative of temporality centered solely upon the Moment 
There is no other temporal category. "Behold this moment!. . .  From this 
gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs back, an eternity lies behind us... 
. Must not all things that can happen have already happened, been done, 
run past?"57
The eternal recurrence is therefore not of every concrete action, 
choice, and event; but rather of this one Moment the eternal repetition of 
the Now. It is a mistake of bad conscience to assign values to the past or 
future, these are invalid temporal categories that distract the individual 
from the only unit of time that exists: the Now.
55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:10.
56 "The one thing that casts no shadow is the moment, and it is the moment that is to be 
affirmed in life, in what is as it is because it is, in the thought of the Eternal Return. In this 
way, Nietzsche could explain that Zarathustra's ideal was an individual who saw flux and 
death and birth and life—all as realities, as many realities, as the Real The only human 
redemption possible must be attained through this aesthetic sight of the Real. This vision 
teaches how one is to go under, and how one overcomes oneself, because it teaches the 
ineluctability (it teaches the fierce creator's or artist's joy) of death in life. Yet. . .  it would 
be wrong to claim that the redemptive world- and life-affirming power of this thought is 
meant for everyone." Babich, N ietzsche's Philosophy o f Science* 296.
57 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2:2.
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And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this 
moment draws after it all future things? Therefore— draws itself too? 
For all things that can run m ust also run once again forward along 
this long lane. . .  must we not all have been here before. . .  and must 
we not return and run down that other lane out before us, down that 
long, terrible lane—must we not return eternally?58
All things reoccur because all things are within the Moment This
assertion destroys the idea of Being. Everything is in flux, there is no such
thing as stable existence. Because time has no meaning outside of
perception, and the Moment is the only unit of time that can be concretely
perceived, past and future are illusion. The Moment as it eternally
reoccurs, must be eternally reinterpreted by the individual. This constant
interpretation leads to continuous change. There is no being, only
becoming. "Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally
and we ourselves with them You teach that there is a great year of
Becoming, a colossus of a year this year must, like an hour-glass, turn itself
over again and again."59
Nietzsche's analysis of time is open to criticism if it is taken to be a
concrete view of temporality. Many Nietzsche interpreters, Heidegger and
Jaspers included, have taken the view that Nietzsche's espousal of the
eternal recurrence is a back-door attempt to introduce metaphysical or
transcendental elements into an essentially materialist philosophy.
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2:2
59 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:13.2
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However, Nietzsche's concept of the eternal recurrence is not presented as 
an actual model of the behavior of time.60 Nietzsche presents the eternal 
recurrence in a metaphorical manner, likening it directly to die ancient 
concept of the eternal chain of Being. The eternal recurrence is meant as an 
illustrative device to induce a sense of reverence at each passing moment, 
and to emphasize the importance of the present over the projections of past 
and future.61
However, Nietzsche's concept of the eternal recurrence is problematic 
as it clouds the distinction between Being and Becoming. If all that exists is 
the Moment, then it is difficult to imply that becoming is predominant, as an 
eternal Now implies a sense of stability or even stagnation. Further, without 
projecting the self into the future or reflecting upon the past it is difficult to 
conceive of the possibility of a project of self-overcoming. If all that exists is 
the now, what is to be overcome?
These critiques ignore one of the essential precepts of Nietzsche's 
philosophy. Nietzsche is not concerned with the distinction between Being 
and Becoming because Nietzsche views it as a false dichotomy. Being is a
60 "The analogy here is with Kant In this instance we are admonished to behave as i f  
recurrence were true." Magnus, N ietzsche's Existential Imperative, 140.
61" . . .  Nietzsche appears to be committed to a form of naturalism whose basis is the belief 
that humans are naAraZFykronophobic. We are kronophobes, despisere of time." Magnus, 
N ietzsche's Existential Imperative, 189. The elaboration of the eternal return by Nietzsche 
is his constructive attempt to transcend this deep-seated antipathy towards the passing of 
time. Heidegger argues that this antipathy is the underlying cause of ressentunent; but this 
is incorrect See the appendix for an extended discussion.
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static concept which ignores the fundamental flux of existence. Indeed, the 
category "Being" arose as a psychological necessity akin to the will-to-truth. 
Nietzsche destroys traditional temporal categories because he wants to 
emphasize the contingent nature of existence inherent in the concept of 
becoming. In this sense, the metaphors of the eternal recurrence and 
Becoming represent an active approach towards the passing of time rather 
than the essentially reactive, static approach of teleology and the paean to 
Being.
IV.
By centering his positive philosophy within the Moment, Nietzsche 
makes an important and radical philosophical leap. Existence has no 
meaning, no independent ontological status. Only the individual concrete 
consciousness has any ontological status, as it perceives within the Moment 
In this sense, the world is indeed interpretation, and it is completely so.
This is why it is only when Zarathustra is alone that he can realize the 
eternal recurrence. This type of ontological leap simply cannot be made 
within a societal context it must be willed through a process of self- 
overcoming, the first stage of which is die overcoming of nausea. Thus, the 
announcement of the eternal return by the animals amounts to the final 
acceptance of the nagging internal truth that most people repress. The 
concrete individual will is all that exists; die world, society, history, even
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other people are all a sham.62 They all depend upon the individual's
perception in the Moment It is necessary to overcome all resistance to this
fundamental reality. As Ansell-Pearson argues:
This point on the eternal return can only be appreciated if it is 
recognized that what is willed in the experience of return is no the 
literal contents on the moment but the very momentariness of the 
moment, that is, time's desire and time's perishing. This notion of the 
"same" in the thought of the eternal return provides the criterion for 
judging whether one's actions are motivated by innocence and 
forgetfulness or by guilt and revenge. As a thought-experiment, the 
eternal return asks us how well-disposed towards life we would have 
to feel in order to desire nothing more passionately and intensely 
than its eternal confirmation and seal.63
This knowledge is exceptionally dangerous. The ethical implications
of the recognition of the full implications of the eternal return are
momentous. In the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche identifies the
overcoming of the great nausea as a pivotal event for humanity, through
which humanity may will its own destruction:
What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any 
other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but 
profound nausea; also not great fear but great pity. Suppose these 
two were to some day unite, they would inevitably give rise to the 
uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, 
nihilism.64
62 "Zarathustra invited human beings to reflect on good and evil so that they come to know 
and will that which has formed them, instead of accepting it as a blind fate and a dreadful 
chance over which they have no control. They must be taught to overcome even that which 
they feel mot impotent in the face of, and which they can only rage in anger and frustration 
against: the past" Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, 172.
63 Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, 173.
64 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f M orality, 111:14.
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Nietzsche's implication is that this knowledge is too dangerous for 
the whole of humanity, it can only be appreciated by the individual who has 
conquered nausea. By embracing this instinctual knowledge there is a 
foundation upon which it is possible to create a new self through a process 
which is inner-directed and not based in collective narratives. As Bemd 
Magnus has argued, the eternal recurrence offers a metaphor for the 
abandonment of the illusion of progress and the embracing of a new 
existential imperative. The new task at hand is the struggle to order the 
disparate elements of the consciousness illuminated through the 
confrontation with nausea into a dynamic, integrated self.
The first step along this journey is to embrace the eternal recurrence 
as a guide for action. It is necessary to live properly in the Moment, as it is 
indeed the fullness of time. The embracing of the Moment destroys the 
need for metaphysical consolation and provides the existential courage 
necessary to live in a meaningless universe. "Courage, however, is the best 
destroyer, courage that attacks: it destroys even death, for it says: 'Was that 
life? Well then! Once more!' But there is a great triumphant shout in such a 
saying. He who has ears to hear, let him hear."65
The governing psychological imperative behind die attitude of the 
Obermensch is the inclination towards life as expressed in the doctrine of
65 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2.1.
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the eternal return. The recurrence of everything, including the smallest 
things, seems at first impossible for Zarathustra to accept The return is 
exactly the same—not that the best part returns or that all except the worst 
returns, but all returns—this is difficult for Zarathustra to acknowledge.
The recurrence of the men farthest removed from the overman especially 
troubles Zarathustra, and he becomes nauseous. "All too small, even the 
greatest man!—that was my disgust at man! And the eternal return of the 
smallest man!—that was my disgust at all existence!"66 How is man to be 
overcome if he returns eternally? Nevertheless, Zarathustra eventually 
accepts the doctrine of eternal return of these small men without nausea, 
seeing the promise of affirmation of one's life. "But joys all want eternity— 
Want deep profound eternity."67
The doctrine of eternal recurrence offers an interesting perspective on 
the idea of progress. In a cyclical existence, no final forms can be attained or 
retained, everything is in a state of flux "O my soul, I have taught you to 
say 'today' as 'one upon a time' and 'formerly,' and to dance your measure 
over every Here and There and Yonder."68 The perspective offered by the 
eternal return teaches that there is no need for regret or anxiety; die moment 
is all that is meaningful. "Oh, how could I not be ardent for eternity, for die
66 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:13.2.
67 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:15.3.
68 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:14.
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marriage ring of rings—the ring of the return? . . .  For I love you, O 
eternity!"69
In this view, eternal recurrence is a metaphor, intending to urge the
reader to live his life as if it will repeat eternally. There is textual evidence
to support this interpretation. "Courage, however, is the best slayer,
courage which attacks: it slays even death itself; for it says:' Was that life?
Well! Once more.'"70 In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche refers to the eternal return as
the "highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable."71 In The Science
of Joy, Nietzsche offers an especially revealing example of how the eternal
return could be employed as a principle of affirmation.
What, if some day or night a demon were to . . .  say to you: "This life 
as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more 
and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in i t . . .  
The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and 
again, and you with it, speck of dust!" Would you not throw yourself 
down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?
Or have you one experienced a tremendous moment when you 
would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard 
anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it 
would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in 
each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and 
innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the 
greatest weight Or how well disposed would you have to become to 
yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate 
eternal confirmation and seal?72
69 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:163.
70 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:2.1.
71 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 751.
72 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Science o f Joy, § 341.
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The imperative of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence therefore is to 
carefully examine one's actions and abandon ideas of progress. The eternal 
return is a doctrine of immanence, not transcendence. The commandment 
of Nietzsche's imperative is to seize the moment and take joy in existence. 
Thus, the doctrine of eternal return is a central, guiding metaphor of 
Nietzsche's politics of the self. Rather than concern for humanity as a whole 
or the contemplation of "the good" of the community, Nietzsche's 
Obermensch is concerned with his own life and the perfection of it  As 
Deleuze notes:
As an ethical thought the eternal return is the new formulation of the 
practical synthesis: whatever you will, will it  in such a way that you 
also will its eternal return . . .  Laziness, stupidity, baseness, 
cowardice or spitefulness that would will its own eternal return 
would no longer be the same laziness, stupidity, etc. How does 
eternal return perform the selection here? It is the thought of the 
eternal return that selects. It makes willing something whole. The 
thought of the eternal return eliminates from willing everything 
which falls outside the eternal return, it makes willing a creation, it 
brings about the equation "willing = creating".73
Through the embracing of the Moment and the eternal recurrence,
Zarathustra's original social nausea is addressed. Although the rabble are
ontologically equal to the exceptional individual, they are not existentially
equal. The essential difference is action. The exceptional individual,
spurred by nausea, becomes a creative force separated from ressentiment
73 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 68-69.
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and societal bad conscience. Nausea has redeemed the individual by 
separating him from the masses and preparing him for the project of 
transmutation. The exceptional individual is no longer "all-too-human," but 
the process of overcoming has only begun. "I am a railing beside the 
stream: he who can grasp me, let him grasp me! I am not, however, your 
crutch."74
74 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:6.
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Chapter VI 
Th e  Ethics o f Absurdity 
It follows from Nietzsche's argument thus far that once nausea has 
been confronted and the nature of the universe is called into question there 
can be no possibility of either teaching or even sharing in the quest for self. 
Rather, there is a need to concentrate upon the individual self outside of any 
collective context Unlike Nietzsche's analysis of nausea, the discussion of 
self-overcoming and self-creation occurs in several places within the 
narrative, generally arising after criticism of collective existence.
Nietzsche seems to have a relatively coherent theory of the authentic 
individual selfhood, however this project is far from clearly defined. 
Zarathustra himself asks in desperation, "for what, then, is it—high time?"1 
Without doubt it is a project arising from within the self; an individual 
imperative:
Thus in symbols everything called to me: "it is time!" But I—did not 
hear: until at last my abyss stirred and my thought bit m e Alas, 
abysmal thought that is my thought! When shall I find the strength 
to hear you boring and no longer tremble? My heart rises to my 
throat when I hear you boring! Even your silence threatens to choke 
me, you abysmal, silent thought!2
Nietzsche does not delineate a formula for self-overcoming, this 
would be nothing more than the creation of a new dogma to supplant the
1 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:18.
2 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:3.
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old. However, Nietzsche offers several important points concerning the 
problems underlying the project of self-overcoming that must be addressed 
by individuals.
First, it is necessary to recognize that individuals begin as socially- 
created beings. "Peoples were the creators at first; only later were 
individuals creators. Indeed, the individual himself is still the latest 
creation."3 For Nietzsche, the herd creature is not properly an individual, 
rather part of a group identity. As seen in his discussion of nausea, it is only 
through the confrontation with finitude that the individual is created, and 
even then this process is far from certain. Society actively seeks to repress 
individuation, as this necessarily frustrates group identities and threatens 
the stability of the herd: "Joy in the herd is older than joy in the Ego: and as 
long as the good conscience is called herd, only the bad conscience says: "I". 
Truly, the cunning, loveless Ego. . .  that is not the origin of the herd, but die 
herd's destruction."4
Nietzsche argues that these herd creatures are not true individuals; 
indeed this social creature is not properly human: "is there not still 
lacking—humanity itself?"5 Individuals within the social matrix have 
repressed their will-to-power to such an extent that they have become the
3 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
5 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
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perfect expressions of bad conscience and self-loathing. Unable to express
their own inclinations and overcome themselves, they fall too easily into the
traps examined earlier
These are the dreadful creatures who carry a beast of prey around
within them, and have no choice except lusts or self-mortification___
They have not yet even become men, these dreadful creatures.. . .  
These are the consumptives of the soul: they are hardly bom before 
they begin to die and to long for doctrines of weariness and 
renunciation.6
It is the pitiful state of humanity that causes Nietzsche to condemn
mass society in the strongest possible terms: "the earth. . .  has a skin: and
this skin has diseases. One of these diseases, for example, is called 'Man'."7
Nietzsche's main complaint is that people within collective existence
become intellectually lazy and refuse to ask questions concerning their own
existential and ontological status. Without provocation, it never even occurs
to herd individuals to ask whether they have achieved their potential:
Have you ever spoken thus? Have you ever cried thus? Ah, had I 
only heard you crying thus! It is not your sin, but your moderation 
that cries to heaven, your very meanness in sinning cries to heaven! 
Where is the lightning to lick you with its tongue? Where is the 
madness, with which you should be cleansed? Behold, I teach you 
the Ubermensch he is this lightning, he is this madness!8
6 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:9.
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:18.
8 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3. Lightning and madness are metaphors for Dionysian 
ecstasy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192
Nietzsche's positive theory as contained in Zarathustra is an attempt 
to delineate the conditions necessary for this transformation of herd creature 
to self-creating individual. Nietzsche, however, does not articulate this in 
terms of a political theory of collective existence. It is also clear that 
Nietzsche does not call for a new ethics in the classical sense of a method of 
living with others. Indeed, he explicitly recognizes that all ethical systems 
are no more than sets of rationalizations for the mediocrity of mass culture.
Nietzsche's call is to the individual to create a new aesthetic ethics 
based upon resistance to these social norms and centering upon self­
overcoming. Nietzsche's aesthetic ethics is therefore necessarily 
revolutionary and individualistic. In order for this process to begin, 
Nietzsche argues that it is necessary to retreat into solitude so as to 
overcome the socially-created elements within the self.
L
This call to solitude is not easily accepted by the collective.9 For a 
society grounded in normalization and group identity, separation represents 
the ultimate rebellion against authority. "He who seeks may easily get lost
9 Indeed, Nietzsche emphasizes in his reevaluation of Zarathustra that the tum to solitude 
is the most important theme of this work. "My whole Zarathustra is a dithyramb on 
solitude or, if I have been understood, on cleanliness.—Fortunately not on pure 
foolishness—Those who have eyes for colors will compare it to a diamonds—Nausea over 
man, over the 'rabble/ was always my greatest danger.—Do you want to hear the words in 
which Zarathustra speaks of the redemption from nausea?" Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 1:8.
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himself. It is a crime to go apart and be alone"—thus speaks the herd."10 
Indeed, group identities are so ingrained that the individual who actively 
seeks to separate from the herd experiences feelings of guilt "The voice of 
the herd will still ring within you. And when you say: 'We have no longer 
the same conscience, you and I', it will be a lament and a grief. For see, it is 
still this same conscience that causes your grief: and the last glimmer of this 
conscience still glows in your affliction."11 However, once nausea is 
confronted the act of separation becomes a necessity, as the individual 
realizes that adhering to a morality and political state that causes the self to 
wither away is in the individual's worst interest12
The individual must begin the process of self-exploration, necessarily 
a dangerous task. Because of the inevitable power relations that form in any 
collective context Nietzsche emphasizes that this project can only begin in 
solitude. Furthermore, Nietzsche emphasizes that it is only in solitude that 
nausea can ultimately be overcome without backsliding into metaphysical 
solace. "How did I free myself from nausea?. . .  Did my nausea itself create 
wings and water-divining powers for me? Truly, I had to fly to the most
10 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
11 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
12 "Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself, to feel attracted by 'disinterested' 
motives, that is virtually the formula of Dekadenz.” Nietzsche, The Twilight o f the Idols, 
9:35.
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extreme height to find again the fountain of delight!. . .  And here there is
life at which no rabble drinks with me!"13
The separation of the individual from society is therefore the first
step towards self-overcoming. It is the socially-created parts of die self that
must be overcome first, as these are inculcated from the cradle and
reinforced by the institutions of collective existence. Because of this, the
individual is unknown even to himself:
And truly, to learn to love oneself is no commandment for today or 
tomorrow. Rather is this art the finest subtlest; ultimate, and most 
patient of all. For all his possessions are well concealed from the
possessor; and of all treasure pits, one's own is the last to be dug----
Almost in the cradle we are presented with heavy words and values: 
this dowry calls itself "good" and "evil". For its sake we are forgiven 
for being alive.14
It is necessary for the individual to seek solitude to differentiate the 
elements of the consciousness that are socially-created repressive 
mechanisms from the healthy instincts and drives that constitute the 
genuine self. In essence, the individual must deconstruct the self to reveal 
the multiple and conflicting identities that constitute die consciousness. 
Nietzsche emphasizes that this process is not a reactive one, but is instead a 
creative process arising from die vacuum left by the overcoming of nausea 
and the need for a self-actuated identity.
13 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:6.
14 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:11.
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You must be ready to bum yourself in your own flame: how could 
you become new, if you had not first become ashes? Solitary man, 
you are going the way of your creator you want to create yourself a 
god from your seven devils! Solitary man, you are going the way of 
the lover you love yourself and for that reason you despise yourself 
as only lovers can despise. The lover wants to create, because he 
despises!15
Nietzsche argues that the movement into solitude represents no less
than the return to the care for the self. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche treats
solitude as a companion, which was abandoned and must be regained. The
return to solitude is an existential necessity for the exceptional individual.
O solitude! Solitude, my home. . . .  Now shake your finger at me as 
mothers do, now smile at me as mothers smile, now say. . .  "Who 
departing cried: I have sat too long with Solitude, I have unlearned 
how to be silent! You have surely learned that— now? O 
Zarathustra, I know all: and that you were lonelier among the crowd, 
you solitary, than you ever were with me. . .  loneliness is one thing, 
solitude another."16
Unlike the noise found in collective existence, solitude and reflection 
upon the self allows for uncontaminated insight "Solitude, my home! How 
blissfully and tenderly does your voice speak to me! We do not question 
one another, we do not complain to one another, we go together through 
open doors. For with you all is open and dear; and here even the hours run 
on lighter feet"17 Paradoxically, Nietzsche's greatest ethical imperative is 
that in order for the individual to reach his potential, it is necessary to be
15 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
16 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IH9.
17 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:9.
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existentially self-sufficient "Go apart and be alone with your love and your 
creating."18
Solitude and self-reflection lead to the only valid philosophical 
insight available: the internal manifestations of the will-to-power as it is 
constantly interpreted by and within the individual self. The internal 
conversation of these manifestations lead to a healthy understanding of 
individual existence in all of its mutability. Nietzsche emphasizes that this 
type of knowledge can only be gained outside of a collective context "Here 
[in solitude], the words and word-chests of all existence spring open to me: 
all existence here wants to become words, all becoming here wants to learn 
speech horn me. Down there, however—all speech is in vain! There best 
wisdom is to forget and pass by."19 Solitude therefore represents the best 
environment for the individual to seek knowledge of the self. "So let us live 
above them like strong winds, neighbors of eagles . . .  neighbors of the sun: 
that is how strong winds live."20
Solitude calls for a great degree of self-direction, and is not to be 
undertaken by the faint of heart "I make for my own goal, I go my way; I
18 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:9.
2° Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:6.
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shall leap over the hesitating and the indolent"21 The individual must have 
a deep commitment to self-overcoming, as it necessarily entails isolation and 
suffering. "But do you want to go the way to your affliction, which is the 
way to yourself? If so, show me your strength for it and your right to it!
Are you a new strength and a new right? A first motion? A self-propelling 
wheel? Can you also compel stars to revolve around you?"22
The exigencies of solitude dictate a new ethics centered on the self. 
Indeed, Nietzsche argues that the care for the self is to be the new goal for 
human life, beyond any other concerns. "Ah, my friends! That your Self be 
in the action, as the mother is in the child: let that be your maxim of 
virtue!"23 However it begins, self-overcoming is a protean task, without 
prototype. It is also necessarily a process, not an event As Nietzsche writes, 
"this, however, is my teaching: He who wants to learn to fly one day must 
first learn to stand and to walk and to run and to climb and to dance—you 
cannot learn to fly by flying."24 Self-overcoming is not a process that can be 
defined or described as it arises from essentially unique internal experiences 
and the individual manifestations of the will-to-power. However, Nietzsche
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
22 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
23 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:5.
24 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:11.
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consistently argues that the diverse paths to self-overcoming can only be
realized apart from others, who merely cloud perspectives:
I came to my truth by diverse paths and in diverse ways: it was not 
upon a single ladder that I climbed to the height where my eyes 
survey my distances. And I have asked the way only unwillingly— 
that has always offended my taste! I have rather questioned and 
attempted the ways themselves. All my progress has been an 
attempting and a questioning—and truly, one has to leam  how to 
answer such questioning!25
The return to solitude, therefore, represents the full-circle of 
Zarathustra's journey. With nausea confronted and solitude regained, the 
process of self-overcoming can now begin in earnest Nietzsche's language 
echoes that of the beginning of the narrative, in which Zarathusfra goes 
down to men. After the confrontation with nausea, Zarathustra realizes that 
he must do down into himself. "I stand before my highest mountain and 
my longest wandering: therefore I must first descend deeper than I have 
ever descended—deeper into pain than I have ever descended, down to its 
blackest stream!"26 This type of self-examination is inimical to social 
existence, which seeks to impose socially-sanctioned identities on 
individuals and suppresses the desire to question and explore. The 
individual must revalue his interpretation of existence to affirm the self
25 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:11.
26 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1. hi order to progress further, Zarathustra must delve further 
into his unconscious self.
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rather than to repress individual identity. This calls for a degree of focus
that can only occur outside of the distraction of others:
One must learn to love oneself with a sound and healthy love, so that 
one may endure it with oneself and not go roaming about—thus do I 
teach. Such roaming about calls itself "love of one's neighbor": these 
words have been up to now the best for lying and dissembling, and 
especially for those who were oppressive to everybody.27
Nietzsche does not deny the difficulty of separation and the pain of 
self-examination. Indeed, Zarathustra affirms that the critique of the self is 
much more excruciating than the critiques of collective existence. 
Nevertheless, the exceptional individual must embrace this pain as leading 
to the possibility of the transmuted self that is the ultimate goal of self­
overcoming. "Alas, I have to climb my most difficult path! Alas, I have 
started upon my loneliest wandering! But a man of my sort does not avoid 
such an hour the hour that says to him: 'Only now so you tread your path 
of greatness! Summit and abyss—they are now united in one!"'28
Nietzsche's description of the return to solitude emphasizes patience. 
The individual, long oppressed by external forces, must await the return of 
ffie authentic self. 'Truly, I too have learned to wait, I have learned it from 
the very heart, but only to wait for myself. And above all I have learned to 
stand and to walk and to run and to jump and to climb and to dance."29
27 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:11.
28 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1.
29 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IILll.
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Essentially, the return to solitude is the return to the self, finally free of 
collective identities and external mechanisms of repression. "It is returning, 
at last it is coming home to me—my own Self and those parts of it that have
long been abroad and scattered among all things and accidents I stand
now before my last summit and before the deed that has been deferred the 
longest"30
Is this not the type of solipsism of which Nietzsche is always 
accused? Nietzsche has Zarathustra return to his cave, a reversal of Plato's 
cave myth and an implicit critique of Plato's Republic. For Zarathustra, 
truth is found inside of the cave, not outside. Furthermore, the philosopher 
does not return into the cave to educate others to the truth; he flees others in 
order to avoid their pollution of his own truth. Zarathustra reflects upon his 
time with men in terms of disgust "I sat among them disguised, ready to 
misunderstand m yself so that I might endure them, and glad to tell myself: 
'You fool, you do not know men'."31 For Nietzsche, one should not come to 
know men; this is an avoidance of the task at hand. The rabble, not 
possessing their own authentic identities, represent only a semblance of 
humanity. As such, the seeking individual is forced to mask himself against 
the ressentimentof die masses. "And do I not have to hide myself, like one
30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1.
31 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ni:9.
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who has swallowed gold, so that my soul shall not be slit open? Do I not 
have to wear stilts, so that they may not notice m.y long legs—all these 
envious and injurious people around me?"32
It is telling that Nietzsche consistently uses the language of ascent 
when referring to solitude, as the removal of the Other is the beginning of 
self-overcoming and the creation of an authentic selfhood. "When I am 
aloft, I always find myself alone. No one speaks to me, the frost of solitude 
makes me tremble."33 The descent to men represents Zarathustra's error, 
which is redeemed through his return to solitude. Nietzsche concludes that 
it is only in solitude that the individual can begin the process of organizing 
the self along the lines of the will-to-power. However, it is necessary to 
examine the individual's motive for seeking solitude. It must not be a 
retreat, but rather an active and positive decision. "For one person, solitude 
is the escape of an invalid; for another, solitude is escape from the 
invalids."34 However this process of self-overcoming begins, Nietzsche is 
imperative that it must take place. "There are diverse paths and ways to 
overcoming: just look to it!"35 The reason that it is so imperative that the 
individual seek solitude is to become free of the noise of others, so as to
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:6.
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
34 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IIL6.
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.4.
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listen to the voices of the self: "Life wants to raise itself on high with pillars 
and steps; it wants to gaze into the far distance and out upon joyful 
splendor— that is why it needs height. . .  Life wants to climb and in 
climbing overcome itself."36
IL
Through the call to solitude, Nietzsche urges that the individual must
revalue the will-to-truth as the will-to-self. Both of these are manifestations
of the will-to-power, but they are antithetical. The will-to-truth is a
repressive societal impulse, while the will-to-self is a validation of the
individual self as the signifier of authentic identity. Nietzsche argues that
the view of the self as a discrete subject is a dangerous philosophical error
that arises from an interpretation of the individual consciousness distorted
by a prejudice towards consistency. The will-to-truth, representative of the
impulse to concretize reality, has extended to the analysis of the individual,
implying a stability to the human psyche. However, Nietzsche's concept of
the will runs counter to this traditional view. Haar notes:
What the individual calls his "will" is a plurality of instincts and 
impulses in constant battle with one another to gain the upper hand. 
.. what language designates by the word "will" is in reality only a 
complex and belated feeling, which accompanies the victory of one 
impulse over others, or the translation into conscious terms of the 
temporary state of equilibrium that has obtained among the 
competing impulses.37
36 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
37 Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, 6-7.
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The will, as the primary constituent of the human self, cannot be 
understood as an element of a stable consciousness. This is because die will 
is active; it is constantly extended to both the internal and external realms.
As such, it defies the stability imputed to it by traditional philosophical and 
psychological theories. The will is not quantifiable; it is the essence of 
change. For Nietzsche, therefore, freedom is understood as the act of 
willing.
All feeling suffers in me and is in prison: but my willing always 
comes to me as my liberator and bringer of joy. Willing liberates: that
is the true doctrine of will and freedom In knowing and
understanding, too, I feel only my will's delight in begetting and 
becoming; and if there be innocence in my knowledge it is because 
will to begetting is in it38
The will is the essence of activity and the opposite of reaction. 
"Willing liberates: for willing is creating: thus I teach. And you should learn 
only for creating!"39 Freedom is therefore creation, understood as an act of 
will. The very essence of creation is change, and the self must necessarily be 
understood as under perpetual transformation. In this sense, it is 
impossible to speak of the self as a discrete subject or identifiable identity.
Self-overcoming, in its most fundamental sense, is the recognition 
that there is no self, rather what we falsely identify as the discrete self is a
38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
39 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:12.16.
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constant flux of impulses, perspectives, and interpretations. The desire for 
stability within the self is the last vestige and die most fundamental 
manifestation of the impulse toward concretization, as has become 
evidenced by the victory of the will-to-truth. Nietzsche calls for self- 
overcoming in the sense of the return to a healthy interpretation as the self 
as the site for creation through the exercise of the will-to-power.40
Individuals liberated from the tyranny of morality and custom 
through the realization of solitude must resist the impulse to stability The 
will is necessarily mutable, and this fickleness must be accepted and 
embraced. Indeed, the desire to concretize the self as a fixed identity is the 
symptom of a reactive herd mentality. Morrison notes, "the real battle for 
power is within the individual. As Nietzsche says man is a war, which is a 
'war within oneself, and the basic weapons in this war are "self-control
40 " Selbstilberwingdung or 'self-overcoming' is related to Nietzsche's other notions of 
Sublimierung or 'sublimation', Vergeistigung or 'spiritualization' and Seibstaufhebung- 
A ufhebung being a term that defies translation by a single English word: as Kaufmarm 
observes, Nietzsche uses it with its Hegelian sense in mind of a dialectical process involving 
' a simultaneous preserving, canceling, and lifting up.' However, in Nietzsche's usage the 
lifting-up is not necessarily to something higher. Unlike Hegel's Geist, whose dialectical 
movement is progressive and hierarchical, Nietzsche's basic force, the will to power—at 
least when human consciousness enters the process—can degenerate: man has evolved 
from the ape, but may also degenerate back into the ape." "Nietzsche says that the 'ta sko f 
wakefulness itse lf , and that to this end the practices of self-observation and 'Learning to
sed would be necessary foundations What Nietzsche calls his 'immediate urgent task',
is the task of applying self-observation as a means of developing a measured and sustained 
critical awareness of what is actually happening within and without, as well as being a 
means of restraining and overcoming the unruly passion, such as 'w rath. . .  choler. ..  
revengefulness. . .  lusts', in order to 'prevent their becoming devastating torrents.' It is 
only then that one can 'sowthe seeds of good spiritual works in the soil of the subdued 
passions.'" Morrison, Nietzsche and Buddhism, 157-158.
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[and] self-outwitting."'41 Self-overcoming thus entails a recognition of the 
plurality of the consciousness and the futility of either finding or creating a 
stable ego.
The existence of disparate elements within the self has been 
recognized since Plato. However, the method by which these elements are 
ordered or integrated has greatly differed. The ancient view of the self, 
typified by Plato and Aristotle, emphasized the existence of rational and 
irrational elements within the soul. These elements were organized by the 
faculty of reason. The Christian model emphasized the incomplete nature of 
the self, and relied upon the intervention of the divine to order the self 
correctly and prevent the rule of sinful impulses. The Enlightenment 
attempted to synthesize these models into a model of reasoned self-interest 
in which humans were seen as flawed in their selfish behavior, but 
ultimately capable of redemption through the correct application of reason 
and positive law.
All of these schemes call for the destruction of the individual will 
through the release of the self to either divine will or perfect reason. The self 
is seen as somehow flawed as it resists stability and defies order. For 
Nietzsche, the denial of the unstable nature of the self is actually a denial of 
the only stable element of human nature: change. This leads to repression of
41 Morrison, Nietzsche and Buddhism, 171.
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perfectly natural elements of the consciousness that are inimical to order 
and reason. The "irrational" parts of the self are repressed rather than being 
confronted and understood for what they are. In addition, the will is seen as 
suspect as it is not innately rational and proceeds under the auspices of self­
actuation rather than on behalf of reason or divine imperatives. Because the 
self is surrendered to the control of an outside signifier, this is not an 
authentic interpretation of selfhood. "Good men never tell the truth, to be 
good in that way is a sickness of spirit They yield, these good men, they 
acquiesce, their hearts imitate, they obey from the heart but he who obeys 
does not listen to himself.”*2 An authentic perspective of the self does not 
give in to these external signifiers to alleviate the anxiety that arises from the 
realization of the unstable self. It is necessary to resist the urge to concretize 
the self and to recognize this impulse for the escapism that it represents:
Genuine—that is what I call him who goes into godforsaken deserts 
and has broken his venerating heart In the yellow sand and burned 
by the sun, perhaps he blinks thirstily at the islands filled with 
springs where living creatures rest beneath shady trees. But his thirst 
does not persuade him to become like these comfortable creatures: for 
where there are oases there are also idols.43
For Nietzsche, elements are not automatically privileged, but are
ranked through experimentation and the aesthetic sense. The creation of
42 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.7.
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:8.
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the self is the ultimate expression of action, and it is to be undertaken from a 
position of strength. As Morrison notes:
Nietzsche concludes that: "the wish to preserve oneself is a condition 
of distress" and those motivated by such are, according to his 
premise, the "weak" not the "strong". Nietzsche's "strong"—the 
"lucky hits", "geniuses", etc.—are always singular and rare and 
embody a fuller expression of his notion of life than those who 
surround them. They are the "sovereign individuals. . .  liberated. . .  
from the morality of custom" [i.e. the group's mores], who are 
"autonomous" and "independents and who "aspire after a secret 
citadel where [they are]. . .  set free from the crowd, the many, the 
majority". For them life itself is art they are both artist and the work 
of art «
The parts of the consciousness are ultimately ordered through the 
will; However in keeping with this aesthetic sense this ordering is not 
necessarily consistent "Every soul is a world of its own. . .  appearance lies 
most beautifully among the most alike; for the smallest gap is the most 
difficult to bridge. For me — how could there be an outside-of-me? There is 
no outside!"45 Nietzsche therefore offers the view that the individual 
consciousness is the site of "reality," not an independent reason or a 
concrete world. Nietzsche argues that all of reality is interpretation, 
including the internal self. Therefore, one cannot become complacent with 
the self; it must be remade constantly or the individual will succumb to 
stagnation and Dekadenz,
44 Morrison, Nietzsche and Buddhism, 85.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:13.2
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But you behave in all things in too familiar a way with the spirit; and
you have made of wisdom a poorhouse and hospital for bad poets.
You are no eagles: so neither do you know the spirit's joy in terror.
And he who is not a bird shall not make his home above abysses.46
Zarathustra withdraws from humanity in order to accomplish this 
reevaluation and reinterpretation of the self. Away from distractions that 
tend to pigeonhole the individual, it is possible to analyze the most essential 
characteristic of the creative personality, the will. "So that no one might see 
down into my profundity and ultimate will—that is why I devised my long, 
luminous silence."47 Nietzsche's ethical project is centered upon redeeming 
the will from a reactive enslavement to custom and morality into an 
affirmative will arising from an aesthetic ethos of creation. "To redeem that 
past of mankind and to transform every 'it was', until the will says: 'But I 
willed it thus! So shall I will i f —this did I call redemption."48
The creative individual must realign the will according to the goal of 
self-overcoming and self-interpretation, entailing a great deal of psychic 
pain. "This is the will of those of noble soul: they desire nothing gratis, least 
of all life. He who is of the mob wants to live gratis; we others, however, to 
whom life has given itself—we are always considering what we can give life
46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:8.
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:6.
48 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:123.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
in return1."*9 This partially arises from the fact that the self must be 
continuously overcome, there is no end to this project The desire for an 
endpoint to self-overcoming is a symptom of Dekadenz. "Oh my Will! My 
essential, my necessity, dispeller of need! Preserve me from all petty 
victories!"50 It is necessary for the individual to acknowledge the ultimate 
impossibility of complete self-overcoming. This allows the individual to 
escape the trap of ressentiment against the self through regret and grief over 
lost time:
Willing liberates: but what is it that fastens in fetters even the 
liberator? "It was": that is what the will's teeth-gnashing and most 
lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been 
done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past The will cannot 
will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire—that is 
the will's most lonely affliction.51
Nietzsche argues that will-to-power is the essential characteristic of 
all living existence. "Only where life is, there is also will: not will-to-life, but 
. . .  will-to-power! The living creature values many things higher than life 
itself; yet out of this evaluation itself speaks—the will-to-power!"52 
However, individuals are ranked by Nietzsche according to the purpose for 
which they employ the will, and to what conscious effect It is true that the
49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:123.
30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1230.
51 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:20.
52 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
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individual is largely a prisoner of factors beyond its control; it is socially-
created and historically defined. Nietzsche is not naive enough to argue
that all societal mechanisms can be overcome. However, the individual is
able to become conscious of the primacy of the will and act accordingly.
I know how to speak the parable of the highest things only in the 
dance—and now my greatest parable has remained in my limbs 
unspoken! My highest hope has remained unspoken and 
unachieved! And all the visions and consolations of my youth are 
dead! How did I endure it? How did I recover from such wounds, 
how did I overcome them? How did my soul arise again from these 
graves? Yes, something invulnerable, unburiable is within me, 
something that rends rocks: it is called m y Will. Silently it steps 
unchanging through the years. It shall go its course upon my feet, 
my old Will; hard of heart and invulnerable is its temper.53
The primacy of the will is therefore the most fundamental necessity
for self-overcoming. Through the emphasis upon the individual will,
Nietzsche argues that the individual will be able to resist normalizing
mechanisms, as these are recognized as external and contrived. "Yes, you
are still my destroyer of graves: Hail, my Will! And only where there are
graves are there resurrections."54 In this sense, the will acts as a counter-
agent to repression and offers a healthier mode for interpreting the world:
Will to the conceivability of being: that is what /call your will! You 
first want to make all being conceivable: for, with a healthy mistrust, 
you doubt whether it is in fact conceivable. But it must bend and 
accommodate itself to you! Thus will your will have it  It must 
become smooth and subject to your mind as the mind's mirror and 
reflection. That is your entire will, you wisest men; it is a will-to-
53 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:11.
54 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:11.
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power; and that is so even when you talk of good and evil and of the 
assessment of values.55
One of the most destructive impulses in humanity is the desire for 
comfort and freedom from doubt related to the desire for stability. The 
exceptional individual, consciously willing self-overcoming, must move 
beyond this impulse towards confrontation with discomfort and tragedy. 
"For enjoyment and innocence are the most modest things: neither want to 
be looked for. Once should ha ve them—but one should look rather for guilt 
and pain!"56 Through the realignment of the self around the will-to-power, 
the principle of multiplicity is affirmed. This sets the stage for the 
transmutation of the self from the contemplation of its essential fluidity. 
"Truly, like the sun do I love life and all deep seas. And this /call 
knowledge: all that is deep shall rise up—to my height!"57
Self-overcoming under the auspices of the will-to-power is without 
doubt a radical departure from traditional theories of selfhood. Nietzsche 
can be criticized for advocating this radical project without providing any 
clear-cut directives or even the semblance of a goal. However, Nietzsche 
goes on to propose a theory of self-creation that reemphasizes the essential 
fluidity of die self while offering an interpretive frame to guide die
55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
56 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:125.
57 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:15.
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individual. Following Nietzsche's interpretive philosophy, this theory 
centers on the aesthetic manifestation of the will-to-power. "Have you 
never seen a sail faring over the sea, rounded and swelling and shuddering 
before the impetuosity of the wind? Like a sail, shuddering before the 
impetuosity of the spirit, my wisdom fares over the sea—my untamed 
wisdom!"58
m.
Because creation is inherent in both self-overcoming and self­
creation, the authentic self is an aesthetic interpretation of the will-to-power 
as manifested in the individual. Since the will-to-power is the most 
fundamental facet of human existence, Nietzsche's theory of the self calls for 
an active reinterpretation of the competing drives within the self while 
maintaining its plurality. Schutte notes:
Nietzsche's idea of self-overcoming is aesthetic rather than moral. It 
sees the drive for perfection as a drive toward integration and 
wholeness, not as a moralistic and judgmental effort to be perfect in 
order to accumulate rewards for oneself or to acquire power for 
oneself to reward or punish others.59
The complicated notion of the self as an autocreated work of art will 
be the subject of the next chapter. However, it is first necessary to connect 
Nietzsche's concept of the will-to-power with aesthetic interpretation. First, 
Nietzsche praises all forms of artistic expression as creative acts of will. The
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL8.
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will channels formlessness into a precisely willed constellation which is the 
active expression of the consciousness. Camus argues: "Nietzsche's message 
is summed up in the word creation, with the ambiguous meaning it has
assumed The transmutation of values consists only in replacing critical
values by creative values."60 As such, artistic expression is a direct 
manifestation of the will-to-power. The product of art, and indeed of any 
creative action, is therefore a manifestation of the will-to-power. Nietzsche 
writes: "Where is beauty? Where I have to wiZ/with all my will; where I 
want to love and perish, that an image may not remain merely an image."61
Secondly, Nietzsche views artistic creation as indicative of the 
struggle fundamental to all existence. The act of creation is one that is 
necessarily destructive. "A change in values—that means a change in the 
creators of values. He who has to be a creator always has to destroy."62 
Creation is essentially revaluation, the universe is reinterpreted according to 
the individual's expression of will. "Evaluation is creation: hear it, you 
creative men! Valuating is itself the value and jewel of all valued things. 
Only through evaluation is there value: and without evaluation the nut of
59 Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism : N ietzsche w ithout Masks, 34.
60 Albeit Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in  R evolt 74.
61 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:15.
62 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
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existence would be hollow."63 Because of the destructiveness inherent in
creation, it is a dangerous act; but as Nietzsche argues, "all creators,
however, are hard."64 All of existence is therefore a continuous struggle of
interpretation and reinterpretation of the will-to-power.
There is battle and inequality and war for power and predominance
even in beauty How divinely vault and arch here oppose one
another in the struggle: how they strive against one another with 
light and shadow, these divinely-striving things.65
Therefore, the act of self-interpretation is the ultimate expression of
the will-to-power. This necessarily entails the readiness to destroy parts of
the self. However, this is not nihilism or the escapism inherent in
"afterworldly" religions and philosophies. The ego is not to be annihilated,
but to be constantly reformed according to the exigencies of the will.
"Loving and perishing: these have gone together from eternity. Will to love:
that means to be willing to die, too. Thus I speak to cowards!"66 The
reinterpretation of the self is therefore an affirmative act, as it acknowledges
the centrality of the will-to-power. Deleuze notes: "Affirmation remains as
the sole quality of the will to power, action as die sole quality of force,
63 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
64 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:3.
46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
66 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:15.
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becoming-active as the creative identity of power and willing."67 Nietzsche
emphasizes that it is only through creation that life is imbued with meaning:
"Creation— that is the great redemption from suffering, and life's easement
But that the creator may exist that itself requires suffering and much
transformation. . .  thus you are advocates and justifiers of all
transitoriness."68 Deleuze notes:
Being is not the object of affirmation, any more than it is an element 
which would present itself, which would give itself over to 
affirmation. Affirmation is not the power of being, on the contrary. 
Affirmation itself is being, being is solely affirmation in all its power.
. . .  Being and nothingness are merely tire abstract expression of 
affirmation and negation as qualities o f the will to power.69
By centering upon the self, Nietzsche further dissipates the hold of
external moral and ethical standards and sets the stage for a comprehensive
revaluation of selfhood. "When you are willers of a single will, and you call
this dispeller of need your essence and necessity: that is when your virtue
has its beginning."70 Because these external signifiers repress the expression
of the will, the self is unable to satisfy the imperative of the will-to-power.
The creative Self created for itself esteem and disesteem, it created for 
itself joy and sorrow. The creative body created spirit for itself, as a 
hand of its will. Even in your folly and contempt, you despisers of
67 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 196.
68 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
69 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 186.
70 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:221. Thus, integration of the self is the new virtue, the new 
ruling principle of the self: unifying the symbols of the sun and the serpent. This leads to 
the discussion of "noon."
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the body, you serve your Self. I tell you: your Self itself wants to die 
and turn away from life. Your Self can no longer perform that act 
which it most desires to perform: to create beyond itself.71
However, it is impossible to overcome the socially-created portions of
the self easily. It is one thing for Nietzsche to criticize the inauthentic
expression of the will-to-power; it is a completely different matter to
elaborate the process for self-overcoming. As it has been demonstrated,
Nietzsche only hints at the specifics of the process for self-overcoming in the
most general terms. It is possible to criticize Nietzsche for this, perhaps
even stating that he has no concrete notion of how the self is to be overcome;
perhaps this entire project is rhetorical. However, Nietzsche does offer
some very concrete advice for self-overcoming, couched in his admiration
for creative action and respect for multiplicity. It is not however, in the
manner of a positive political or psychological theory.
Rather, Nietzsche's ethical stance is highly subjective and
transgressional. Traditional ethics, insofar as it is an encoded and fixed
system that operates independently of the individual, is nothing less than
the repudiation of the validity of individual existence and experience. As
Haar notes:
From a genealogical point of view, it appears that ethical systems can 
only be defined univocally, in purely negative and pejorative terms: 
moral consciousness and its ideals are analyzed and unmasked as
71 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:4. The despisers of the body, by betraying their own creative 
self in favor of the "ego," have sealed their mediocrity.
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inventions of ressentunent But what does ressentiment mean if not 
hatred, condemnation, depreciation of "life"? In other words, ethical 
systems derive from a weak and impotent Will to Power reacting 
against the most affirmative impulses and favoring negation and 
destruction. . .  it serves the purpose of a defensive wall, of a 
systematic protection against the unrelenting impulses of sex, egoism 
(every ethic being a disdain for the self, a rejection of the self 
EnsteJbstung), aggression, cruelty, etc. 72
Nietzsche seeks to revalue the idea of ethics to one that is reflective of 
his emphasis upon the condition of the individual ego. Indeed, this project 
is foreshadowed in the prologue to Zarathustra: "Mankind is something
that must be overcome All creatures hitherto have created something
beyond themselves: and do you want to be the ebb of this great tide, and 
return to the animals rather than overcome man?"73
The ethical actor in the Nietzschean sense is one who takes as the 
object of ethical action his own self. Because of the lack of a template, this 
can only take the form of experimentation. The individual, the searching 
experimenter, must resist social norms and transgress against custom.74 
Everything is called into question, although this does not mean that 
everything is bad or must be discarded. Rather, everything about the self 
must be questioned. Freedom through creation must be maintained, and
72 Haar, Nietzsche and M etaphysics 17.
73 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
74 "The term' Versuchet', which occasionally appears in Nietzsche's texts, has the double 
meaning of'experimenter' and 'tempter.' Every creator is at once someone who tempts 
others and who experiments on (tem pts) him self and others in order to create something
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this means that there can be no conclusion to the experimental interpretation
of the self. The Nietzschean ethical imperative may mirror the Delphic
"become who you are," but it goes much further. It is also necessary to
"overcome what you have become," again and again.
Now that there is no goal for all, "an experimental morality is called 
for. setting one's self a goal." What is meant is "a substitute for 
morality through the will to our goal and consequently to the means 
to this goal." It is the substance of the future that is to become free: 
"They will call you the destroyers of morality, but you are really only 
the finders of yourselves."75
This is no hit-or-miss experimentation. Self-overcoming is not a 
project to be taken lightly or handled carelessly. Nietzsche emphasizes that 
it is the epistemological necessity of the will to overcome itself, even calling 
likening it to the destiny of individual existence. "Truly, I have gone my 
way through a hundred souls and through a hundred cradles and birth- 
pangs. I have taken many departures, I know the heart-breaking last hours. 
But my creative will, my destiny, wants it so."76 This experimentation is a 
direct reflection of Nietzsche's view of both the individual and die universe. 
Deleuze notes: "We affirm chance and the necessity of chance; becoming
that does not y e t exist a set of forces capable of acting upon and m odifying that which 
exists." Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 127.
75 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 158.
76 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL2.
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and the being of becoming; multiplicity and the unity of multiplicity----
Difference reflects itself and repeats or reproduces itself."77
Nietzsche does not deny that aesthetic ethics are certainly fraught 
with difficulty. The affirmation of chance and flux has profound 
psychological impact The lack of stability is disconcerting, even though it 
represents the ultimate expression of freedom in the Nietzschean sense.78 
There is no form to which to aspire, although Nietzsche strives to include 
even the most mundane elements in the process of aesthetic self­
overcoming. If aesthetic ethics are to be successful, even those elements of 
the self which were endemic or artificial must be re-willed into existence, 
creating the image of an internal harmony. As Klossowski argues, 
"Zarathustra's remedy is to re-will die non-willed, inasmuch as he desires to 
assume the accomplished fact himself, thereby rendering it unaccomplished 
by re-willing it innumerable times.”79 As Nietzsche writes, "truly, like the 
sun do I love life and all deep seas. And this /call knowledge: all that is
77 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 197.
78 "In this world rid of God and of moral idols, man is now alone and without a master. No 
one has been less inclined that Nietzsche (and in this way he distinguishes himself from the 
romantics) to let it be believed that such freedom would be easy. This complete liberation 
put him among the ranks of those of whom he himself said that they suffered a new form of 
anguish and a new form of happiness." Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in  
Revolt 70.
79 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle 67.
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deep shall rise up—to my height!"80 Integrating the elements of the self is
the only goal in Nietzschean aesthetic ethics:
Ah, you men, I see an image sleeping in the stone, the image of my 
visions! Ah, that it must sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone! Now my 
hammer rages fiercely against its prison. Fragments fly from the 
stone: what is it to me? I will complete it for a shadow came to me— 
the most silent the lightest of all dungs came at once to me! The 
beauty of the Obermensch came to me as a shadow. Ah, my brothers! 
What are the gods to me now!81
Deleuze and Guattari argue: "Creations are like mutant abstract lines 
that have detached themselves from the task of representing a world, 
precisely because they assemble a new type of reality that history can only 
recontain or relocate in punctual systems."82 The implication of this 
argument is that autocreation is a fragile process that can be derailed by any 
number of factors. It can therefore not occur within a social context "But 
by my love and hope I entreat you: do not reject the hero in your soul! Keep 
holy your highest hope!"83 Nietzsche therefore argues that it is necessary to 
reject those institutions and forms that are not created. For Nietzsche, such 
forms as the state and society are not valid because they are not aesthetic; 
they have not been created by the individual. Mass culture is inherited by
80 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:15.
81 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
82 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 296.
83 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
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others and thus is not dynamic and tends toward stagnation. Indeed, the
state and the weakened man it produces saps the strength of the individual:
Nothing is beautiful, except man alone: all aesthetics rests upon this 
naivete, which is its 61s t truth. Let us immediately add the second: 
nothing is ugly except the degenerating man—and with this the 
realm of aesthetic judgement is circumscribed. Physiologically, 
everything ugly weakens and saddens man. It reminds him of decay, 
danger, impotence; it actually deprives him of strength.84
Nietzsche's aesthetic ethics is designed to return to the care for the
self that has become neglected in modem society. Rather than offering a
concrete model for self-overcoming, Nietzsche delineates the conditions
under which this process may become possible. Through the
reinterpretation of the self under the auspices of the will-to-power,
Nietzsche opens up the possibility of the transmuted self.
8« Nietzsche, The Twilight o f the Idols, 9£0.
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C h a p te r  vn 
M etam orphose: th e  T ran sm u ted  S e lf 
This dissertation has argued thus far against a concretization of 
Nietzsche's philosophy and political thought Nevertheless, Nietzsche 
certainly envisions some kind of personal transformation as the goal of his 
philosophy of self-overcoming. This is the meaning of the symbol of the 
Obermensch. However, it is necessary to examine the Obermensch as a 
psychological mode rather than as the traditional notion of an ideal type. 
The Obermensch represents an attitude towards life as encompassed in the 
overcoming of nausea and the acceptance of the task of self-overcoming; 
innately opposed to the idea of patterning one's life after a set of 
commandments.1 As such, Nietzsche's task of personal creation cannot be 
delineated in terms of essential traits or specific manifestations, in keeping 
with the argument thus far. Nietzsche's philosophy of the self is therefore 
inconsistent and nebulous by design. To paraphrase The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche is "superficial out of his profundity." The individual must seek 
transmutation on his own, not as the follower of another.
Nietzsche's invitation to this task is found in the pivotal section of 
Zarathustra "The Vision and the Riddle." The vision is an invitation to 
embrace the void left after the overcoming of nausea. "I saw a young
1 "Full life-expression is a matter of physiological and spiritual endowment." Babich, 
Nietzsche's Philosophy o f Science, 771.
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shepherd. . .  and a heavy, black snake was hanging out of his mouth. Had I
ever seen so much disgust and pallid horror on a face?. . .  Then a voice
cried from me: 'Bite! Bite!"'2 The snake is representative of existential
nausea, and the shepherd must embrace this horror, let it become part of
him, if he is to survive. Once the horror of existence is confronted and
nausea overcome, the individual is no longer properly human, but a
transmuted self. The riddle is therefore the emergence of a transmuted,
creative self from the realization of nihilism:
Who is the man into whose throat all that is heaviest, blackest will 
thus crawl? The shepherd, however, bit as my cry had advised him .
.. he spat far away the snake's head—and sprang up. No longer a 
shepherd, no longer a man—a transformed being, surrounded with 
light, laughing. . . .  My longing for this laughter consumes me: oh 
how do I endure still to live! And how could I endue to die now!3
One must embrace the void (i.e., snake), consume it take it into one's
own being; and only then become transformed above the loathsomeness of
life. This represents no less than the recreation of the self arising from a
fundamental change in perspective and the destruction of previous external
modes of interpreting both the self and the world. Self-overcoming
therefore leads to the imperative of self-creation. "There are many souls one
will never uncover, unless one invents diem first"4
2 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, HL2.Z
3 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:23.
4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
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Nietzsche's recognition of the self as an ever-changing flux of forces
in need of self-overcoming, however, represents only the beginning of
Nietzsche's theory of selfhood.5 The transmuted self, symbolized by the
Obennensch, is its culmination. Because Nietzsche consciously avoids
attaching specifics to the transmuted self, it is necessary to resort to
inference and symbolic interpretation to divine the meaning behind the
transmuted self. Deleuze argues that the transmuted self is a synthesis of
the active and reactive, the unity of actor and medium, a self-replicating
creative power relation.
Reactive forces break their alliance with the will to nothingness.; the 
will to nothingness, in turn, breaks its alliance with reactive forces. It 
inspires in man a new inclination: for destroying himself, but
destroying himself actively Zarathustra wants to say: I love die
one who makes use of nihilism as the ratio cognoscenti of the will to 
power, but who finds in the will to power a ration essendiin which 
man is overcome and therefore nihilism is defeated.. . .  Active 
destruction means: the point, the moment of transmutation in the will 
to nothingness. Destruction becomes active at die moment when, 
with the alliance between reactive forces and the will to nothingness 
is broken, the will to nothingness is converted and crosses over to the
5 "One common and general feature shared by both Nietzsche and Buddhism is the 
centrality of man in a godless cosmos, in the sense that both look to man, and not any 
external power, being, or numious source, for their respective solutions to what they 
perceive as the problem(s) of existence.. . .  Both see men as an ever-changing flux of forces 
possessing what may generally be called physical and psychological aspects. And within 
this flux there is no autonomous or unchanging subject corresponding to such terms as 
'self, 'ego', or 'soul.' Both also emphasize the hierarchy that exists or can exist between 
individuals and within the individual's own nature.. . .  Another feature shared by both. . .  
is that their respective goals are to be achieved through a process of'self-overcoming', 
(SeJbsttlberwindungin Nietzsche's case, dtta-bhavana in Buddhism's), and that this self­
overcoming is understood as the spiritual expression of a more basic and natural force (will 
to power in Nietzsche's case, tanha in Buddism's)." Morrison, Nietzsche and Buddhism, 
63.
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side of affirmation, it is related to a po  wer o f affirming which 
destroys the reactive forces themselves. Destruction becomes active 
to the extent that the negative is transmuted and converted into 
affirmative power the "eternal joy of becoming" which is avowed in 
an instant, die "joy of annihilation", the "affirmation of annihilation 
and destruction." . . .  This is the "decisive point" of Dionysian 
philosophy: the point at which negation expresses an affirmation of 
life, destroys reactive forces and restores the rights of activity.6
In this sense, the self becomes the site of both action and reaction, as
it is in the process of creating and destroying itself. It is also possible to
argue that the transmuted self represents a transcendence of the dichotomy
of active and reactive. Babich argues, "the emphasis upon the 'post-human'
. . .  in Nietzsche succeeds in a critical reading of the nature of the human as
such, shifting its position to the sliding or precessionally decentered subject
of interpretive style."7 The individual can be neither a subject nor object of
action; it is no less than the site for the interpretation of phenomenon. The
distinction between external and internal experience ceases to have
meaning. Furthermore, the differentiation between action and reaction
cannot be made; they are both manifestations of the will-to-power,
perceived differently. Thus, Nietzsche's vision of the integrated self has a
gestaJt-Uke form. Schutte notes: "As soon as the individual form is given
preference over the totality, the intent of Nietzsche's teachings is lost"8
6 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 174-175.
7 Babich, N ietzsche's Philosophy o f Science, 21.
8 Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism : Nietzsche w ithout Masks, 34.
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It is misleading to seek to determine whether or not the transmuted 
self represents the transcendence of action and reaction or a synthesis of the 
two. Nietzsche presents the transmuted self as something to be 
experienced, not analyzed. As such, this interpretation seeks to identify the 
symbols Nietzsche chooses to communicate the internal experiences of the 
transmuted self and explore their implications for the politics of the self. In 
terms of the transmutation itself, it will be argued that Nietzsche poses this 
as a problem of separating creative action from the necessity of reaction, 
leading to an ethos of eternal creation: the next permutation of the eternal 
recurrence as will-to-power.
L
Nietzsche uses the symbol of metamorphosis prominently in his 
theory of transmutation. Indeed, one of the most important sections of 
Zarathustra details the "three metamorphoses of the spirit" Nietzsche uses 
the symbols of the camel, the lion, and the child to detail the personality 
types found on the path to transmutation. This section is essentially a 
microcosm of Nietzsche's political argument in Zarathustra, and further 
serves to underscore the thesis of this dissertation.
The first type, the camel, represents the socially-created individual 
Nietzsche criticizes in the first part of Zarathustra. The camel is essentially a 
beast of burden, taking on inherited guilt and institutional structures that 
are not its own. The greatest problem with this type of individual is the lack
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of creativity arising from the needless repression of the self. "There are 
many heavy things for the spirit, for the strong, weight-bearing spirit in 
which dwell respect and awe: its strength longs for the heavy, for the 
heaviest"9 The camel takes on many disparate elements from the social 
realm, ignoring the exigencies of the self in order to please others or simply 
out of laziness.
Nietzsche condemns this tendency in strong terms, extending it to the 
Ultimate Man. Nietzsche argues that the personality of the camel is an 
affront to human dignity and the self-worth of the individual. "What is this
heaviest thing, you heroes Is it not this: to debase yourself in order to
injure your pride? To let your folly shine out in order to mock your 
wisdom?"10 As seen earlier, Nietzsche calls for the individual to escape 
society in order to seek self-overcoming. "But in the loneliest desert the 
second metamorphosis occurs: the spirit here becomes a lion; it wants to 
capture freedom and be lord in its own desert"11
The lion is independent and largely free of societal influence. As 
such, the lion represents the individual searching for identity and self- 
overcoming, as typified in die Higher Men. However, die lion is a pride 
animal, not fully self-sufficient and still open to the influence of others, as
9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
10 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
11 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
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elaborated in Nietzsche's critique of the community. The lion represents 
self-overcoming, but is not able to make the transition to self-creation. "To 
create new values—even the lion is incapable of that but to create itself 
freedom for new creation—that the might of the lion can do. To create 
freedom for itself and a sacred No even to duty. . .  the lion is needed."12 
The metamorphosis into the lion therefore creates the necessary substrate 
for the possibility of transmutation. However, the lion is incapable of self­
creation, as evidenced by the failure of the Higher Men.
The last metamorphosis is that of the child, innocent enough to begin 
the process of self-creation without lapsing into repression. The child is no 
less than the transmuted self as expressed in the symbol of the Obermensch.
But tell me, brothers, what can the child do that even the lion cannot? 
Why must the preying lion still become a child? The child is 
innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self- 
propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes. Yes, a sacred Yes is 
needed, brothers, for the sport of creation: the spirit now wills its own 
will, the spirit sundered from the world now wins its own world.13
The symbol of the child underscores the interpretive aspect of
transmutation. Nietzsche is not naive enough to assert that the self can
actually be recreated from scratch. Rather, the significance of transmutation
is that the individual can reinterpret both the self and the world from a
perspective that is not colored by inherited institutions or repressive
12 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
13 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
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normalizing mechanisms. However, even this more modest goal is 
troublesome. As Nietzsche emphasizes consistently, most of the means of 
human expression are in some sense repressive, including language and 
conventional philosophical discourse. More fundamentally, modes of 
thought such as reason and abstract conceptualizing are bound by factors 
that are socially-constructed and overly reductionistic. In this sense, 
Nietzsche seems to offer a false hope, if not a delusion, as his goal for 
human existence. If the individual's mode of interpretation is almost 
completely determined by socially-bounded symbols and methodology, 
self-overcoming would represent the total destruction of all previous 
experiences and their replacement by an undetermined, perhaps 
indeterminable, interpretive scheme arising totally from the individual's 
consciousness.
This criticism is not without merit However, it retains its validity 
only if Nietzsche's critiques are taken to the extreme and his positive theory 
is taken too concretely. The most important implication of the symbolic 
progression of the three metamorphoses is that Nietzsche actually presents 
them as a progression. The individual must actually proceed through each 
of these manifestations in order to reach die goal of transmutation, which is 
the integration of the self-actuated elements of the consciousness under the 
auspices of the will-to-power. It is not necessary to forget previous
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experience or even to abandon socially-created symbols and discourse, but 
to recognize them for what they are and to give the individual's own 
reinterpretation precedence over inherited power structures.
This point is underscored by Nietzsche's insistence on the integrity of 
the self as a discrete unit capable of presenting a valid interpretation of both 
itself and its world. In addition, Nietzsche emphasis upon the integration of 
the parts of the self into a plural entity explicitly recognizes that all parts of 
the consciousness, including those that may be influenced by social and 
experiential patterns, must be retained and validated as essential to 
individual existence. The camel is not annihilated or even repressed, but is 
sublimated into the integrated consciousness along with the independence 
of the lion and the creativity of the child. All of these elements, coexisting 
and competing, insure that the individual neither stagnates nor consumes 
itself in the morass of nihilistic helplessness. Nietzsche positive theory is 
not couched in negative terms, but rather in language of integration, 
typified by the symbol of noontide.
n.
One of the most important symbols in Zarathustra is that of the 
"noon" or "noontide." Nietzsche elaborates on this symbol in The Twilight 
o f the Idols, identifying die positive purpose of Zarathustra with the symbol 
of noon. In this work, Nietzsche identifies the symbol of noon closely with 
an altered perception of reality and with the integration of the self:
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The true world—we have abolished. What world has remained? The 
apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also 
abolished the apparent one. (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; 
end of the longest error; high point of humanity; IN dPIT  
Zarathustra).14
For Nietzsche the symbol of noon represents die individual 
integrated consciousness, with no "shadows." By adopting the symbol of 
the shadow, Nietzsche implies that the subconscious elements of the 
consciousness are never destroyed, but are rather drawn up into the 
consciousness through existential awareness. 15 In this sense, the 
unconscious elements are integrated into the consciousness through die 
process of overcoming and the confrontation with repressed knowledge. 
This mirrors the synthesis of the Apollonian and Dionysian psychological 
types that Nietzsche praised in ancient tragedy. The healthy mode of 
existence that Nietzsche envisions must take into account all aspects of 
human existence as manifestations of the will-to-power and therefore valid 
expressions of life. Morrison notes, "the real batde for power is within the 
individual. As Nietzsche says man is a war, which is a 'war within oneself, 
and the basic weapons in this war are "self-control [and] self-outwitting/"16
14 Nietzsche, Twilight o f the Ido ls\
15 Nietzsche's symbolic language in this regard is strikingly similar to Jung's analysis of the 
subconscious. Jung was certainly familiar with Nietzsche's argument in Zarathustra, but it 
is impossible to determine if he adopted this language from Nietzsche.
16 Morrison, Nietzsche and Buddhism, 171.
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The transmuted self represents the outcome of this battle; it is the 
awakening of awareness.
In the course of his masterful analysis, Jaspers identifies three types 
of "awareness of being" Nietzsche proposes, each of which "can be made 
manifest only through indirect language, through image and simile." These 
are "(1) contemplative vision, (2) mystical oneness with being and (3) 
Dionysian intoxication" Although Jaspers does not delineate examples 
within Zarathustra where each of these states appears, it is possible to 
identify examples within the text In the contemplative vision "the truthful 
man experiences what he himself is and what being is as 'the great 
enlightenment about existence.'" Jaspers argues that mystical oneness with 
being is expressed most vividly in Zarathustra, with the symbol of noon. 
With this image, "the world's perfection stands revealed. The yes, which 
has absorbed all that is, is experienced." Dionysian intoxication is a multi­
layered and more complex stage of experiencing being. Dionysian 
intoxication involves the affirmation of existence with all of its vicissitudes, 
through which the individual becomes "die transmuter of existence when he 
learns to transmute himself."17
The transmuted self embodies all three of these modes, but 
Zarathustra emphasizes integration and wholeness above all others. The
17 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 354-347.
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integration of the self through the awareness of its multiplicity is 
paradoxical, but consistent with Nietzsche's theory of freedom. Camus 
states, "there is freedom at midday when the wheel of the world stops 
spinning and man consents to things as they are. But what is becomes what 
will be, and the ceaseless change of things must be accepted."18 Noontide 
represents the recognition of the only stability inherent in the human 
constitution: change. The transmutation of the self is indeed a 
transformation, but one of perspective rather than concrete. This 
perspective acknowledges that the primacy of the self and of its variegated 
nature:
But now the day, the transformation, the sword of judgement, the 
great noontide comes to them all: then many things shall be revealed! 
And he who declared the Ego healthy and holy and selfishness 
glorious—truly, he, a prophet, declares too what he knows: “Behold, 
it comes, it is near, the great noontide?*19
The recognition of the individual self as project further emphasizes 
the lack of an endpoint for transmutation. Self-overcoming must continue 
irrespective of the extent of transmutation. "Man is a bridge and not a goal; 
counting himself happy for its noontides and evenings, as a way to new 
dawns."20 The symbol of noon, a moment which recurs daily, is emblematic
18 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, 78.
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:10.
20 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:123.
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of the continuing nature of Nietzsche's theory of selfhood. The symbol of
noon also connotes optimism for the possibility of transmutation:
And this is the great noontide: it is when man stands at the middle of 
his course between animal and Obermensch and celebrates his 
journey to the evening and his highest hope: for it is the journey to a 
new morning. Then man, going under, will bless himself; for he will 
be going over to the Obermensch and the sun of knowledge will 
stand at noontide. "A ll gods are dead: now we want the Obermensch 
toJivd'—let this be our last will one day at the great noontide!21
The symbol of noon is also related to the symbols of the eagle and the
snake. It is telling that these symbols first occur in the narrative
simultaneously, in section ten of the prologue. Furthermore, the animals
only reappear in the narrative when Zarathustra is alone, when he finally
abandons the "other." The voice of the animals represents instinct and self-
knowledge, not the herd or collective mentality. Nietzsche emphasizes this
point as both animals are solitary creatures. This is related to the symbol of
noon as the animals are representative of parts of Zarathustra's own
consciousness that are ignored or repressed when Zarathustra is within die
confines of society. When the consciousness is exposed in solitude, these
elements are free to manifest themselves:
Zarathustra said this to his heart as the sun stood at noon: then he 
looked inquiringly into the sky—for he heard above him die sharp 
cry of a bird. And behold! An eagle was sweeping through the air in 
wide circles, and from it was hanging a serpent; not like prey but like 
a friend: for it was coiled around an eagle's neck.22
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:22.3.
22 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §10.
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Zarathustra encounters the voice of the animals, which represents his
own internal dialogue. This encounter takes place at noon, representing die
integration of the self. This integration is the beginning of transmutation, a
task as formidable as self-overcoming. "The proudest animal under the sun
and the wisest animal under the sun—they have come scouting I found
it more dangerous among men than among animals; Zarathustra is
following dangerous paths."23 When taken together, the symbols of noon
and the animals represent a fundamental point of Nietzsche's theory of die
transmuted self. The symbol of noon, in connection with that of the
animals, emphasizes that the individual must cultivate awareness of the
internal movements within die self. "My animals are awake, for I am
awake. My eagle is awake and, like me, does honor to the sun. With eagle's
claws it reaches out for the new light"24 The price of personal
transmutation is perpetual self-overcoming and vigilance.
The symbol of noon is therefore both one of integration and die
affirmation of plurality. This apparent contradiction is at the very heart of
Nietzsche's positive thought Deleuze notes:
The sense of Nietzsche's philosophy is that multiplicity, becoming 
and chance are objects of pure affirmation. The affirmation of 
multiplicity is die highest speculative proposition, just as die joy of
23 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §10.
24 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:2Q. The animals axe therefore part of Zarathustra's 
consciousness.
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diversity is the practical proposition. The player only loses because 
he does not affirm strongly enough, because he introduces the 
negative into chance and opposition into becoming and multiplicity.25
The symbols of die transmuted self: the metamorphoses of the spirit,
noontide, and the animals are all representative of this imperative. The
transmuted self is not a completed project Indeed, the last paragraph of
Zarathustra unites all of these symbols in the assertion that Zarathustra's
work has only now begun, that of the transmutation:
My suffering and my pity—what of them! For do I aspire after 
happiness? I aspire after my world Very well, my lion has come, my 
children are near, Zarathustra has become ripe, my hour has come! 
This is m y morning, m y day begins: rise up now, rise up, great 
noontideI Thus spoke Zarathustra and left his cave, glowing and 
strong, like a morning sun emerging from behind dark mountains.26
Nietzsche, therefore, finishes his narrative by emphasizing that the
integration of the self is a project that is never to be completed, and cannot
therefore be explained. However, the mechanisms mediating the disparate
elements of the consciousness receive a great deal of attention in
Zarathustra, and must therefore be examined to gain any degree of
understanding of the transmuted self.
25 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 197.
26 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:20. This is the last paragraph of the book—but where is 
Zarathustra going? Back to man? No, now that the great noontide has come and his 
consciousness is integrated, he can leave the solitude of his cave and venture forth into the 
world.
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m.
Much of Nietzsche's thought proceeds from an analysis of die 
dynamics of the human psyche, indeed it is ultimately from Nietzsche's 
psychological observations that his other philosophical and political 
doctrines flow. These psychological explorations are driven by frustration 
engendered by the lack of self-knowledge by modem individuals.
Nietzsche laments in the Genealogy o f Morality, "we are unknown to 
ourselves, we knowers, we ourselves, to ourselves, and there is a good 
reason for this. We have never looked for ourselves—so how are we ever 
supposed to find ourselves?"27
In keeping, much of Nietzsche's thought is concerned with the 
analysis of the self. Indeed, one of the fundamental elements of Nietzsche's 
critique of modernity is the role of die human self as presented in the idea of 
the "subject" The idea of the subject that has free will and the ability to act 
is essential to the modem project It is only through the distinction between 
the subject and the object that it is possible to attach value judgments to 
actions, depending upon the intentions behind those actions.
Nietzsche tells us that this idea of die subject can not be seen as given, 
but is rather the product of an extensive historical development28 Thus, the
27 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f M orality, ed. Keith AnseU-Pearson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3.
28 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f M orality, 12-13.
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modern project is built upon an untenable ontological foundation, implicitly 
relying upon the concept of a fundamental human nature. Instead,
Nietzsche emphasizes that the universe is not ordered, and that it is only 
through the interposition of the will that any semblance of order becomes 
apparent29 Therefore, if one is to look for foundations one must seek to 
create them out of the concrete self.
Nietzsche insists that the self is composed of many parts, not one 
essential spirit or nature. Nietzsche wants philosophy to abandon die idea 
of the soul as found in Christian theology and even in Enlightenment 
thought30 In the Christian philosophical tradition and Cartesian dualism, 
the soul is seen as separate from the body in a fundamental sense. The body 
and the spirit are composed of different elements, and exist on separate 
planes. The implication of these schemes is that the soul or spirit is superior 
to the body, and the entire material plane is, at least to some degree, 
contemptible.
At no time does Nietzsche entertain the notion that there may be a 
soul that exists outside the body. "But die awakened, the enlightened man
29 "As an alternative to the logical method the Dionysian state of consciousness offers forms 
of communication such as song and dance. Nietzsche's Zarathustra teaches one not to 
believe in a god that does not dance. The godliness of which Nietzsche speaks is that of the 
creative process of hfe, which is never self-contained. The rhythms and movement of song
and dance, like those of life, elude classification The subject-object distinction that rules
discursive thought is suspended as the dynamic unity of life is perceived." Ofelia Schutte, 
Beyond Nihilism: N ietzsche w ithout M asks, 26-27.
30 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and E vil trans. Walter Kaufmaim (New York: Vintage, 1989), 54.
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says: I am body entirely, and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for
something in the body."31 Nietzsche urges us to "give the finishing stroke to
that other and more calamitous atomism which Christianity has taught best
and longest, the soul atomism."32 Nietzsche contends that it is necessary to
have a new conception of the self, one that does not see the soul as
composed of some external "substance." The spirit, the consciousness, is
therefore a historical development, and its contents are likewise products of
this development
Our mind flies upward: thus it is an image of our bodies, an image of 
an advance and elevation. The names of the virtues are such images 
of advances and elevations. Thus the body goes through history, 
evolving and battling. And the spirit—what is it to the body? The 
herald, companion, and echo of its battles and victories.33
Nietzsche takes great pains to demonstrate that the self is created and
bound by external factors, but ones that are concrete and experiential. As
Schacht states: "in short human consciousness for Nietzsche requires to be
understood as a phenomenon intimately connected with our underlying
human nature and constitution and our entanglement in a web of social
relations."34 Nietzsche's genealogical investigations were designed to
31 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:4.
32 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §12
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:221.
34 Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, (London: Routkdge, 1983), 315.
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demonstrate exactly this point "Consciousness is capable of attaining at
most a limited degree of self-autonomy in relation to them."35
Rather than postulating the existence of a soul or endlessly
contemplating the eternal nature of man, one should instead examine the
many competing parts of the concrete consciousness. The soul in
Nietzschean terms is the "sum of the inner movements" within the
individual psyche.36 The psyche is composed of competing drives and
inclinations, each of which seeks predominance. This is analogous to Plato's
metaphor of the soul as a dwelling, as Parkes notes:
Nietzsche now introduces an image of the psyche as a boarding 
house. As new experiences enter the domicile of the soul 
([Seelenwohnung), those unable to find anything related to them are 
obliged to 'reside there alone, often to the displeasure of the older 
residents with whom they often run into conflict' But if the 
newcomer is fortunate, it will not be long before 'new guests stream 
in from all sides into the open house, and the one who was just then 
standing alone finds many and noble relatives. 37
Unlike Plato, however, Nietzsche does not argue that the elements of
the consciousness should be ordered according to an arbitrary principle
such as reason.
What the sense feels, what the spirit knows, never has an end in itself. 
But sense and spirit would persuade you that they are the end of all
35 Schacht, Nietzsche, 315.
36 Nietzsche, Daybreak Thoughts on the Prejudices o f M orality, trans. RJ. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), §311.
37 Graham Parkes, Composing the Souk Reaches o f N ietzsche's Psychology, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press: 1994), 43.
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things: that is how vain they are. Instruments and toys are sense and 
spirit behind them still lies the self.. . .  Always the self listens and 
seeks: it compares, overpowers, conquers, destroys. It controls, and it 
is in control of die ego too. Behind your thoughts and feelings, my 
brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name 
is self, hi your body he dwells; he is your body.38
It is in the tension between competing psychological elements that
human existence occurs. 'The I is no longer something stable and fixed, but
rather labile and dynamic: 'a moving midpoint'"39 Nietzsche does not
accept that the self is or must be a stable spirit or essence. Instead, it is
possible for the self to be eternally changing, as Nietzsche discusses in die
ideal type of the Dionysian man. "By virtue of die power of Dionysus one
can resolve oneself into a plurality of persons and play, thanks to the patron
deity of masks, a variety of parts in die drama of life."40 Nietzsche argues
not only that the consciousness is composed of multiple competing parts,
but that the very notion of consciousness is a manifestation of the tension
between these parts. "The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with
one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman. Your littie
intelligence. . .  is also an instrument of your body, a littie instrument and
toy of your great intelligence."41 Nietzsche argues that this tension is what
38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:1.
39 Parkes, Composing the Soul 74.
40 Parkes, Composing the Soul 276.
41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:4.
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is properly termed the "self," not a stable identity or perceiving subject42 In
this sense, the self is radically de-centered and perpetually unstable:
Sense and spirit are instruments and toys: behind them still lies the 
Self. The Self sees with the eyes of die sense, it listens too with the 
ears of the spirit The Self is always listening and seeking: it 
compares, subdues, conquers, destroys. It rules and is also the Ego's 
ruler. Behind your thoughts and feelings, brother, stands a mighty 
commander, an unknown sage—he is called Self. He lives in your 
body, he is your body.43
The manner in which individuals are able to organize their internal 
chaos into a manageable and creative conversation is the hallmark of self­
creation. 44 This endeavor may be dangerous to both the individual and to 
society.45 In Zarathustra Nietzsche employs an interesting analogy
42 "Nietzsche calls the ‘ under-willd o r' under-soul^  the different protagonists of this 
internal struggle (which is only a feeble debate, involving 'the one who ordere,' 'the one 
who obeys/ 'the one feeling satisfaction') in the midst of the willing subject These are, in 
fact the parts of the unconscious of the body, an 'edifice of multiple souls.' Why does he 
talk about 'souls'? The usurpation or reversal, which attributes the 'noble' name 'soul' to 
what tradition considers inferior, is aimed at designating the true 'acting principles/ the 
impulses, the instincts." Haar, Nietzsche and M etaphysics, 94.
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:4.
44 "Yet the sub-ego plurality is not reducible simply to the forces of the bodily unconscious, 
any more than it can be assimilated to the diversity of feelings and ideas. The logical 
identity of the ego or the moral identity of the person takes hold at the expense of the 
presence of multiple 'persons/ i.e., roles that follow each other or coexist in the apparatus of 
the individual psyche. Nietzsche does not tire of stressing that the 'person' is nothing but 
some special underscoring, a product of circumstances, within the multiple 'persons,' i-e., 
characters or personalities that we carry inside us in a state of greater or lesser virtuality. 
Most often a person, Le., a dramatic character, a more or less 'arbitrary' mask, sticks to us, 
occupying the center stage of consciousness alone at the expense of those masks that we 
carry'inside the body.'" Haar, Nietzsche and M etaphysics, 94-95.
45 "Nietzsche's well-known separation of men into higher and lower orders is not so much 
an evaluation of their soul's composition as of the different manner in which these 
materials are organized and exploited." Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o f the 
Soul, 67.
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highlighting the peril of this undertaking: ''What is great in man is that he is
a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture
and a going under" 46
 envy and mistrust and calumny among your virtues is necessary.
Behold how each of your virtues desires the highest place: it wants 
your entire spirit; that your spirit may be its  herald, it wants your 
entire strength in anger, hate, and love. Every virtue is jealous of the 
others, and jealousy is a terrible thing. Even virtues can be destroyed 
through jealousy. He whom the flames of jealousy surround at last 
turns his poisoned sting against himself, like the scorpion.47
The mechanisms by which the tensions between competing
psychological states are mediated receive a great deal of attention from
Nietzsche. Traditional philosophy cites reason as the faculty capable of
bringing the drives under control and ordering the consciousness.
Nietzsche does not disparage human reason, but he insists that it is not
capable of the type of universal explanatory power that Enlightenment
thinkers believe. Nietzsche insists that reason is simply another form of
interpretation, although its operation is somehow endemic to the human
mind. "Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we
cannot throw off."48 Reason, however, is intrinsically incapable of ordering
the passions, as reason and the passions are not entirely separate. Reason is
46 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue §4.
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 15.
48 Nietzsche, The W ill to Power, trans. Walter Kaufinann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Vintage, 1968), § 522
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influenced by the passions, and die passions contain a "quantum of
reason."49 Reason may be a special form of intellectual operation, but it is
not to be accorded a privileged place in Nietzschean psychology:
They are always looking back to the dark ages: then, indeed, illusion 
and faith were a different matter; raving of the reason was likeness to 
God, and doubt was sin.. . .  That is why they hearken to preachers of 
death and themselves preach afterworlds.50
In no case would Nietzsche accept any type of noetic reason existing
on a different plane than that of human existence. Offering such a claim is
sheer fantasy and is certainly harmful. In a section of Twilight o f the Idols
entitled "'Reason' in Philosophy" Nietzsche writes:
The reasons for which this world has been characterized as 
"apparent  ^are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other 
kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable. . .  to invent fables about 
a world "other" than this one has no meaning at all, unless an instinct 
of slander, detraction, and suspicion against life has gained the upper 
hand in us: in that case, we avenge ourselves against life with a 
phantasmagoria of "another," a "better" life.51
The insistence upon an exterior order is thus representative of a
deeply set antipathy towards the Lebenswelt52 Rather than confronting life
49 Nietzsche, W ill to Power, § 387.
s° Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
51 Nietzsche, Twilight o f the Idols, tnuis. Walter Kaufmarm, in The Portable N ietzsche (New 
York: Penguin, 1954), 484.
52 "Our inability to see ourselves, along with those propensities to self-evaluation that 
parade as self-knowledge, causes us to live in constant self-deception. What we really are is 
concealed from us in a number of ways: (a) The framework within which we view 
ourselves is determined by language ...(b ) Unconsciously we seek out the principles 
which conform to our temperaments: 'Our thought and judgement are subsequently taken
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as it presents itself, these philosophers are incapable of dealing with the 
vicissitudes of life and must construct a higher reality towards which they 
can pine. It is "the instinct of life-weariness, and not that of life, which has 
created the 'other world.'"53 Neither human nor abstract divine reason can 
be the ordering mechanism for the human consciousness. It is necessary to 
seek a more fundamental ordering mechanism than reason, and one that is 
located within the concrete consciousness.
As an alternative, Nietzsche suggests that the only possibility of 
bringing the drives under control is through the will, specifically the will-to- 
power. This process of subordinating the drives to the will may be referred 
to as sublimation. Rather than suppressing a drive or fulfilling it directly, it 
is possible to channel it into creative spiritual activity, creating an "organic 
harmony."54
Yes, this Ego, with its contradiction and confusion, speaks most 
honestly of its being—this creating, willing, evaluating Ego, which is 
the measure and value of filings. And this most honest being, file 
Ego—it speaks of the body, and insists upon the body, even when it 
fables and fabricates and flutters with broken wings. Ever more
to be causes of our nature/ We interpret ourselves intellectualistically. (c) Success leads to 
falsification.. . .  (d) The image o f our past must be agreeable to us. 'One forgets much of his 
past and deliberately excludes it from his memory.. . .  We are always actively engaged in 
this kind of self-deception.' (e) We are contaminated by the views which others take o f us:
'What we know of ourselves is not decisive for our happiness At times we are
suddenly overwhelmed by what others know of us (or think they know of us), and we 
realize that their opinions can overpower our own.'" Jaspers, Nietzsche, 133.
53 Nietzsche, W ill to Power, § 586C
54 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 227.
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honestly it learns to speak, the Ego: and the more it learns, the more it 
finds titles and honors for the body and die earth.55
Nietzsche conceived the will to power as the essential drive in
humanity.56 hi his notes, Nietzsche states "this world is the will to pow er—
and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and
nothing besides!"57 The will to power is manifested individually; it is
neither a social creation nor is it expressed socially. The will to power acts
primarily as a guide to the individual:
A will to the thinkability of all being: this I call your will. All being 
you want to make thinkable: for you doubt with well-founded 
suspicion, whether it is thinkable. Yet it shall yield and bend for you. 
. . .  Smooth it shall become and serve the spirit as its mirror and 
reflection. That is your entire will. . .  a will to power.58
The individual who has been able to achieve self-mastery over his
drives through the use of the will is truly a "free spirit" 59 This spirit does
not need external signifiers to provide a reason to live or to order his
consciousness; that would be herd morality. Rather, it is possible for the
55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
56 "Nietzsche was a dialecticalm onist His basic force, the will to power, is not only the 
Dionysian passionate striving, akin to Schopenhauer's irrational will, but is also Apollonian 
and possesses as inherent capacity to give itself form. The victory of the Dionysian is thus 
not complete, and the will to power is a synthesis of Nietzsche's earlier two dualistic 
principles." Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 235-236.
57Nietzsche, W ill to Power, § 1067.
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
59 "The framework within which Nietzsche's psychological understanding occurs is 
composed of (1) the fundamental relation ofman to him selfwhen he sees and evaluates 
himself, deceives himself about himself and proceeds to mould himself; and (2) The 
operation and transformation o f drives." Jaspers, Nietzsche, 132.
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free spirit to order his consciousness free of any such considerations. 
Therefore, freedom for Nietzsche is to be "understood as facility in self- 
direction."60
One could conceive of such a delight and power of self- 
determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit could take 
leave of all faith and every wish for certainly, being practiced in 
maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and 
dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par 
excellence.61
The free spirit is thus able to organize his inner chaos, but Nietzsche 
never asserts that the plural nature of the soul itself is something to be 
overcome. "Pluralism within the soul is to be maintained/'62 The pluralism 
is the fundamental nature of the human psyche, and it is through conflict 
between different elements that creativity is possible. "The finest 
discoveries concerning culture are made by the individual man within 
himself when he finds two heterogeneous powers ruling there."63 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche understands that there must be a type of mental 
parsimony.
One of the most integral characteristics of the mediating process 
within the psyche is forgetfulness. Nietzsche does not mean mere
60 Nietzsche, W ill to Power, 705.
61 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, tnuis. Walter Kaufmaim (New York; Vintage, 1974), 347.
62 Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul, 67.
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thoughtlessness or some form of dementia. For Nietzsche, forgetfulness is
necessary for health; it is a type of mental hygiene. Forgetfulness allows for
peace, no happiness would be possible without it64 Nietzsche's concept of
forgetfulness is similar in application to Freud's concept of the unconscious
mind, which also results in a type of mental economy operating to preserve
sanity. Nietzsche expresses a similar sentiment in his earlier work:
The Greeks gradually learned to organize the chaos by following the 
Delphic teaching and thinking back to themselves, that is, to their real 
needs, and letting their pseudo-needs die out Thus they again took 
possession of themselves; . . .  This is a parable for each of us: he must 
organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs.65
The task of making man into this reliable creature, "answerable for
his own future!' has been accomplished through the customs of society.66
The "conscience" of man is socially constructed and designed to preserve
the prevailing social order; it does not emanate from some divine source
outside of convention.67 The repression of the self by society ultimately
leads to a form of self-loathing, "bad conscience." "All instincts which are
not discharged outwardly turn inwards- this is what I call the
internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be
63 Nietzsche, Human A ll too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. RJ. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), §276.
64 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f M orality, 38.
45 Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", in Untimely 
M editations, trans. RJ. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 123.
66 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f M orality, 39.
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called his 'soul.'"68 Bad conscience, inextricably tied to religion, serves as a 
stumbling block to individual progress:"[I]ndeed, the possibility cannot be 
rejected out of hand that the complete and definitive victory of atheism
might release humanity from this whole feeling of being indebted----
Atheism and a sort of second innocence belong together."69
Nietzsche determines that the triumph of "slave morality" in the 
modem age has left society incapable of responding to the challenge of 
nihilism engendered by the collapse of die modem worldview, primarily 
because the individual is caught up in the personal torments of "bad 
conscience," rendering him incapable of realizing his true potential. For 
Nietzsche, modem society is missing the ability to produce a culture based 
upon positive, aesthetic values rather than the repression of natural, healthy 
drives.70 The internal regime of competing drives forms the stage for the 
politics of self-exploration and self-creation. As Thiele notes, "the 
individual is a law unto himself, unpredictable and unmanageable."71
The transmuted self as Nietzsche envisions it is therefore the 
affirmation of internal multiplicity. The theory of the multiple self is a
67 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f Morality, 41-42.
68 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f M orality, 61.
69 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f M orality, 67.
70 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f M orality, 22-23, see also "The Greek State."
71 Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul 38-
Re produced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
250
straightforward extension of Nietzsche's affection for the mask, but is more 
nuanced. By denying the stability of the self, Nietzsche undercuts the 
philosophical anthropology underlying modem models of selfhood and 
philosophical discourse. Nietzsche presents die self as essentially a 
conversation. The ideal of the transmuted self is the recognition of this fact 
and the addition of a level of intentionality to this fundamental process.
Haar argues:
[T]he point of view of internal plurality is not only that of a 
succession, but also that of a "social" coexistence o f persons. "The 
free man is . . .  a society of individuals." "The individual is a 
society." In fact we maintain with ourselves and within ourselves 
social relations as complex and numerous as those we maintain 
within the individuals around us.72
By affirming internal life as an interpretive dialogue, Nietzsche 
validates the competing sections of the self which have been recognized 
since Plato while avoiding the type of rank-ordering philosophy has 
afforded to one part or the other. Rather than the creation of an entirely 
new self or the destruction of previous identity, the transmuted self is 
essentially the reinterpretation of the self along the lines of multiplicity. As 
Jaspers notes, "man, though blind to himself and captivated by his own self- 
deceptions, still manages—in spite of the self-evaluations by which he
72 Haar, Nietzsche and M etaphysics, 97.
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lives— to mould his own nature. To mould himself would appear to be the 
highest possibility open to man."73
IV.
Nietzsche's emphasis on the self as a project represents a return, at 
least in spirit, to the ancient care of the self. Unlike the ancients, however, 
Nietzsche presents no goal or standards by which to measure the worth of 
the individual or a ranking for the constituents of the soul. This is in 
keeping with his view of existence as an interpretive endeavor, rife with flux 
and perpetually changing configurations of the will-to-power. Nietzsche's 
call to the transvaluation of values proves to be the reinterpretation of the 
need for valuation as an internal constellation of forces rather than as a 
means of measuring external phenomena. Transmutation represents 
revaluation as self-interpretation and self-valuation, a process without an 
endpoint or precedence. The analysis of Zarathustra, however, identifies 
three key strategies associated with transmutation: constant 
experimentation, transgression against norms, and the embracing of 
creativity as a way of life.
Because of the difficulty of identifying normalizing mechanisms, it is 
necessary to transgress social norms constantly and experimentally. The 
revaluation of die self requires consistent, affirmative action to avoid
73 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 134.
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stagnation. "Are you the victor, the self-conqueror, the ruler of your senses. 
. . .  Or do the animal and necessity speak from your desire? Or isolation?
Or disharmony within yourself?"74 This further emphasizes the 
indeterminate nature of Nietzsche's theory of transmutation. Constant 
experimentation is required because of the lack of any meaningful order to 
revaluation. That which is revalued must be consistently revalued to avoid 
dogmatization or complacency. As Schutte notes, "from the Dionysian 
standpoint the self is always in process. It speaks for the dynamic unity of 
the body, not for something that controls the body or lodges in a different 
sphere from the body and the earth."75
Nietzsche argues that the only possible definition of virtue can 
therefore be that of the purity of self-created value. "Your virtue is your 
dearest self.. . .  That your virtue is your Self and not something alien, a 
skin, a covering: that is the truth from the bottom of your souls, you 
virtuous!"76 The great tragedy of mankind, as well as a great pity, is that the 
vast majority of individuals never even try to achieve this type of virtue.77
74 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:20.
75 Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism : N ietzsche without Masks, 34.
76 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL5.
77 "It follows from the above that the self for which we consciously live is by no means our 
actual self: the vast majority live their whole lives 'only for the phantom of an ego.'. . .  
Consequently all of them together reside in a cloud of impersonal opinions and arbitrary or, 
one might say, fictitious, evaluations. This cloud of opinions comes very close to having a 
life of its own, independent of the people that it envelops: from it derives the enormous 
effect of universal judgements about 'man'". Jaspers, Nietzsche, 133-134.
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This is in fact Zarathustra's greatest fear, that pity over mankind will drag
him into despair and ruin his attempt at transmutation. It is better for
Zarathustra to succeed alone than for everyone to fail.
The body purifies itself through knowledge; experimenting with 
knowledge it elevated itself; to the discerning man all instincts are 
holy; the soul of the elevated man grows joyful. Physician, heal 
thyself: thus you will heal your patient as well. Let his best remedy 
be to see with his own eyes him who makes himself well.78
It is also for this reason that Nietzsche does not attempt to present a
political theory to reform the state and social structures. No matter how
well constructed, collective systems have failed their members. Nietzsche
therefore capitalizes on the failure of collective institutions. The individual,
through resistance to normalizing mechanisms, can gain the experiences
necessary to begin self-creation. In order for the individual to revalue, there
must be values to reinterpret
All names of good and evil are images: they do not speak out they 
only hint He is a fool who seeks knowledge from them. Whenever 
your spirit wants to speak in images, pay heed; for that is when your 
virtue has its origin and its beginning. Then the body is elevated and 
risen up; it enraptures the spirit with its joy, that it may become 
creator and evaluator and lover and benefactor of all things.79
Society is therefore good for something, and indeed necessary, as an
object of resistance. By resisting the seriousness of society and its
imperatives, the individual realizes how hollow these inherited structures
78 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, I£22.
79 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, T;22.1.
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actually are. "And when I beheld my devil, I found him serious, thorough,
profound, solemn: it was the Spirit of Gravity—through him all tilings are
ruined. One does not kill by anger but by laughter."80
By embracing creativity as a way of life, the individual has come full
circle. Beginning initially as a socially-created being, the individual has
become a fully self-aware being capable of self-interpretation and
continuous self-overcoming. "I have learned to walk: since then I have run.
I have learned to fly: since then I do not have to be pushed in order to move.
Now I am nimble, now I fly, now I see myself under myself, now a god
dances within me."81 This is the transmuted self, and its exigencies are
incommunicable. Nietzsche presents the transmuted self in veiled terms
because it cannot be explained, it is too bound up in internal experience and
hermeneutics to even try:
This tree stands here alone on the mountainside; it has grown up 
high above man and animal. And if it wished to speak, it would find 
no one who understood it  so high it has grown. Now it waits and 
waits—yet what is it waiting for? It lives too near the seat of the 
clouds: is it waiting, perhaps, for the first lightning?82
The transmuted self is therefore a concept that cannot be explained,
only experienced. Nietzsche's theory of the transmuted self is anything but
80 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
81 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
82 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
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nihilistic, but it is solipsistic. "There are a thousand paths that have never 
yet been tread, a thousand forms of health and hidden islands of life. Man 
and man's earth are still unexhausted and undiscovered."83 Nietzsche 
therefore, does not present a political theory in any conventional sense. He 
does, however, present a theory of politics grounded in the sanctity of the 
individual self and the innate dignity of the individual spirit
83 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, h22Z
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C h a p te r  vm 
Z a r a th u s tr a  a s  A n ti-P ro p h e t 
Nietzsche's presents a remarkably insightful analysis of the conflict 
between the self and society. Rather than the extremes of solipsism or 
statism attributed to him in some of the prominent interpretations,
Nietzsche presents a radically different view of political life in Zarathustra. 
The modes of political existence analyzed by Nietzsche, the state and the 
community, produce tensions within the individual that must be resolved. 
Nietzsche's theory of the transmuted self presents a response to the void 
that is healthier than the internalized guilt he so vehemently criticizes. In 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche presents the possibility of a new type of human 
existence that can transcend the morass of modem society and the grim fate 
of the last man to aspire to a new level of political life. Rather than a 
disconnected, ambiguous collection of political aphorisms, Nietzsche's 
Zarathustrian political theory is one of hope in die face of die horror of 
absurdity.
Nietzsche deconstructs human collective existence from die most 
broadly aggregated, the state, to the most basic, die interpersonal friendship, 
in order to reveal its pernicious effects upon the individual. Nietzsche 
concludes that all forms of human relationships invariably give rise to 
repressive power relations that threaten die natural expression of die 
individual self and frustrate the emergence of die creative personality. In
256
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the course of the narrative, Nietzsche shifts his analysis toward the 
manifestations of the will-to-power within the consciousness of the 
individual.
Nietzsche concludes that each individual is a collection of competing 
drives and impulses, which are perceived and interpreted by the will. In 
this sense, "reality" is an interpretive construct arising from each 
individual's confrontation with the world, each necessarily different 
Accordingly, any attempt to concretize this hermeneutic scheme either in 
analytic philosophical systems or political dogmatism is a falsification of 
authentic experience, which can only be gained through individual 
confrontation with the held of objects and the other. Genuine philosophical 
insight cannot be communicated through symbolically-deficient language; it 
can only be hinted at The philosophical use of such language is 
exceptionally dangerous, as it leads to intellectual laziness and the 
perpetuation of philosophical error. Nietzsche, attempting to overcome 
these hazards, seeks a less repressive approach to the communication of 
philosophy.
Nietzsche argues that each attempts to construct an interpretation of 
reality in accord with their own internal configuration of the will-to-power. 
Individuals with repressed drives or internalized social ideologies interpret 
die world in unhealthy ways, undermining their won potential and 
condemning them to mediocrity. Through self-overcoming, the individual
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recreates the world in a healthier mode, corresponding to a more open 
internal configuration of the will-to-power. Reality is therefore always a 
projection of the internal, as all tilings are ultimately interpreted according 
to the internal constellation of forces within the individual. The will-to- 
power, as conceived by Nietzsche, is therefore the will-to-create, both 
ourselves and the world.
Zarathustra is thus Nietzsche's attempt to convey his interpretation 
of the will-to-power by invoking within the reader a semblance of his own 
internal experience. The narrative symbols in Zarathustra represent the 
forces that can provoke a change in the internal configuration of the will-to- 
power radical enough to cause a total reevaluation of the Umwelt The most 
profound of these experiences is existential nausea, which strips away the 
false comfort underlying traditional interpretations.
After nausea is confronted, individuals are forced to radically modify 
their interpretive scheme, forcing an individually-actuated hermeneutics to 
come to the fore. As such, the interpretive frame arising from the 
individual's internal configuration of the will-to-power is necessarily 
reconfigured, parallel with the change in these constellations. This change 
in interpretive scheme is transmutation. The self is not therefore "re­
created" in a concrete sense, but rather the perspective by which the 
individual interprets reality and the self is radically altered. This change in 
perspective is the outcome of self-overcoming, and the realignment
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produced is the transmuted self. Transmutation is the interpretation of the 
elements of the consciousness under the auspices of internally-actuated will- 
to-power; a process rather than an outcome. "This—is now my way: where 
is yours? Thus I answered those who asked me 'the way/ For theway— 
does not exist!"1
Importantly, no where in Zarathustra does Nietzsche articulate 
anything which could be construed as a traditional political theory. 
Nietzsche's contribution to political theory, apart from his formidable 
critiques, must therefore lie in his highly individualistic theory of the self. 
This chapter will examine whether it is possible to synthesize this material 
into a political theory, or whether Nietzsche's philosophy is inimical to 
political thought
As examined in the previous chapter, the section "The Three 
Metamorphoses" represents the progression of the individual from herd 
creature to the overcoming of humanity to the transmuted self. This is 
properly termed a political theoiy, as it involves the relation between the 
individual and the state, political socialization, and the question of justice. 
However, Nietzsche political thought is unique in its lack of concern for the 
state and collective institutions. They remain objects to be criticized or 
perhaps rebelled against, but are not to be rehabilitated. Essentially,
1 Nietzsche, Zaratftustra, 111:11.
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concern with the reform of social institutions is placing the cart before the
horse; it makes no sense to rehabilitate the social realm when the individual
self is at risk. Nietzsche's condemnation of society is complete, and he sees
no use in attempting to rehabilitate it
Everything among them speaks, no one knows any longer how to 
understand. Everything falls away into failure, nothing falls any 
longer into deep wells. Everything among them speaks, nothing 
prospers and comes to an end any longer.. . .  And what yesterday 
was still too hard for time itself and its teeth, today hangs chewed 
and picked from the mouth of the men of today. Everything among 
them speaks, everything is betrayed. And what was once called a 
secret and a secrecy of profound souls, today belongs to the street- 
trumpeters and other butterflies.2
For Nietzsche, an essential step in self-overcoming is no less than die 
alleviation of the human drive towards collectivization and thereby the 
concretization of the manifestations of internal life, i.e. the will-to-power.3 
Nietzsche's political thought is therefore radically individualistic, not only 
because of the imperative to separate from social life but also in the 
distinctive interpretive philosophy he espouses. As Nietzsche writes, "it is 
the stillest words which bring the storm. Thoughts that come on doves' feet 
guide the world."4
2 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IH9.
3 As Nietzsche argues: “ Suffering bom  solitude is also an objection—I have suffered only 
from 'multitudes/" Ecce Homo, IL10.
4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:22.
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It is therefore difficult for political theorists, accustomed to dunking 
in state and collectively-bounded terms, to approach Nietzsche in the 
manner he intends. It is for this reason that Nietzsche's political thought has 
been essentially misunderstood by most political theorists as presenting an 
aristocratic theory of domination by a cadre of Obermenschen.5 As argued 
in the introduction, this interpretation of Nietzsche as an advocate of "great 
politics" can only be advocated from an incomplete reading of Nietzsche 
and through the deliberate disregard of his most profound philosophical 
and psychological insights. The main political argument contained in 
Zarathustra is that of a metamorphic journey towards individual creation 
and away from the herd, not the return to society as a type-former or 
demagogue.
The interpretation of Nietzsche as an aristocratic or statist thinker is 
revealed as untenable through the careful reading of Zarathustra. This is 
because the metamorphic structure of Zarathustra is the only work in 
Nietzsche's mature philosophic corpus that brings together die disparate 
strands of his political critique and positive theory and provides a 
comprehensive political interpretation. From this analysis, the essential 
thrust of Nietzsche's intentionally evasive political thought becomes
5 Indeed, one of the leading textbooks in political theory advocates this interpretation, 
essentially by presenting Nietzsche's ideas out of context and drawing from the dubious 
Machlass fragments. John H. Hallowell and Jene M. Porter, Political Philosophy: The Search 
for Humanity and Order, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice HaO, 1997), 620.
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evident Nietzsche envisions no less than a reinterpretation of the way
individuals live in the fullness of existence.
As mentioned earlier, Nietzsche's earliest works have often been
used to argue that Nietzsche envisioned a type of heroic community, like
Homeric society. Similarly, Nietzsche's later works have been used to
demonstrate that Nietzsche was the "ultimate nihilist" Both of these
interpretations are flawed. Nietzsche's political writings, as mediated
through Zarathustra, reveal a perpetual desire to criticize the status quo,
and seek continually to improve the self through resistance to mediocrity
and the institutions that perpetuate it  As Jaspers notes:
Nietzsche follows neither course: he provides no constructive whole 
like Hegel's and no practical political technique like Machiavelli's. 
Instead, his thinking derives from an all-encompassing concern for
the being of man He hopes to generate a movement that will
quicken the ultimate grounds of humanity's being, and he wishes 
through his thinking to impel those who hear and understand him to 
enter into this movement Still he does not limit or define die content 
of this movement politically, ethnologically, or sociologically.6
Nietzsche's political thought is indeed radical, perhaps so radical that
political theorists overlook the more nuanced elements in their search for
Nietzsche's positive thought As Zarathustra laments, "but why do I speak
where no one has m y kind of ears? Here it is yet an hour too early for me.
Among these people lam my own frontrunner."7 Nietzschean political
6 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 253.
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:5.3.
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thought simply does not provide the blueprint many writers seek to find. 
Rather, Nietzsche urges individuals to contemplate their existence, become 
aware of their potential, and act accordingly. This process cannot occur 
within a rigid state framework, although such a situation may spur 
individuals to act Likewise, a community structure can serve only a limited 
role in the quest for self-authentication. The ultimate site for political action 
must lie within the restless individual spirit Thus no political system, 
however constructed, can ever capture the essence of political reality: 
change. Nietzsche pushes us to accept this essential fact and to stop creating 
unhealthy narratives that perpetuate the myth of a stable cosmos.
L
Zarathustra explores the space between the competing drives 
inherent in the self: the urge for order and the desire for freedom. The 
interpretations of Nietzsche that stress the desire for order and those that 
stress his call for the release from bounds both are equally in error.
Nietzsche was neither an authoritarian nor an anarchist His political theory 
does not fit into any categories of conventional political thought; Nietzsche 
consciously avoids this type of concretization. Nietzsche's political thought 
is attitudinal rather than institutional. This renders die interpretation of 
Nietzsche's political thought exceptionally difficult, as it extends to elements 
traditionally thought outside of political theory, such as psychology and
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ontology. This, however, is exactly what Nietzsche intends. As Jaspers 
notes:
One cannot make a rational system of Nietzsche's politics without 
falsifying his thought His voluntaristic thinking, whose direction is 
determined vitally rather than conceptually, exhibits what is most 
characteristic only when one seeks out die antithesis which it 
contains.8
Therefore, it is impossible to speak of Nietzsche's political thought as 
being in any sense bounded or well-defined. Nietzsche's politics is based 
upon a reinterpretation of what it means to be political. For Nietzsche, 
politics is an active stance toward the process of becoming-oneself.9 This 
necessarily involves interaction with others and even social institutions, but 
does not stop there. Nietzsche's critiques are grounded in contempt for 
those who are unwilling to consider the proposition that the fullest 
expression of politics may lead to the separation of the individual from die 
collective rather than the continuing immersion of the individual into the 
social matrix. The perfection of politics is not to be found in the re­
articulation of die social, but in the continual reinterpretation of the self.
8 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 253.
9 Nietzsche speaks to the inherent individuality of his project in a preliminary draft for 
section III of Ecce Homo. "My writings are difficult; I hope this is not considered an 
objection?. . .  Silence is as much of an instinct with me as is garrulity with our dear 
philosophers. I am brief, my readers themselves must become long and comprehensive in 
order to bring it up together all that I have thought, and thought deep down.. . .  Finally, I 
speak only of what I have lived through not merely of what I have thought through the 
opposition of thinking and life is lacking in my case. My 'theory' grows from my 
'practice'—oh from a practice that is not by any means harmless or unproblematic'' Found 
in The Basic W ritings o f Nietzsche, 796.
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Politics, as originally conceived in the polls, recognized this proposition and 
was structured accordingly.10
In this sense, Nietzsche apparently returns to a classical theory of 
politics, but his analysis paradoxically serves to undercut one of the 
fundamental presuppositions of classical political thought. Nietzsche 
affirms he classical emphasis on the care for the self while denying the 
validity of the polis. Whereas thinkers like Aristotle consistently argued 
that humans can only be fully human within the polis, Nietzsche agues that 
the opposite is the case. Within the confines of collective existence, humans 
are not capable of reaching their full potential qua humans; the mechanisms 
of conformity are simply too invasive. Nietzsche, however, does not reject 
the notion of the polis out of hand, his flirtation with the possibility of the 
community of the Higher Men is an experiment along the lines of the 
ancient heroic community. Nevertheless, Nietzsche concludes that even the 
least restrictive social situation will inevitable compromise the individual; it 
cannot be otherwise.
13 Patocka argues that the sixteenth century is the line of demarcation that leads to the 
destruction of the care-for-self. "Care for the soul means that truth is something not given 
once and for all, nor merely a matter of observing and acknowledging the observed, but 
rather a lifelong inquiry, a self-controlling, self-unifying intellectual and vital practice. 
Greek thought distilled the care for the soul in two forms: we care for the soul so that it 
could undertake its spiritual journey through the world. . .  or, conversely, we think and 
leam to render our soul into that firm crystal of being. . .  which represents one of the 
possibilities of the being which bears within it the source of movement, of deciding its 
being or nonbeing, that is, dissolution in the uncertainty of instinct and undarified 
tradition." Jan Patocka, Heretical Essays in  the Philosophy o f H istory, trans. by Erazim 
Kohak, ed. James Dodd (Chicago: Open Court; 1996); 82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
266
This is especially true of contemporary ideas of politics. The modem
conception of politics, long removed from the intimacy of the polis, has
become another detached symbol, appealing to ideals that no longer exist
Therefore, Nietzsche is not as radical as he first appears when he calls for a
return to emphasis upon the individual. This theme has been repeated
throughout history in response to the problems inherent in increasing
collectivization. As Patocka argues, the individual self is always the victim
of the collectivization of goals and commitments:
From that time on another motif comes to the fore, opposing the 
motif of the care of the soul and coming to dominate one area after 
another, politics, economics, faith, and science, transforming them in 
a new style. Not a care (or the soul, the care to be, but rather the care 
to have, care for the external world and its conquest  ^becomes the 
dominant concern. 11
In its emphasis upon societal collective goals and identities, modem 
politics has betrayed the classical foundations of politics and surrendered to 
a more primitive type of human existence, analogous to tribal existence. 
Whereas the ancients were preoccupied with defining a political space in 
which individuals could reach their ultimate potential as individual human 
beings, modem politics seeks to produce compliant members who do not 
seek to express their individuality, or only do so in a tightly confined 
manner, hi essence, the classical political emphasis was upon die
11 Patocka, Heretical Essays, 83. Modem politics therefore has little to do with the classical 
conception of politics; they are antithetical.
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production of citizens, the modem emphasis is upon the production of 
subjects. Nietzsche calls for neither. Both models of politics have been a 
failure in that the inevitable product of collective existence is always 
mediocrity.
Nietzsche is calling for a return to the ancient care-for-self that was 
emphasized by classical philosophy,, albeit without the emphasis upon the 
polis This more than anything else represents Nietzsche's most radical 
contribution to political theory. Nietzsche's political thought is therefore 
not social, but it is not asocial either. The metamorphic structure of his 
argument in Zarathustra depends upon an initial immersion within a social 
matrix; this is the only condition which allows for the rise of nausea. 
Without the social, therefore, Nietzsche's positive thought concerning the 
self is impossible. Indeed, the self is transmuted, i.e. changed, through the 
experience of existential horror; it must be changed from its initial state of 
collective being. The social man is the larval stage of humanity; nausea is its 
chrysalis; and the transmuted self is the goal. There can be no transmuted 
self without the social; this is why the community of die Higher Men is not 
tenable. It is not possible to skip over die stage of social creation of the self, 
to do so precludes the experiences necessary for the fostering of nausea.
It is most accurate to term Nietzsche's political thought transsodal. 
Nietzsche's politics thus remains necessarily ambiguous, but this return to
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ambiguity is only the surface expression of a deep commitment to
individual self-worth. Jaspers mirrors this point
. . .  that which underlies and determines all judgements is provided 
by an attitude directed upon die whole of being. It is no longer mere 
politics but philosophy, on the basis of which, within the wealth of 
possibilities but without rational principle, opposing and 
contradictory ways can be tried solely under die guidance of the idea 
of saving and advancing humanity's being.. . .  In comparison with 
the great traditional constructions of political science and philosophy 
of history, Nietzsche's political thinking is bound to show an absence 
of logical unity and of consistent, precise conceptual procedures. The 
substance of his thinking shuns any attempt at unequivocal 
expression, but still it generates a wholly uniform atmosphere. Such 
thinking can sweep through one's soul like a storm; but it cannot be 
formalized and conceptualized in a clear and conclusive manner. 
Insofar as Nietzsche intends to produce this atmosphere, he avoids 
anything that could resemble a doctrine.. . .  His conceptuality is not 
meant to express a truth that is assuming a fixed goal and final shape; 
rather it appears to present itself as a means of unlimited flexibility in 
the hands of a governing will to think that is not bounded by 
anything. In this way its formulation attains a maximum of 
suggestive power. Only by taking this power o f expression together 
with the capacity for change can we lay hold of the import of such 
thinking.12
Rather than opening a new political space for collectives, Nietzsche
instead calls for a reevaluation of traditional political categories with an eye
towards individual development He does not solve the problems of
collective existence, nor does he seek to try. Politics must remain a function
of the self, eternally changing and mysterious. As Jaspers notes:
Apart from Nietzsche, all political thinkers regard politics as 
precisely delimited. They usually take it to be bounded by God or 
transcendence or refer it to a specific human actuality. Political
12 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 252-253.
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thinking can for instance proceed (as in the case of Hegel) within die 
scheme of existing and developing totalities; then it is a systematic
whole expressing die self-awareness of a factual reality Or again,
it can develop (as in the case of Machiavelli) with a view to particular 
realities and their significance for the autonomy of power. 13
Because of this, the elaboration of a Zarathustrian political theory
cannot take the form of a framework or even an ethical code; it is necessarily
too subjective. Rather, Nietzschean ethics is a protean exercise operating
within the context of the Nietzschean perspective of flux and eternal
Becoming:
Free from what? Zarathustra does not care about that! But your eye 
should clearly tell me: free /or what? Can you furnish yourself with 
your own good and evil and hang up your own will above yourself 
as a law? Can you be the judge of yourself and avenger of your law? 
It is terrible to be alone with the judge and avenger of one's own law. 
It is to be like a star thrown forth into empty space and onto the icy 
breath of solitude.14
Nietzsche therefore cannot create a framework for politics without 
becoming hypocritical. Nietzsche's theory of power precludes the creation 
of a non-repressive ethics. He consistendy argues that all ethical systems, 
of whatever form, will eventually degenerate into dogma and repression.
As Nietzsche's ultimate concern is with the liberation of the individual from 
external signifiers, Nietzschean politics must be necessity resist
13 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 252.
14 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
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concretization in any form.15 By positing his ethical imperative in an
aesthetic mode, Nietzsche seeks to insure that each transmutation is
fundamentally separate and unique, precluding concretization. As Deleuze
and Guattari argue:
The diagnosis of becomings in every passing present is what 
Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as physician, "physician of 
civilization," or inventor of new immanent modes of existence. 
Eternal philosophy, but also the history of philosophy, gives way to a 
becoming-philosophical.16
The interpretation of Zarathustra presented in this dissertation makes 
it possible to reconcile die disparate strands of Nietzsche's seemingly 
scattered political references with his epistemological and ontological 
precepts. In Zarathustra, he begins with a simple, yet devastating 
assumption: God is no longer in the picture. Although this assertion is one 
of the most powerful that can be offered, Nietzsche presents it in a 
subordinate clause within his introductory section. The irrelevance of God 
is not the ultimate conclusion of Nietzsche's philosophy; it is the beginning. 
Nietzsche goes on to reject other traditional bases for order and ultimately
15 "Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it 
even with the best right bat without inner constraint proves that he is probably not only 
strong, but also daring to the point of recklessness. He enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies 
a thousandfold the dangers which life brings with it in any case, not the least of which is 
that no one can see how and where he loses is way, becomes lonely, and is tom piecemeal 
by some minotaur of conscience. Supposing one like that comes to grief, this happens so for 
from the comprehension of men that they neither feel it nor sympathize. And he cannot go 
back any longer. Nor can he go back to the pity of men." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and 
E vil % IS.
16 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Fhilosophy?\\7t.
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meaning. He concludes that the state is a poor substitute for the unifying 
effect of the belief in God. The community of like-minded individuals is 
capable of more positive action, but is ultimately flawed as it will 
degenerate into a type of herd mentality.
It is this total loss of order and meaning that sets the stage for 
Nietzsche's positive theory. Nietzsche does not mourn the loss of meaning; 
it was never really there to begin with. The nausea of the eternal return is 
not only contempt for the return of the commonplace and the mediocre; it 
represents something much more important Indeed, nausea, not the eternal 
return, may well be the central metaphor in Zarathustra. It represents the 
abject horror created by the realization that there is ultimately no meaning 
to be found in the universe as a whole. The heavens are silent, and human 
society seeks to quell the questioning spirit
The horror caused by this realization nearly destroys Zarathustra. 
However, it is necessary for Zarathustra to stare into the void and 
appreciate die full horror of the absurd universe before his task can begin in 
earnest Zarathustra is a harsh document; it peels away the layers of belief 
that we have constructed over the course of human history to reveal the 
only true arche. nothingness. It is only when Zarathustra embraces the void 
that he can go on living. Thus, the concept of eternal return is not important 
perse, it is rather the effect that it produces, existential nausea, which is
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important Eternal return teaches the individual that there is no higher 
good, no ultimate meaning. The universe is absurd and will remain so.
The horror of existence ultimately destroys die static view of the self; 
including the solace that comes from the belief in order, divine or human, 
which allows people to live their lives in the ordinary world without 
complaint The confrontation with finitude destroys the ability to live as 
before and continued existence can only come with the price of great 
internal suffering in the face of an absurd universe. Ultimately, the 
individual life can have great meaning, but only within that individual self. 
Once we abandon hope for another world, and reliance upon others, it is 
possible to create ourselves in our own image. This is the ultimate political 
meaning of Zarathustra. It condemns the individual to an uncertain 
existence, consciously free from the systems and institutions of solace that 
have built up in society to shield the individual from these harsh truths. As 
Ldwith argues, "as an at-tempter, Nietzsche-Zarathustra is always in transit; 
a 'wanderer' who attempts, and walks along, different paths in order to 
come to the truth."17 This "truth" is the radical isolation of the individual in 
the face of a meaningless universe. It is a condemnation of a type, but 
Nietzsche argues that it opens up an entirely new space of personal 
existence, an undiscovered country.
17 Karl Ldwith, Nietzsche's Philosophy o f the EtemaJ Recurrence o f the Same, 1Z
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Although Nietzsche couches Zarathustra's arguments in prophetic
language and metaphor, Zarathustra is far from being a conventional
prophet Importantly, Zarathustra urges those who have listened to his
message to abandon him and mistrust his message. "I now go away alone,
my disciples! You too now go away and be alone! So I will have it  Truly, I
advise you: go away from me and guard yourselves against Zarathustra!
And better still: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he has deceived you."18
As argued earlier, this admonishment is meant as much to protect
Zarathustra from contamination as to preserve his disciples. However, the
figure of Zarathustra offers another object of resistance that can spur
personal growth in those who listen:
The man of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies but 
also to hate his friends. One repays a teacher badly if one remains 
only a pupil. And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels? 
You respect me; but how if one day your respect should tumble?
Take care that a falling statue does not strike you dead!19
Zarathustra's failure to teach others is not a failure of his educational
method or because of his lack of desire: die subject simply cannot be
communicated, much less taught It is the mistake of the modem age, and
of ourselves, to assume otherwise. How can someone learn self-overcoming
18 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:22.3.
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:223. Jung quoted this passage to Freud when he decided to 
transcend his theories with that of symbolic analysis.
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without first having self-knowledge? It is this frustration that is the origin
of Nietzsche's genealogical analyses, and is exhibited prominently in
Zarathustra. This is why Zarathustra constantly laments that "they do not
understand me: I am not the mouth for these ears."20 It is impossible to
expect individuals who have not yet experienced the horrors of nausea to
recognize the profound symbols in Zarathustra's teaching for what they are:
calls to transmutation. The idea of transmutation cannot occur to such a
mind; it hardly warrants consideration. "You had not yet sought yourselves
when you found me Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and
only when you have all denied me will I return to you."21
Nevertheless, Zarathustra continues throughout the narrative to refer
to himself as a prophet "I spoke my teaching, I broke upon my teaching:
thus my eternal fate will have it—as prophet do I perish!"22 Nietzsche
intentionally casts Zarathustra as a prophet rather than a teacher. A prophet
can speak in symbolic language; it is natural for the role. Furthermore, the
prophet communicates knowledge that is gained in an unconventional
manner, in this instance through personal insight Jaspers argues:
What is Nietzsche's real intention in this conflict between prophetic 
proclamation and rejection of blind followers, between pedagogue 
and iconoclast and in all the interplay of statements that cancel each
20 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:223.
22 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:132.
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other out while they yet strike at the heart of tilings? What will 
replace the religious founder for him and what does he wish to be for 
others?23
To answer Jaspers, Zarathustra does not wish to be anything for
others. This is precisely the goal of Zarathustra's rejection of his followers.
If anything, Zarathustra is prophesying to himself, uttering a riddle of what
he might become. "Zarathustra the prophet, Zarathustra the laughing
prophet. . .  I myself have set this crown on my head!"24 Zarathustra serves
as an impetus to the individual, but not as a guide. The harsh critiques of
social existence advanced by Nietzsche can offer an impetus to the
individual, but they cannot take the place of the experiences themselves.
The individual must be ready to receive the prophesy in order for the
transmutation to make sense.
The figs are falling from the trees, they are fine and sweet; and as 
they fall their red skins split I am a north wind to ripe figs. Thus, 
like figs, do these teachings fall to you, my friends: now drink their 
juice and eat their sweet flesh! It is autumn all around and clear sky 
and afternoon. Behold what abundance is around us! And it is fine 
to gaze out upon distant seas from the midst of superfluity. Once 
you said "God" when you gazed upon distant seas; but now I have 
taught you to say " Obermensch’ P
In actuality, Zarathustra's role is unclear, even to himself. It is 
impossible to characterize him as either a traditional prophet or teacher.
23 Jaspers, Nietzsche.
24 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.18.
25 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, C:2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
276
Zarathustra is as much the subject of his prophesy as its conveyor, in
keeping with the conclusion that die narrative of Zarathustra is essentially a
vehicle for the communication of internal experiences:
A seer, a wilier, a creator, a future itself and a bridge to the future— 
and alas, also like a cripple upon this bridge: Zarathustra is all this. 
And even you have often asked yourselves: Who is Zarathustra to 
us? What shall we call him? And, like me, you answer your own
questions with questions I walk among men as fragments of the
future: of that future which I scan. And it is all my art and aim, to 
compose into one and bring together what is fragment and riddle and 
dreadful chance.26
Indeed, the most profound assertions Zarathustra makes arise horn 
his inner experience, as revealed through his continuing reinterpretation. 
"My past broke open its graves, many a pain buried alive awoke: they had 
only been sleeping, concealed in winding sheets."27 By releasing this 
repressed knowledge and reinterpreting the will-to-power, the individual 
brings forth his own prophetic imagination. "Truly, my happiness and my 
freedom come like a storm.. .  yes, you too, my friends, will be terrified by 
my wild wisdom; and perhaps you will flee from it together with my 
enemies."28 Zarathustra's prophesy is therefore one of self-revelation.
26 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:20.
27 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:3.
a  Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:1.
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Because of the essentially subjective nature of this endeavor,
Nietzsche warns of the tendency to create ideal types based upon one's self,
most prominently in The Twilight o f the Idols,
Let us finally consider how naive it is altogether to say: "Man ought 
to be such and such!" Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of 
types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms—and 
some wretched loafer of a moralist comments: "No! Man ought to be 
different!" He even knows what man should be like, this wretched 
bigot and prig: he paints himself on the wall and comments, "Ecee 
HomoZ'29
In Zarathustra, Nietzsche asserts that there is no ideal type of the
transmuted self; the symbol of the Obermensch is intentionally undefined.
Even the process of self-overcoming is different for each individual, much
more so the outcome of this journey. As McGowan notes:
In the chaotic world of atomistic impulses, precepts, and experiences, 
all explanatory schemes must fail because random chaos is the only 
reality, and all freedom must be impossible because there can be no
agent who directs or chooses die movements of will As a result
like Nietzsche, postmodern theory often finds itself in die position of 
affirming (and desiring) something that it also declares impossible to 
attain.30
Nietzsche emphasizes that since self-overcoming is never complete, it 
makes no sense to articulate a goal that can never be attained, setting up 
another signifier for bad conscience. "There has never yet been an 
Obermensch. I have seen them both naked, the greatest and die smallest 
man. They are still all-too-similar to one another. Truly, I found even the
29 Nietzsche, Twilight o f the Idols, 5:6.
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greatest man—all-too-human!"31 The individual who is ready to receive 
Zarathustra's prophesy does not need such a concrete expression of the 
transmutation, it will intuitively make sense. "One has to speak with 
thunder and heavenly fireworks to feeble and dormant senses. But the voice 
of beauty speaks softly: it steals into only die most awakened souls."32
m.
Nietzsche is not able, or does not desire, to overcome the political 
problems that plague modem existence. Essentially, the political argument 
in Zarathustra dismisses all forms of collective life as lost, a waste of time if 
not a danger for the individual. Nietzsche's positive thought while it does 
not seek to destroy collective existence, relegates its role to that of producing 
the misery necessary to spur individuals toward nausea. However, 
Nietzsche also makes it absolutely clear that only a few will be able to 
overcome societal pressures and begin the process of self-creation. As such, 
Nietzsche's positive thought leaves political theorists at something of a loss.
Nietzsche does not deal with important political issues such as order 
and justice. Indeed, he dismisses both of these as societal myths that have 
evolved to perpetuate the status qua Nietzsche's reticence on these topics is 
therefore somewhat understandable. He does not speak to die nature of
30 McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics, 88.
31 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:4.
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL5.
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justice because his theory of interpretation denies stable meanings, and 
because he does not wish to set up the basis for new dogmas. However, this 
does not solve the serious problems involved in social action. Nietzsche 
essentially refuses to speak to practical politics, and therefore does not give 
any guidance for how people should live together within the Lebenswelt. 
Nietzsche's silence is his prerogative, but it has contributed to his 
marginalization within political theory.
Nietzsche's political analysis in Zarathustra, inasmuch as it is 
transsocial, denigrates the social realm in a manner that could be construed 
as dangerous. If the social is not valued, indeed viewed with contempt, 
there is no incentive to insure that those who are not capable of self­
overcoming are protected. Although Nietzsche does not argue that the 
masses should be manipulated, he does not provide any guidance for how 
the exceptional individual should interact with others. However, 
Nietzsche's imperative to separate from others to avoid contamination, 
which ultimately led Zarathustra to seek solitude again, certainly supports 
the assertion that Nietzsche did not have a social role in mind for die 
individual.
Zarathustra therefore sets the stage for individual creation of a new 
political milieu. Nietzsche informs us that die this project needs to be 
undertaken, but not does not elaborate how. This is frustrating and
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dangerous, but certainly consistent with Nietzsche's philosophy and with
postmodern thought in general.
Nietzsche's legacy to postmodernist theory, then, is his deeply 
ambiguous atomism, which embodies a radical desire for freedom 
(understood negatively) and provides a powerfully skeptical 
ontology in his battle against the truth value of human 
representational schemes, discourses of knowledge, and moral 
systems. 33
For Nietzsche, the blind alleys along the way to self-overcoming are
as important as the successes. Indeed, those who walk a direct path are
probably not obeying their inner directives. "All good things approach their
goal crookedly His step betrays whether a man is stepping along his
own path: so watch me walk! But he who approaches his goal, dances.."34
Nietzsche's Zarathustra resembles Tiresias the blind soothsayer. He
possesses knowledge, but does not dare elaborate it to those who are not
ready. Such disclosure would surely destroy both the speaker and the
hearer. For Nietzsche, reticence is a virtue; it is the hallmark of truth. The
speaker immediately sets himself up as an external signifier, the potential
oppressor of those who hear. Further, the speaker assumes a measure of
responsibility for those who listen:
Something said to me voicelessly. "You know, Zarathustra, but you 
do not speak!" And I answered at last defiantly: "Yes, I know, but I 
will not speak!" Then again something said to me voicelessly: "You 
will not Zarathustra? Is this true? Do not hide yourself in your
33 McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics, 87.
34 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.17.
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defiance!" And I wept and trembled like a child and said: "Alas, I 
want to, but how can I? Release this from me alone! It is beyond my 
strength!"35
In this sense, Zarathustra is a riddle. Its ultimate meaning can only
be grasped through interpretation and personal insight Because of this, it is
Nietzsche's reluctance to be specific that gives his philosophy such power.
"Be like a wind when it rushes forth from its mountain caves: it will dance
to its own pipe, the seas tremble and leap under its footsteps."36
Concretization and the hubris this implies is Zarathustra's greatest enemy,
threatening to destroy what he has created:
Where I found again my old devil and arch-enemy, the Spirit of 
Gravity, and all that he created: compulsion, dogma, need and 
consequence and purpose and will and good and evil: For must there 
not exist that which is danced upon, danced across?37
Not all of the socially-created elements can be overcome. Even if they
could, the self in constant flux and one therefore never know himself
completely. No matter how much we resist, it is inescapable that humans
are innately social; we are created through interactions with others and
cannot live on our own for a number of years. The project outlined in
Zarathustra therefore is incapable of completion; it is a continuing project
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:22. This is the stillest hour. It highlights that Zarathustra 
contains this knowledge all along but does not want to confront the truth. Zarathustra is 
spoken to by "something"—it is his subconscious.
36 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:132).
37 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:122.
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without a definite outcome. This is not a flaw—it is the intentional
outgrowth of Nietzsche's epistemology. The tension with the social realm
serves as a constant impetus to resistance and therefore creation. "The air
thin and pure, danger near, and the spirit full of a joyful mischief: these
things suit one another."38 This also precludes concretization into a
teleological schematization. Nietzsche's project seeks to provide an
alternative to continual emergence in collective identity. The transmuted
self can see the social realm and the Ultimate Man for what they are, and
this contempt will serve to prevent backsliding into the morass of collective
mediocrity, even if the social can never be completely overcome:
What is the ape to men? A laughing-stock or a painful 
embarrassment In the same way will man be to the Obermensch a 
laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment You have made your 
way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you 
were apes, and even now man is more of an ape than any ape. But he 
who is wisest among you, he also is only a discord and a hybrid of 
plant and of ghost39
Nietzsche's analysis implies that resistance is a natural expression of 
the will-to-power. However, modem society causes the individual to 
internalize this innate conflict which is then expressed in bad conscience 
and self-hatred. Nietzsche argues that it is necessary to add a level of 
intentionality to resistance. This is not to say that there must be a goal to 
resistance, only that the individual must resist For Nietzsche, resistance is
38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
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not a moral statement, "the good and the just call me the destroyer of 
morals: my story is immoral."40 Resistance is however an ethical statement, 
albeit within the sphere of individual aesthetic ethics. In this sense, 
continual resistance is consistent with die need for perpetual self- 
overcoming. Resistance should be welcomed and encouraged; it is the 
hallmark of transmutation. "You tell me: 'Life is hard to bear/ But if it were 
otherwise why should you have your pride in die morning and your 
resignation in the evening?"41 Nietzsche's philosophical and political 
thought is therefore based upon the continual opposition between 
competing perspectives, both within and external to the self. "Whatever I 
create and however much I love it—soon I have to oppose it and my love: 
thus will my will have it"42 The imperative of the will-to-power is therefore 
constant flux and continual tension. It makes no sense to speak of stable 
political structures or fixed identities; these are oxymoronic.
39 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
40 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:19.
41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7. "The modem hero, the modem individual who dares to heed 
the call and seek the mansion of that presence with whom it is our whole destiny to be 
atoned, cannot, indeed must not, wait for his community to cast off its slough of pride, fear, 
rationalized avarice, and sanctified misunderstanding. 'Live/ Nietzsche says, 'as though 
the day were here/ It is not society that is to guide and save the creative hero, but precisely 
the reverse. And so every one of us shares the supreme ordeal—carries the cross of the 
redeemer—not in the bright moments of his tribe's great victories, but in the silences of his 
personal despair." Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1949), 391.
42 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL12.
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Nietzsche recognizes that the model of selfhood he proposes is 
inimical to politics. By its very nature, the simple fact of living with others 
necessarily involves the creation of a superstructure of debts, obligations, 
and responsibilities. Besides becoming the basis of bad conscience, these 
responsibilities limit the possibilities for self-creation necessary for 
transmutation. "Great obligations do not make a man grateful, they make 
him resentful; and if a small kindness is not forgotten it becomes a gnawing 
worm."43 All individuals seek to express the will-to-power, but this 
expression is inevitably frustrated by the limiting factors imposed by 
collective existence. Because of this, collective existence in any form is 
inimical to the fundamental nature of humanity: "Where I found a living 
creature, there I found will-to-power; and even in the will of the servant I 
found the will to be master."44 Because of this, Nietzsche refuses to 
entertain the notion of a reformed political theory of either the state or the 
community. Nietzsche's silence on this matter speaks volumes.
The implication of the interpretation advanced in this dissertation is 
that Nietzsche's model of transmuted selfhood precludes all models of 
collective action. Although Nietzsche offers hints that some types of 
collective existence might be acceptable, like die Greeks or friendship, these 
are never articulated as a concrete alternative. Furthermore, it is telling that
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, U:3.
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Nietzsche never discusses, in any of his works, educating children. His 
positive theory seems wholly devoted to the improvement of die already 
mature individual. As such, Nietzsche's philosophy is one of redemption, 
not utopianism. Nietzsche abandons die impulse inherent in political 
theory to articulate a new political system to foster his goals. Rather, it is the 
responsibility of the individual to recognize the pathological character of 
modem society and attempt existential escape.
Zarathustra can therefore be read as a modem philosophical tragedy. 
We know the problems of individual and collective existence, but can never 
complete the process of transmutation or redeem social existence. We can 
see the meaninglessness of existence as revealed in the void, but can never 
fully overcome it or even seek consolation. Human knowledge is uncertain, 
and given the symbolic deficiency of language, the most important insights 
concerning reality cannot be communicated. As Nietzsche states: " The 
world is deep*."*5 Interpretation can never cease; life is constant uncertainty 
in the face of an absurd universe that can communicate no solace.
Humanity is in a sense cursed; it alone is capable of nausea but can never 
alleviate it  This is why individual existence is so precarious and prone to 
self-deception. "Uncanny is human existence and still without meaning: a
** Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:195.
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buffoon can destroy it"46 If the individual is to survive as an individual, it 
is necessary to become light in the face of the void, and to dance over its 
precipice:
And me too, who love life, it seems that butterflies and soap bubbles, 
and whatever is like them among men, know the most about 
happiness. To see these light; foolish, dainty, affecting little souls 
flutter about— that moves Zarathustra to tears and song. I could only 
believe in a God who knew how to dance.47
This is the meaning behind Nietzsche's often misunderstood 
imperative: "many die too late and some die too early. Still the doctrine 
sounds strange: 'Die at the right time.'"48 Through the realization of 
personal finitude, the individual is able to project himself against a concrete 
endpoint, and thereby reinterpret his existence accordingly. Only then is it 
possible to create a meaning for oneself in the face of the abyss of 
meaninglessness.
What, then, does this interpretation of Zarathustra offer? Certainly 
not a political theory, but a political project continual resistance and self­
creation. Whenever and wherever the individual encounters seemingly 
stable institutions and value judgements, they must be confronted and 
resisted. "Good and evil, and rich and poor, and noble and mean, and all 
the names of the virtues: they should be weapons and ringing symbols that
46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §7.
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
48 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
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life must overcome itself again and again!"49 Nietzsche argues that eternal 
self-overcoming is the secret of life. "And life itself told me this secret 
'Behold, it said, 'I am that which m ust overcome itself again and again."’50 
This is a process of continual self-overcoming, not a teleological exercise. 
This eternal flux is inimical to social existence of any type, which requires 
stability. As Jaspers concludes, "instead of developing an unambiguous 
political theory, Nietzsche's thinking reveals the abyss of existence and the 
ambiguity of all reality."51
Zarathustra can be read as offering hope in the face of increasingly 
collectivized existence. In this sense, Zarathustra is indeed a subversive 
document It denies the validity and efficacy of politics, and calls for 
resistance to social norms and even to the idea of society. It further calls for 
individuals to confront inner truths that are profoundly disturbing, not only 
to personal mental health but to societal harmony. Is Zarathustra then the 
harbinger of nihilism and anarchy? Nietzsche's critique of society and new 
model of selfhood does not necessarily call for the destruction of society or 
complete alienation from others. Rattier, Nietzsche calls for psychological 
liberation from metaphysical systems of consolation and existential
49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
51 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 277.
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alienation. As Ldwith states, "in the horizon of Nietzsche's 'atheism/ which 
recognizes for the first time that the'death o f God means for man'freedom 
towards death/  Hegel and Feuerbach draw together as 'church fathers/ 
'half-priests/ and 'veil-makers'."52 Similarly, the "death of the state" opens 
up a new space for personal existence free from ideology and nationalism. 
Jaspers states:
Creation without transcendence, or self-being without God, must 
lead to two conclusions that Nietzsche actually draws. When human 
finiteness ceases to be evident as finiteness because it is no longer 
enclosed by any infinity, i.e., when creative freedom faces 
nothingness instead of transcendence (for that which has nothing 
outside itself is everything, with die result that finiteness cannot be 
taken seriously), then either (1) creation is absolutized as a temporal 
actuality to which no valid standard applies, or (2) it is deified. 
Neither of these related to transcendence; each is, instead, a way in 
which confidence becomes evident at the boundary which is no 
longer a boundary but a fulfillment53
Zarathustra can be read as a calling to a way of life that is cognizant 
of the dangers of society and confident of individual self-worth. The 
transmuted individual is unwilling to compromise personal growth for 
safety or convenience. This is perhaps the ultimate individual expression of 
the will-to-power, the will-to-self. It is paradoxical that one must be called 
back to an awareness of the self, an awareness that should be die most 
fundamental. As Klossowski argues, "on die one hand, forgetfulness and 
unconsciousness axe necessary to life; on the other hand, there is a 'will to
52 Ldwith, N ietzsche's Philosophy o f the Eternal Recurrence o f the Same, 38-39.
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unconsciousness' which, precisely because it is willed, implies the 
consciousness of our conditioned state: an iiresoluble antimony."54 
Nietzsche does not provide the resolution to this tension; perhaps it cannot 
be resolved.
Nietzsche is therefore not the prophet of nihilism; he also does not 
call for anarchy. He rather calls us to confront the uncomfortable truth that 
the universe is meaningless, the universe is silent, the myths with which we 
surround ourselves are unhealthy and insure mediocrity. As painful as it is, 
we must embrace the void and realize our own personal nausea. When we 
do this, it becomes evident that the only alternative is to create ourselves in 
our own image. "To be sure, I am a forest and a night of dark trees: but he 
who is not afraid of my darkness will find rosebushes too underneath my 
cypresses."55 There is, however, little guidance available and no assurance 
of success.
53 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 160.
54 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 54.
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL10.
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A ppendix
A Response to  Heidegger's Question: "W h o  is N ietzsche' s
Zarathustra?"
Both Nietzsche and Heidegger have received a great deal of attention 
in contemporary scholarship. Indeed, it has widely been recognized that 
these two philosophers have made some of the greatest contributions to 
"postmodern" philosophy and political thought However, despite the 
voluminous amount of research and exhaustive interpretation of both of 
these thinkers, there is a surprising lack of unanimity regarding the content 
of their central philosophical tenets, much less the implications of their 
thought for philosophy as a whole. The philosophies of both Nietzsche and 
Heidegger remain heuristic nightmares, full of mutability and outright self- 
contradiction.
Complicating this interpretive endeavor is the fact that Heidegger 
was greatly influenced by Nietzsche; indeed a thoroughgoing examination 
of Nietzsche is central to Heidegger's philosophical-ontological project The 
culmination of this ongoing dialogue is Heidegger's voluminous four- 
volume treatise on Nietzsche, which has arguably become the most 
influential interpretation of Nietzsche's thought coloring many later 
interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy.
However, Heidegger's analysis is open to criticism along many 
angles, from charges of outright misinterpretation to his reliance on the
299
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
300
highly problematic Nachlass fragments. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to examine Heidegger's entire interpretation of Nietzsche, especially 
considering these potentially serious problems with the text Fortunately, 
Heidegger produced a compact essay on Nietzsche's self-proclaimed 
masterpiece, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Heidegger's essay, "Who is 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" contains the essential philosophical points 
Heidegger concludes from his Nietzsche project and therefore serves as a 
microcosm of Heidegger's ruminations on Nietzsche. This essay will 
therefore examine Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's magnum opus 
to demonstrate the fundamental problems with Heidegger's reading of 
Nietzsche.
L
With characteristic understatement, Heidegger begins his essay by 
stating: "the question, it would seem, can be easily answered."1 However, 
Heidegger demonstrates that the interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is 
anything but easy. The narrative format of Zarathustra is a drastic 
departure from conventional philosophical texts, and the use of symbol and 
metaphor can lead to intense confusion and multiple interpretations. 
Although Heidegger does not separate his essay into sections, it is possible
1 Martin Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" in N ietzsche U: The Eternal 
Recurrence o f the Same, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Frandsco: Harper and Row, 1984), 
211. All references are to this edition. This essay is also included in The New Nietzsche, ed. 
David B. Allison, trans. Bemd Magnus (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985).
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to identify several heuristic stages Heidegger progresses through to reach 
his ultimate conclusion: Nietzsche's thought as expressed in Zarathustra 
represents the ultimate expression of metaphysical thinking.2
First, Heidegger grapples with what the actual figure of Zarathustra 
is supposed to represent Zarathustra goes down from his mountain to 
teach the wisdom he has accumulated in solitude. He is therefore according 
to Heidegger an advocate, ein Fiirsprecher? Heidegger argues that the 
advocate does not only proclaim knowledge, he "interprets and explains 
what he is talking about and what he is advocating/'4 Thus, Nietzsche's 
character of Zarathustra must do more than simply present "truth," he must 
integrate it into an interpretation of the fundamental order of the universe. 
Heidegger identifies this fundamental order as the will-to-power.
It is therefore Heidegger's contention that Nietzsche's philosophy is 
centered around the exploration of different manifestations of this unitary 
concept: the will-to-power. "Zarathustra speaks on behalf of life, suffering, 
and the circle, and that is what he speaks forth. These three, 'life, suffering, 
circle,' belong together and are the selfsame."5 Indeed, for Heidegger the
2 As Heidegger argues: "every great thinker always thinks one jump more originally than 
he directly speaks. Our interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid by him." 
Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche 1: The W ill to Power as A rt trans. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper, 1979),134.
3 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 211.
4 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 212.
5 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 212.
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entirety of Nietzsche's Zarathustra is devoted to an examination of the
different permutations of the will-to-power, as expressed in conflict and
recurrence. In this sense, Zarathustra is expressing a philosophy of
perpetual flux, yet rooted in the actions of the will:
Accordingly, Zarathustra introduces himself as an advocate of the 
proposition that all being is will to power, a will that suffers in its 
creating and colliding, and that wills itself precisely in this way in 
eternal recurrence of the same. With the above assertion we have 
brought the essence of Zarathustra to definition. . . 6
The "essence" of Zarathustra is therefore this advocacy of the will-to-
power as the fundamental essence of the universe. The two most familiar
elements of Zarathustra's teaching are the Obermensch (overman) and the
eternal recurrence of the same, both therefore manifestations of the will-to-
power.7 Heidegger examines what each of these doctrines represent, but is
more concerned with the relationship between the two. As Heidegger
argues: "to all appearances, he teaches two things: the eternal return of the
same and the overman. However, it is not immediately apparent whether
and in what way the things he teaches belong together."8
Indeed, these two concepts are problematic in themselves; the
connection between the two is even less forthcoming. Heidegger asserts:
6 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 213.
7 It is best to leave the term Obermensch untranslated, but since Krell renders it as 
"overman" I have left it as such in citations from his translation of Heidegger.
8 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 213.
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"yet even if the connection were to be clarified it would remain questionable 
whether we are hearing the advocate, whether we are learning from the
teacher We must pay attention to the way he says it, on what occasions,
and with what intent"9 Thus, for Heidegger the manner in which 
Zarathustra becomes aware of his destiny is as important as Zarathustra's 
ultimate teachings.
Heidegger then moves to examining how Zarathustra becomes aware 
of his destiny to advocate these concepts of the Obermensch and the eternal 
recurrence. Heidegger focuses on a section in the third part of Zarathustra 
entitled "The Convalescent" (Der Genesende). Zarathustra has become 
comatose after his experience of the great nausea and the occurrence of his 
"most abysmal thought"10 Heidegger argues that "'The Convalescent is 
one who is getting ready to turn homeward, that is to toward what defines 
him. The convalescent is under way to himself, so that he can say of himself 
who he is."11
Thus, it is in this passive mode of convalescence that Zarathustra is 
ready to learn of his destiny, what he must ultimately advocate. However, 
Heidegger notes that Zarathustra does not learn of this destiny from within
9 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 213.
10 Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, 111:13.
11 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 212.
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himself. Rather, it is revealed to him. "Zarathustra does not utter the 
decisive phrase 'You are the teacher of the eternal return!' by himself to 
himself. His animals tell him this."12 Indeed, "the animals seek to learn 
Zarathustra's essence. He asks himself whether he is still—that is, whether 
he is already—the one who he properly is."13 However, Heidegger has 
already identified Zarathustra's essence as that of the advocate of the will- 
to-power in its various forms. Therefore, Zarathustra must come to realize 
this himself and act accordingly.
"The animals say: 'For your animals know well, O Zarathustra, who 
you are and must become: behold, you are the teacher o f the eternal 
return—that is now your destiny!' Thus it comes to light Zarathustra must 
first become who he is."14 Zarathustra becomes this teacher through the 
explication of the will-to-power as expressed in the concept of the 
Obermensch and ultimately the eternal recurrence. Because of the 
problematic nature of these concepts, it is necessary to analyze both of these 
in detail to discern the connection between the two.
12 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 213. In Nietzsche II, Heidegger discusses
the symbolism of the animals in great detail:"___Zarathustra's two animals, eagle and
serpent, symbolize: first, in their circling and coiling—the a id e  and ring of eternal return; 
second—in their essential character as pride and discernment, respectively, these 
constituting the basic stance of the teacher of the eternal return and his mode of knowledge; 
third, as the animals of his loneliness, being supreme exactions on Zarathustra himself." 
Heidegger, N ietzsche H 48.
13 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 214.
14 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 214. Heidegger quotes from "The 
Convalescent".
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First, however, it is necessary to comment upon Heidegger's analysis 
thus far. Heidegger's characterization of Zarathustra's task is problematic. 
Heidegger casts Zarathustra as primarily an advocate of a specific 
worldview, the primacy of the will-to-power. This characterization 
overlooks Zarathustra's self-proclaimed task, self-overcoming, and to urge 
action toward this ultimate goal. "Mankind is something that must be 
overcome. What have you done to overcome him?"15
This task of self-overcoming is more concrete and experiential than 
Heidegger assumes. Indeed, much of the Zarathustra narrative is devoted 
to the task of overcoming various facets of modem humanity. These include 
the repression inherent in mass society, the problems of friendship, and 
finally the confrontation with personal finitude and the tangential nature of 
the self.
The task of self-overcoming necessarily involves the concept of the 
eternal return, but it is not limited to or even epitomized in the eternal 
recurrence, as Heidegger seems to argue. Indeed, Heidegger conflates the 
concept of the will-to-power, self-overcoming, and the idea of die 
Obermensch in his insistence that Zarathustra's destiny is the teacher of the 
eternal recurrence. Each of these concepts are distinct elements in the
is Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
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project of self-creation but are treated separately by Nietzsche. The relation 
between these elements will be specifically discussed later in this paper.
Heidegger's insistence that Zarathustra only learns of his destiny as 
the teacher of the eternal recurrence in the passive mode of convalescence is 
even more problematic. Rather, Zarathustra learns only of his destiny 
through concrete interaction in the world and eventually through self­
contemplation; specifically not through a passive reception of knowledge. 
Indeed, Zarathustra acknowledges this task as supremely difficult:
Alas, I have to climb my most difficult path! Alas, I have started 
upon my loneliest wandering! But a man of my sort does not avoid 
such an hour the hour that says to him: "Only now so you tread 
your path of greatness!" Summit and abyss—they are now united in
one!"16
The convalescence is actually brought about through Zarathustra's
realization of die meaninglessness of existence, as symbolized in the great
nausea. The period of Zarathustra's convalescence is therefore his recovery
from his confrontation with this horror
"Ah! You are coming—I hear you! My abyss speaks, I have turned 
my ultimate depth into the light! Ah! Come here! Give me your 
hand . . .  nausea, nausea, nausea—woe is me!" Hardly had 
Zarathustra spoken these words, however, when he fell down like a 
dead man and remained like a dead man for a long time.17
16 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1.
17 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:13.1-2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
307
Indeed, Zarathustra's worst horror arises from his realization that the
imperative of the eternal return renders him, exceptional though he may be,
as ontologically equal to the most crude specimen of humanity.
I had seen them both naked, the greatest man and the smallest man: 
all too similar to one another, even the greatest all too human! The 
greatest too small!—that was my disgust at man! And eternal 
recurrence even for the smallest! That was my disgust at all 
existence! Alas! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea!18
Zarathustra is only able to overcome this nausea by separating
himself from others, and creating himself as worthy of recurrence.
How did I free myself from nausea? Who rejuvenated my eyes?
How did I fly to the height where die rabble no longer sit at the well? 
Did my nausea itself create wings and water-divining powers for me? 
Truly, I had to fly to the most extreme height to find again the 
fountain of delight!19
Is it therefore accurate to characterize Zarathustra as an "advocate" 
or a "teacher"? All his attempts at communicating his knowledge ultimately 
fail. He abandons his students when he realizes that they are only forming 
new power relationships and making him an object of bad conscience.20 
Indeed, Zarathustra abandons completely the possibility of teaching anyone
18 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, HI:13.2. Hollingdale renders this as "disgust"
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:6.
20 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:22. "But that night he went away alone and forsook his 
friends." This is the end of Part II, and of Zarathustra's dealings with others. He must 
return to his solitude, and his internal conversation, in order to fully comprehend the 
enormity of his repressed knowledge of the void.
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his fundamental concepts, including the eternal recurrence, much less the 
project of self-overcoming:
I need pure, smooth mirrors for my teaching; upon your surface even 
my own reflection is distorted. Many a burden, many a memory 
weighs down your shoulders; many an evil dwarf crouches in your 
comers. And there is hidden mob in you, too. And although you are 
of a higher type, much in you is crooked and malformed. There is no 
smith in the world who could hammer you straight and into shape 
for me.21
Zarathustra rather recognizes his project of self-overcoming as an
essentially solipsistic enterprise, incommunicable and indefinable. He
recognizes his attempts at teaching to have been a waste of time, detracting
from his most pressing task. It is only when he returns to his solitude that
he can begin the project of self-creation in earnest:
It is returning, at last it is coming home to me—my own Self and 
those parts of it that have long been abroad and scattered among all 
things and accidents. And I know one thing more: I stand now 
before my last summit and before the deed that has been deferred the 
longest22
Rather than being an advocate for the eternal recurrence, Zarathustra 
is an advocate of the self-contemplation in a foundationless context He 
does not as much advocate the will-to-power and the eternal recurrence as 
recognize their utility in his project Zarathustra defines himself primarily 
as the conqueror of the great nausea, preparing a way for the creation of his
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:11.
22 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, HI:1. Zarathustra has returned to solitude, and can then recover 
his self and begin the new quest
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own self: "This is the man without nausea, this is Zarathustra himself, the 
overcomer of the great nausea"23
IL
Heidegger analyses in detail the enigmatic concept of the
Obermensch. Heidegger must argue that there is an "essence" of man to be
found in Nietzsche's thought to sustain his contention that Nietzsche's
philosophy is metaphysical. Heidegger argues that Nietzsche identifies the
essence of contemporary humanity as incapable of correctly relating to
"Being," i.e. the will-to-power. Indeed, humanity in its present form is
radically estranged from its own essence—a type of ontological
inauthenticity similar to Heidegger's analysis in Sein u ndZ eit Heidegger
asserts that the Obermensch is more than a new expression of the heroic
personality or even an existential attitude, it is a new permutation of
ontological relation:
With the name overman Nietzsche is by no means designating a 
merely superdimensional human being of the kind that has prevailed 
hitherto. Nor is he referring to a species of man that will cast off all 
that is humane, making naked willfulness its law and titanic rage its 
rule.24
Heidegger asserts that Nietzsche realizes that humanity is no longer 
in proper relation to the "being of Beings", again understood as the will-to- 
power. This ontological estrangement is the cause of modem Dekadenz.
23 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:8.
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The Obermensch is therefore the reawakening of the innate constitution of
human ontology, which has become repressed (forgotten) through centuries
of doctrinal and philosophical error
. . .  the overman—taking the word quite literally—is that human 
being that goes beyond prior humanity solely in order to conduct 
such humanity for the first time to its essence, an essence that is still 
unattained, and to place humanity firm ly within that essence.25
For Heidegger, Nietzsche understands this ontological problem as a
value judgement "The question asks: Is man, in his essence as man
heretofore, prepared to assume dominion over the earth?"26 Nietzsche of
course answers in the negative. The question, then, is how to rectify this
ontological alienation. The answer, and the problem, is to be found in
transcendence. Heidegger asks of Nietzsche:
Must not prior man be conducted beyond himself, over his prior self, 
in order to meet this challenge? If so, the 'over-man/ correctly 
thought cannot be the product of an unbridled and degenerate 
fantasy that is plunging headlong into the world.27
In other words, there must therefore be a method to the madness.
The ontological substrate, the will-to-power, is indefinite and indefinable. If
there is to be a relation between the essence of humanity and pure existence
as such( Being), then it must proceed, Le. be revealed, from existence itself.
24 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215.
25 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215. Italics mine.
26 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215.
27 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215-216.
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Man's existence is already compromised by a faulty relation to its own 
being; it cannot expect to proceed towards an authentic relation to Being, the 
will-to-power.
Heidegger thus asserts that Nietzsche expects Being to reveal itself to
the individual as the will-to-power. If Heidegger is correct, then Nietzsche
is indeed a metaphysician. Transcendent reality, even in the guise of the
indefinable will-to-power, is a component of metaphysical things. One
cannot have metaphysics without the "meta'—the transcendent Indeed, the
use of symbols to identify the indefinable is perhaps even more than
metaphysical, it smacks of theology. Heidegger implies that Nietzsche's
Zarathustra is a messianic figure, showing the way for ontological salvation:
The overman proceeds beyond prior and contemporary humanity; 
thus he is a transition, a bridge. In order for us learners to be able to 
follow the teacher who teaches the overman, we must—keeping now 
to the imagery—get onto the bridge. We are thinking the crucial 
aspects of the transition when we heed these three dungs: First, that 
from which the one who is in transition departs. Second, the 
transition itself. Third, that toward which the one in transition is 
heading.28
Heidegger asserts that the one who is in transition is the inauthentic 
self, the estranged individual. The transition is the revealing of Being. The 
one in transition is therefore heading towards an authentic relation to the 
Being of beings. The aim of this transition, in Nietzsche's terms, is
28 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 217.
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existential justification. Only the ontologically authentic individual is 
justified in assuming dominion over world (existence).29 This is no mere 
call for dominance of others or material reality, it is a call to ontological 
integration. Zarathustra is therefore the advocate for the possibility of 
authentic relation to Being. "Whither the one in transition goes, there his 
longing is at home. The one in transition and even the one who points out 
the way to him, the teacher, i s . . .  on the way home to the essence that is 
most proper to him, He is the convalescent"30
Nietzsche therefore diagnoses the fundamental problem of 
modernity much as Heidegger does himself: the inauthentic relation to 
Being. How then can Heidegger accuse Nietzsche of being the culmination 
of metaphysics? Ultimately, Heidegger implies that Nietzsche's 
understanding of ontological alienation remains too deeply rooted in the 
philosophic tradition to make the leap ahead into clear understanding. 
Nietzsche has begun to grasp the truth, but it remains largely in the 
shadows, primarily because of his problematic and erroneous conception of 
time.
29 "What is being contested is decided in advance: power itself, which requires no aims. It 
is aim-less, just as the whole of beings is value-less. Such aimlessness pertains to the 
metaphysical essence of power. If one can speak of aim here at all, then the "aim" is the 
aimlessness of man's absolute dominance over the earth. The man of such dominance is the 
Over-man." Heidegger, Nietzsche IV: Nihilism , ed. David F. Krell; trans. Frank A. Capuzzi 
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1962), 82.
30 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 217.
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Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's Obermensch and the will-
to-power is far from clear. Even in Zarathustra, Nietzsche speaks sparingly
of the Obermensch, and even then in allegorical terms. However, what does
the Obermensch represent, if not the embodiment of the will-to-power?
Essentially, the Obermensch represents the human being who has been able
to conquer the transcendental nonsense that has been inculcated into
modem man. It is in this sense that die Obermensch is the meaning of the
earth, as it is solely based in the material and experiential Lebenswelt.
The Obermensch is the meaning of die earth. Let your will say: the 
Obermensch shall be the meaning of the earth! I entreat you, 
brothers, remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who 
speak to you of otherworldly hopes! They are poisoners, whether 
they realize it or not31
Accordingly, the Obermensch represents one who is strong enough to 
endure the great nausea without capitulating to the desire for 
transcendental solace. Indeed, the Obermensch actually desires the moment 
of the great nausea, as it is the only method open to the promise of self­
creation:
In truth, man is a polluted river. One must be a sea to receive this 
polluted river and not become defiled. Behold, I teach you the 
Obermensch he is this sea, in him your great contempt can go under. 
What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the
31 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3. Here we are dealing with a conception of the 
"earth" similar to the phenomenological conception of the "world." As such, the individual 
ObennenscHs Umwelt would constitute the meaning of the earth rather than the social 
matrix and pre-constructed meaning of das Mart
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great contempt The hour in which even your happiness becomes 
loathsome, and your reason and virtue as well. 32
This is not to say that the Obermensch is some sort of fixed goal or
predetermined set of psychological traits. "Man is a rope, fastened between
animal and Obermensch—a  rope over an abyss.. .What is great in man is
that he is a bridge and not a goal."33 The Obermensch is therefore not a
separate species or supernatural being. The Obermensch represents an
attitude towards existence, one that is able to endure the horror
meaninglessness of existence and continue to create.
Zarathustra does not see the Obermensch as some ontological
category or even as the embodiment of the will-to-power. In Nietzsche's
philosophy, all beings and objects are manifestations of the will-to-power,
"where I found a living creature, there I found will to power."34 Nietzsche's
concept of the Obermensch is much more concrete than Heidegger
interprets it  Zarathustra argues that the Obermensch lies with toe
individual self, waiting to be created:
Ah, you men, I see an image sleeping in the stone, toe image of my 
visions! Ah, that it must sleep in the hardest ugliest stone! Now my 
hammer rages fiercely against its prison. Fragments fly from toe 
stone: what is it to me? I will complete it  for a shadow came to me— 
toe most silent the lightest of all things came at once to me! The
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3. This is the calling for the great nausea and thus the 
separation from the herd.
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §4.
34 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
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beauty of die Obermensch came to me as a shadow. Ah, my brothers! 
What are the gods to me now!35
For Nietzsche, therefore, the concept of the Obermensch is actually 
anti-metaphysical. It is concrete, arising from die experiences of the 
individual, and actively opposed to the transcendence inherent in 
metaphysical thinking. Heidegger fundamentally misinterprets this concept 
by concentrating on an ontology that is simply not present in Nietzsche's 
thought, as will be further demonstrated.
m.
Heidegger attempts to bolster his metaphysical interpretation by
linking Nietzsche's conception of time as expressed in the eternal recurrence
to the temporality of traditional metaphysics. Indeed, the Heidegger argues
that the very manner in which Nietzsche has Zarathustra realize his
philosophical insights is the epitome of metaphysical thinking:
In die section 'On die Great Longing' Zarathustra speaks to his soul. 
According to Plato's teaching—a teaching that became definitive for 
Western metaphysics—the essence of thinking resides in the soul's 
solitary conversation with itself. The essence of thinking i s . . .  the 
telling-self-gathering which die soul itself undergoes on the way to 
itself, within the scope of whatever it is looking at36
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, II:Z
36 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 218. Heidegger cites Plato, Theaetetus 
189e; and The Sophist 263e. In Nietzsche's defense: "Is there anything worse, said 
Nietzsche, than to find oneself facing a German when one was expecting a Greek?" 
Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? 109.
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It is through this self-conversation that the essential nature of time is
revealed to Zarathustra. "In converse with his soul Zarathustra thinks his
'most abysmal thought"'37 This thought is the fundamental unity of the
three ekstases of time: past, present and future, in the "Moment"38 The
Moment is the conflation of time into an enduring yet constantly recurring
point of temporal existence. Therefore, the Moment is a seeming
contradiction: a moment of recurrence that is also a point of eternal
endurance. Taken metaphysically, this problematic assertion takes on an
almost mystic character
All three phases of time merge in a single identity, as the same in one 
single present, a perpetual "now." Metaphysics calls the constant 
now "eternity." Nietzsche too thinks the three phases of time in 
terms of eternity as the constant now. Yet for him the constancy 
consists not in stasis but in eternal recurrence of the same.39
However, Nietzsche could argue that his conception of time is not as
much of a concrete temporal theory as it is a therapeutic tool for redeeming
mankind from the fundamental cause of its estrangement revenge.
Heidegger acknowledges this possibility: "Nietzsche's thought thinks in the
direction of redemption from the spirit of revenge. His thinking would
37 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 218.
38 "In the end, Zarathustra hears which eternity it is that his animals are proclaiming to him, 
the eternity of the Moment that embraces everything in itself at once: the downgoing." 
Heidegger, Nietzsche H  59.
39 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 218.
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minister to a spirit which, as freedom from vengefulness, goes before all
mere fraternizing—but also before all vestiges of the sheer will to punish."40
If the moment is to be worthy of recurrence, it must be free from
revenge. Since revenge has dominated humanity's thought until now, this
is not a simple task. It requires the overcoming of the inauthentic nature of
man.41 This overcoming is complicated by Nietzsche's particular conception
of revenge. "If Nietzsche understands revenge as the spirit that defines and
sets the tone for man's relationship with Being, then he is from die outset
thinking revenge metaphysically."42
According to Heidegger, this metaphysical revenge is not grounded
in any reaction to concrete conditions or social relationships, it flows horn a
much deeper source. Heidegger argues that such an expansive concept of
revenge is also fundamentally metaphysical:
What is revenge? We can now provisionally say that revenge is 
persecution that defies and degrades. And such persecution is 
supposed to have sustained and permeated all prior reflection, all 
representation of beings? If the designated metaphysical scope may 
in fact be attributed to the spirit of revenge, that scope must 
somehow become visible in terms of the very constitution of 
metaphysics.43
40 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 219.
41 "That is what is peculiar to, and hardest to bear in, the doctrine of eternal return—to wit, 
that eternity is in the Moment, that the Moment is not the fleeting 'now,' not an instant of 
time whizzing by as a spectator, but the collision of future and past. Here the Moment 
comes to itself. It determines how everything recurs." Heidegger, N ietzsche II, 57.
42 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 221.
43 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 222.
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Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's revenge as that of resentment
towards time: "Nietzsche has Zarathustra say: 'This, yes, this alone is
revenge itself: the will's ill will toward time and its 'it was'."44 This is in
turn ill will towards human finitude and therefore death. Heidegger
implies that this spirit of revenge is contempt towards all that which is finite
and ephemeral, which is necessarily therefore everything human:
Revenge is the will's ill will toward time and that means toward 
passing away, transiency. Transiency is that against which the will 
can take no further steps, that against which its willing constantly 
collides. Time and its "It was" is the obstacle that the will cannot 
budge. Time, as passing away, is repulsive; the will suffers on 
account of it  Suffering in this way, the will itself becomes chronically 
ill over such passing away; the illness then wills its own passing, and 
in so doing will everything in the world be worthy of passing away. 
Ill will towards time degrades all that passes away.45
If man is to be redeemed from this ill will, it is necessary to overcome
this contempt for finitude. "Redemption releases the ill will from its 'no'
and frees it for a 'yes.' What does the 'yes' affirm? Precisely what the ill
will of a vengeful spirit renounced: time, transiency."46 It is necessary to
fully accept the truth of finitude, despite the psychological pain that will
surely result
44 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 223.
45 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 224-225. Heidegger is missing the point— 
the individual must acknowledge and accept finitude in order to progress beyond the need 
for metaphysical consolation.
46 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226.
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The mechanism by which this overcoming of resentment against time 
is to be accomplished is the realization of the eternal return of the same. 
"Redemption from revenge is transition from ill will towards time to die 
will that represents being in the eternal recurrence of the same. Here die 
will becomes the advocate of the drcle."47
Heidegger identifies several problems with Nietzsche's advocacy of 
the eternal recurrence which fundamentally link it with metaphysics. First, 
Nietzsche's use of w ill in this context strikes Heidegger as overtly 
transcendental:
Nietzsche says that revenge is the will's ill will. But w ill signifies the 
Being of beings as a whole, and not simply human willing. By virtue 
of the characterization of revenge as 'the will's ill w ill/ the defiant 
persecution of revenge persists primarily in relationship to the Being 
of beings.48
It follows that since the revenge that must be overcome is 
ontological—transcendental; the will that responds must be the quasi-mystic 
"will" that Nietzsche supposedly inherits from Schopenhauer and Hegel.49
47 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226. "As for Nietzsche, he does not want to 
instill perfect comprehension by means of the few, cryptic things he says about his doctrine 
of eternal return. Rather, he wants to pave the way for the transformation of that 
fundamental attunement by which alone his doctrine can be comprehensible and effective. 
What he hopes for his contemporaries is that they become fathers and forefathers of those 
who surely must come." Heideggpr, Nietzsche H, 17.
48 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 223. For Nietzsche there is no willing 
besides human willing! Heidegger fundamentally misses Nietzsche's point about the 
essential concreteness of the politics of ressentim ent, which is a self-replicating system of 
mutually-supportive societal mechanisms.
49 Heidegger ignores the feet that Nietzsche explicitly refutes Schopenhauer's pessimistic 
philosophy o f will and the Hegelian dialectic.
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Heidegger bolsters this supposed parallel by emphasizing the temporal 
understanding of metaphysics that is joined to this particular ontological 
connotation of will. "Passing away and transiency must recur in that 
coming as the same. And such recurrence itself is perdurant only if it is 
eternal. According to the doctrine of metaphysics, die predicate 'eternity' 
belongs to the Being of beings."50
The eternal recurrence is thus doubly metaphysical, both in terms of 
the will driving it to a particular configuration and the confluence of 
metaphysical temporality sustaining die recurrence. Again, Heidegger 
portrays Zarathustra as messianic in tone by advocating this particular 
ontological scheme: "Only when the Being of beings represents itself to man 
as eternal recurrence of the same can man cross over the bridge and, 
redeemed from the spirit of revenge, be the one in transition, the 
overman."51
It is through the joining of the "will" expressed in the Obennensch 
and the perpetual becoming of the eternal recurrence that Platonic 
metaphysics is fulfilled.52
50 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226.
51 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226.
52 "'Recurrence' thinks the peraumentizing of what becomes, thinks it to the point where 
the becoming o i what becomes is secured in the duration o f its  becoming. The'eternal' 
thinks the permanentizing of such constancy in the direction of its ending back into itself 
and forward towards itself." Heidegger, Nietzsche W  164*165.
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As the teacher of eternal recurrence and die overman, Zarathustra 
does not teach two different things. What he teaches coheres in itself, 
since one demands die other as its response. Such correspondence— 
in the way it essentially unfolds and die way it withdraws—is 
precisely what the figure of Zarathustra conceals in itself, conceals yet 
at the same time displays, thus allowing the correspondence to 
provoke our thought Yet the teacher knows that what he is teaching 
remains a vision and a riddle. He perseveres in such reflective 
knowledge.53
Again, Heidegger portrays Zarathustra as a teacher of mystical
knowledge that can only be apprehended in part, and then only through the
revelation of Being through the confluence of "will" and "recurrence."
Indeed, the circular and interdependent structure underlying Nietzsche's
philosophy points to its innate connection to traditional metaphysics:
These doctrines are conjoined in a circle. In its circling, the teaching 
corresponds to that which is—to the circle which as eternal 
recurrence of die same makes out the Being of beings, that is, what is 
permanent in Becoming.54
Nietzsche is thus able to obtain a partial insight into the fundamental
problems of ontology. However, his underlying connection to the
temporality of metaphysics ultimately causes the failure of his project
Within the infinite temporal horizon of metaphysical thinking, it is
impossible to obtain freedom from revenge:
What is left to say, if not this: Zarathustra's doctrine does not bring 
redemption from revenge? We do say i t . . .  But we say it in order to
53 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226-227.
54 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 228.
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turn our attention to the fact that—and die extent to which—
Nietzsche's thought is too animated by die spirit of prior reflection.55
Heidegger thus concludes that Nietzsche remains mired in the 
metaphysical abyss that he claims to be reacting against That this failure to 
break free of metaphysics occurs in Nietzsche's most radically different 
work, employing a narrative framework in explicit rejection of traditional 
philosophical forms, is doubly damning. If Nietzsche is indeed unable to 
break free of metaphysical thinking, which he categorically rejects, 
Heidegger is able to then support his position as the first post­
metaphysician. However, this conclusion is based upon a very narrow 
reading of Nietzsche bordering on misinterpretation, as will be 
demonstrated below.
However, Heidegger's entire analysis of the implications of the 
eternal recurrence is only tenable if one takes for granted that Nietzsche 
actually intended the eternal recurrence to be taken seriously as a 
cosmological doctrine. "Ill will" towards time is a characteristic of a specific 
mode of human existence: mass society. In Nietzsche's analysis, revenge 
towards time is the epitome of ressentim ent. The individual, enmeshed in 
historical and social circumstances, may well resent his place in this order.56
55 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 229.
56 This argument is extensively explored in The Genealogy o f M orality. In addition, 
Nietzsche warns against the "tyranny of history" in his early essay "The Uses and Abuses 
of History."
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Repressive morality has cultivated this existential self-hatred while
depriving the individual of the means to liberate himself:
To be sure, there are sour apples whose fate is to wait until the last 
day of autumn: and they become at the same time ripe, yellow, and
shriveled Many a man never becomes, sweet, he rots even in the
summer. It is cowardice that keeps him fastened to his branch.57
This pathetic creature is identified by Nietzsche as die Ultimate Man.
"The time of the most contemptible man is coming, die man who can no
longer despise himself. Behold! I shall show you the Ultim ate Man."** The
Ultimate Man is the individual manifestation of mass society, unable to even
conceive of himself as an individual outside of his societal context This
individual is a socially-created historical being, truly suffering from the
tyranny of history and revenge against time.
Willing liberates: but what is it that fastens in fetters even the 
liberator? "It was": that is what the will's teeth-gnashing and most 
lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been 
done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past The will cannot 
will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire—that is 
the will's most lonely affliction.59
How, then, does Nietzsche propose to free is from this revenge? 
Heidegger argues that Nietzsche cannot because of his flawed temporality. 
Perhaps the answer lies in Nietzsche's intention—he does not argue that it is
57 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5. D erLetzteM enschis often translated as the "Last 
Man."
59 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:20.
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necessary to completely overcome the revenge against time. Indeed, die 
definition of the Ultimate Man cited above is one that can no longer despise 
oneself, i.e. capitulation to revenge against time. It is the desire to make 
oneself worthy of recurring eternally that drives the project of self-creation 
in Zarathustra. This is epitomized in one of the most misquoted passages 
from Zarathustra: "Many die too late and some die too early. Still the 
doctrine sounds strange: 'Die and the right time.'"60
The attitude of the eternal recurrence is not a capitulation to the need 
for consolation in the face of death. Rather, it is a method of coping with the 
contingency of existence and the realization of finitude. As such, the 
concept of the eternal recurrence represents a much more drastic departure 
from metaphysical temporality than Heidegger is willing to admit Indeed, 
the eternal recurrence is a call for the individual to use time as a foil— 
revenge cannot be overcome, but it can be turned to one's advantage. "O my 
soul, I taught you the great contempt that comes not as the gnawing of a 
worm, the great loving contempt which loves most where it despises 
most"61 Thus contempt brought about by ill will against time can lead to 
the great nausea and the possibility of self-creation.
60 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
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IV.
As argued above, Heidegger's interpretation ultimately rests upon 
construing Nietzsche's ontology as metaphysical Primarily, Heidegger 
attempts to demonstrate that Nietzsche's conception of revenge is 
essentially ontological, rather than concrete or even existential However, 
Heidegger's discussion of the relation of beings to Being is especially 
problematic considering Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics.
The most fundamental problem with Heidegger's interpretation is his 
reading of Nietzsche's "ontology of man." In Heidegger's analysis of 
Zarathustra this takes the form of Heidegger's characterization of human 
will. Heidegger identifies Nietzsche's concept of the will-to-power with 
transcendental ontology. "Here the word willing names the Being of beings 
as a whole. Such Being is will. . .  Nietzsche is thinking the selfsame thing 
when he acknowledges the primal Being of beings as power."62
Heidegger's interpretation of the will-to-power as the primal Being of 
beings extends beyond the subjective will.63 Heidegger completes an 
analysis of Nietzsche's concept of the will-to-power connecting the
61 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IILT4.
62 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 223.
63 "Nietzsche interprets the Being of Beings as will to power. Art he considers the supreme 
configuration of will to power. The proper essence of art is exemplified in the grand style. 
But the latter, because of its own essential unity, points to an original concrescive unity of 
the active and reactive, of Being and Becoming." Heidegger. Nietzsche 1,135-136.
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individual will to the "will" that Heidegger contends lurks behind the
phenomenal world. In this manner, human will is actually a component of
die substrate of primal existence:
In modem metaphysics, there for die first time appears expressly and 
explicitly, the Being of beings appears as will. Man is man insofar as 
he comports himself to beings by way of thought In this way he is 
held in Being. Man's thinking must also correspond in its essence to 
that toward which it comports itself, to w it the Being of beings as 
will.64
Thus, Heidegger connects the will-to-power to his own ontology at
the expense of Nietzsche's philosophy. According to Heidegger,
Nietzsche's concept of will is flawed as it does not explicidy accept a
connection to the "Being of beings" of which it is a part In this sense,
Nietzsche's thinking is im plicitly metaphysical—it may deny an ontological
connection between beings but it nevertheless relies upon this mistaken
distinction in order to support its own ontology:
Metaphysical thinking rests on die distinction between what truly is 
and what measured against this, constitutes all that is not truly in 
being. However, what is decisive for die essence of metaphysics is by 
no means the fact that the designated distinction is formulated as the 
opposition to the suprasensuous to the sensuous realm, but die fact 
that this distinction—in the sense of a yawning gulf between the 
realms—remains primary and all-sustaining.65
hi order to sustain this interpretation, Heidegger must bolster his
contention that there is in fact an "essence" of human existence and that it is
64 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 223.
65 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 230.
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indeed connected to a larger ontological context This is no small feat as 
Heidegger himself acknowledges: "On what basis do Being and die essence 
of human being belong together? How do they cohere/ if Being is no 
fabrication of human beings and humanity no mere special case among 
beings?"66
Can the coherence of Being and the essence of human being be 
discussed at all, as long as our thinking remains mired in the 
previous conception of man? According to it  man is animal 
rationale, the rational animal. Is it coincidence, or a bit of lyrical 
ornamentation, that die two animals, eagle and serpent accompany 
Zarathustra; that theyXsXL him who he must become, in order to he 
the one that he is?67
It is in the discussion of the symbol of die animals that Heidegger 
reveals that he has fundamentally misread Zarathustra and is therefore 
largely incorrect in his interpretation of Nietzsche. Much of Heidegger's 
analysis of Nietzsche has centered upon the symbols of the animals, who 
within the narrative of Zarathustra reveal most of the innate truths about 
existence to Zarathustra. Heidegger interprets this as the revelation of Being 
to Zarathustra, as these pronouncements come from a source outside of 
Zarathustra's concrete experience or philosophical interrogation. Again, the 
connection between die two doctrines is critical:
66 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 231. Here Heidegger has exposed a 
central assumption that is the weakness of his philosophy and interpretation of Nietzsche. 
According to Nietzsche, the idea of essence and Being are assumptions that have arisen 
from the need of logical discourse.
67 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 231.
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The riddle of who Zarathustra is, as teacher of eternal return and 
overman, is envisaged by us in the spectacle of the two animals. In 
this spectacle we can grasp more directly and more readily what our 
presentation tried to exhibit as the matter most worthy of question, 
namely, the relation of Being to that living being, man.68
According to Heidegger, the two animals represent different facets of
Zarathustra's teaching and in turn different facets of existence. Because the
two animals are always presented together in the narrative, Heidegger is
able to argue that they represent two indivisible aspects of the same
teaching. What, however, do these symbols mean? These symbols are
essentially indefinable by conventional philosophical terms, they are poetic
symbols representing the creative energy of Zarathustra.69 Nevertheless,
Heidegger argues the symbol of the animals point to constituent elements of
Zarathustra's ontology.
Heidegger identifies the symbol of the eagle as analogous to the
concept of the Obermensch. The eagle, which Zarathustra hails as
representative of pride, represents the spirit of the person who stands
against the tide of fate to shape his own destiny.70 The analysis of the
68 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 232.
69 "Zarathustra's animals are all the more implacable inasmuch as we hear them—not 
expressing certain propositions or rules or admonitions-but saying from out of their 
essential natures what is essential, and saying it with growing lucidity through the palpable 
presence of sensuous imagery. Sense-images speak only to those who possess the 
constructive energy to give them shape, so that they make sense. As soon as the poetic 
force—that is, the higher constructive energy—wanes, the emblems turn mute. They 
petrify, become sheer 'facade' and 'ornament'". Heidegger, Nietzsche II, 48.
70 "The eagle is the proudest animal. Pride is the fully developed resolution of one who 
maintains himself at the level of his own essential rank, a rank to which his task appoints
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symbol of the serpent reveals an identification with the concept of die
eternal recurrence.71 Zarathustra identifies the serpent with wisdom,
implying that wisdom borne of experience leads to the realization of the
eternal recurrence. These two symbols therefore signify two essential traits:
pride and wisdom.
According to Heidegger, die symbol of the eagle further represents
the "human essence" while the symbol of the serpent represents the
ontological substrate:
Essential to the figure of Zarathustra remains the fact that the teacher 
teaches something twofold which coheres in itself: eternal return and
overman "Eternal return of the same" is the name for the Being
of beings. "Overman" is the name for the human essence that 
corresponds to such being.72
Thus, the two symbols, and the two doctrines that correspond to 
them, are actually representative of the authentic ontological condition. 
Why, then, does Heidegger critique Nietzsche's philosophy as
him. Pride is the assurance of one who no longer confuses himself with anyone else. Pride 
is poised above, is defined by heights and elevation; yet it is essentially different from 
arrogance and superciliousness. The latter remain in need of a relationship with what is 
beneath them; they have to set themselves in relief against it and this they remain 
necessarily dependant upon it  For they possess nothing that would inherently enable them 
to imagine themselves in elevation." Heidegger, Nietzsche D, 46.
71 "The serpent is the most discerning animal. Discernment suggests the mastery of actual 
knowledge concerning the sundry ways in which knowing announces itself, holds itself in 
reserve, asserts itself and yet remains flexible, avoiding its own pitfalls. Proper to such 
discernment are the power to metamorphose and to disguise oneself—a power that cannot 
be reduced to vulgar falsehood—and the mastery of masks. Discernment does not betray 
itself. It haunts the background while playing in the foreground; it wields power over the 
play of Being and semblance." Heidegger, N ietzsche D, 47.
72 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 231.
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metaphysical? Beyond die objections to Nietzsche's temporality analyzed
above, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche fails to recognize the extent of the
ontological link between the two concepts of the Obermensch and die
eternal recurrence.
Heidegger's interpretation of the symbol of the animals is central to
his entire analysis, but it is based upon a questionable presupposition.
Heidegger's interpretation of the animals has them speaking to Zarathustra
as outside influences, presumably the revealing of Being. However, it is
more in keeping to argue that the symbol of the animals represent
constituent elements of Zarathustra's own consciousness. The animals only
appear to Zarathustra when he is in solitude or in his cave. They coax him
to the realization of things he already knows, but has been drowned out by
his interactions with others. Heidegger does not speak to this possibility, no
matter how strongly it is implied by the text
Heidegger further argues that the principal reason Nietzsche foils to
fully comprehend the innate link between these concepts is that both of the
animal symbols correspond to the Dionysian mode of existence rather than
the more analytical and rational mode of die Apollonian. This reliance on
solely poetic symbols is symptomatic of die metaphysics inherent in
Nietzsche's philosophy. According to Heidegger, this is no mere accident
That Nietzsche interpreted and experienced his most abysmal 
thought in terms of the Dionysian only speaks for die fact that he still 
thought it metaphysically, and had to think i t  solely in  this way. Yet
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it says nothing against the fact that this most abysmal thought 
conceals something unthought, something which at the same time 
remains a sealed door to metaphysical thinking.73
Here is the paradigmatic occurrence of Heidegger's analysis of the
"unthought" The unthought Heidegger finds lurking behind Nietzsche's
philosophy is the metaphysical belief in transcendence, however specially
denied by Nietzsche. In this instance, the transcendent element in
Nietzsche's thought is exacerbated by his failure to recognize the essential
unity of the will-to-power and the ontological relationships Heidegger
identifies.
It is in this light that Heidegger constantly criticizes Nietzsche's 
conception of the will-to-power is existential rather than ontological.74 It is 
this fundamental criticism, which includes the problems of temporality, that 
forms the root of Heidegger's critique. Paradoxically, Heidegger criticizes 
Nietzsche for failing to realize the essential character of the will-to-power as 
an ontological doctrine; while at the same time elaborating an ontological
73 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 233. Italics mine. It is difficult to 
characterize Nietzsche's treatment of these, as use of these ideal types changes. The 
Dionysian and the Apollonian are ideal types, both are valid strategies for becoming.
74 "Will to power is the essence of power itself.. . .  Will does not hover beyond power; it is 
rather the empowering command within the essence of power to exercise power. The 
metaphysical determination of Being as will to power remains unthought in its decisive 
import. . .  to think Being, the beingness of beings, as will to power means to conceive of 
Being as the unleashing if power to its essence; the unleashing transpires in such a way that 
unconditionally empowering power posits the exclusive preeminence of beings over 
Being." Heidegger, Nietzsche III: The W ill to Power as Knowledge and as M etaphysics, 
trans. Joan Stambaugh, David F. KnD, and Frank Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 
1987), 164.
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theory strikingly similar to Nietzsche's existential analysis. Both are 
fundamentally concerned with rescuing die individual from repressive 
societal mechanisms, through the realization and confrontation with the 
fundamental truth of finitude.
Heidegger argues that in failing to recognize that there is an actual 
"essence" of human existence, Nietzsche has opened die door to that which 
he decries most Nietzsche's deficient existential conception of the Being of 
beings as the will-to-power actually leads to nihilism, die "forgetting of 
Being."75 For Nietzsche, this is a pleasant prospect Heidegger's ontological 
scheme, which leads to the concept of "destiny" and Volksgeist, is nothing 
more than a repackaging of the mystic transcendence found in religious and 
metaphysical modes.
Indeed, the abandonment of ontology is exactly what Nietzsche 
prescribes for philosophy. Ontological schemes of the type Heidegger 
advances lead to a static perception of reality. Nietzsche's conception of the 
universe as the manifestation of the will-to-power is designed to overcome 
the being/Being relationship inherent in traditional philosophy, including 
Heidegger. The ontology espoused by Heidegger leads to the further 
entrenchment of the Descartean subject/object distinction, specifically 
rejected by the presuppositions of phenomenological thought.
75 "The essence of nihilism proper is Being itself in default of its unconcealment, which is as 
its own 'It', and which determines its 'is' in staying away." Heidegger, N ietzsche IV, 7\h.
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It is in this spirit that Heidegger is the type of philosopher that 
Nietzsche is reacting against Heidegger chastises Nietzsche for failing to 
overcome metaphysics while at the same time setting up a quasi-mystical 
ontology to replace the metaphysical myths of transcendence. Heidegger 
thus falls into the trap of previous philosophers: they become dogmatists. 
"You have served the people and the people's superstitions, all you famous 
philosophers!—you have not served truth!"76
Nietzsche has no lack of venom for career philosophers such as 
Heidegger. According to Nietzsche, such philosophers will always be 
compromised by the need of their work to conform to accepted standards. 
"The genuine man, the free spirits, have always dwelt in the desert; as the 
lords of the desert; but in the towns dwell the well-fed famous 
philosophers—the draught animals. For they always, as asses, pull-the 
people's cart!"77 This leads to the failure to address the really hard 
questions of philosophy, especially the type that leads to the collapse of 
accepted worldviews. Rather than grappling with the meaninglessness of 
existence, philosophy turns towards the endless repackaging of the same 
concepts and doctrines. "To all of these lauded wise men of the academic
76 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:8.
77 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL8.
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chairs, wisdom meant sleep without dreams: they knew no better meaning 
of life"78
Nietzsche therefore argues that philosophical knowledge is
exceptionally difficult to come by, especially ontological knowledge. This
difficulty has led to the creation of disingenuous shortcuts common to
metaphysical philosophy:
It was suffering and impotence—that created all afterworlds; and that 
brief madness of happiness that only the greatest sufferer 
experiences. Weariness, which wants to reach the Ultimate with a 
single leap, with a death-leap, a poor ignorant weariness, which no 
longer desires even to desire: that created all gods and afterworlds.79
For Nietzsche, metaphysics is therefore a symptom of philosophical
Dekadenz. Seeking a fundamental ontology is not problematic perse, but
Heidegger tends to objectify ontological terms in a manner that comes very
close to metaphysical transcendence. Nietzsche argues that there is no
existence beyond that of human experience, and therefore it is necessary to
interpret ontology as essentially a human construct "But that 'other world',
that inhuman, dehumanized world which is a heavenly Nothing, is well
hidden from men; and the belly of being does not speak to man, except as
man."80
78 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:2.
79 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
80 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
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Much as Heidegger argues at the beginning of Being and Time, it is
necessary to interrogate human existence in order to gain understanding of
the nature of Being. This is, of course, a difficult task: "Truly, all being is
hard to demonstrate; it is hard to make it speak. Yet tell me, brothers, is not
the most wonderful of all things most clearly demonstrated?"81 The
narrative of Zarathustra is partially aimed at the interrogation of this Being,
with the conclusion that all existence is concrete and centered within the
human consciousness.
Nietzsche completes this interrogation, with the following results:
Yes, this Ego, with its contradiction and confusion, speaks most 
honestly of its being—this creating, willing, evaluating Ego, which is 
the measure and value of tilings. And this most honest being, the 
Ego—it speaks of the body, and insists upon the body, even when it 
fables and fabricates and flutters with broken wings. Ever more 
honestly it learns to speak, the Ego: and the more it learns, the more it 
finds titles and honors for the body and the earth.82
Therefore, when the self is interrogated, it reveals its immanent
constitution, the concrete, physical Being of consciousness. This Being is not
revealed to the Ego, the Ego seeks this knowledge within itself. By
constructing his argument on the passive reception of this knowledge
through the revelation of Being, Heidegger has set up his fundamental
ontology as a meta-object separate from the human consciousness, and
therefore produces a metaphysical construct
n Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
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Heidegger can only sustain his critique of Nietzsche as a 
metaphysician by concretizing Nietzsche's rhetorical concepts to die point of 
exaggeration. Rather than as an interpretive scheme, Heidegger asserts that 
the will-to-power represents die "Being of beings." Rather than as an 
instructive concept, Heidegger argues that the Obennensch represents the 
"essence of man." Finally, Heidegger represents the eternal recurrence as 
die revelation of the Being of beings to the individual. The 
misunderstanding of these concepts renders Heidegger's interpretation of 
Nietzsche's philosophy untenable.
The answer to Heidegger's question, "Who is Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra," has indeed proven difficult to answer. He is not, however, 
merely the teacher of regurgitated metaphysics. Zarathustra's teaching is 
instead a profoundly anti-metaphysical philosophy of immanent action 
within the lebenswelt, with no hope of help from Beyond.
82 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 13.
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